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Continuity and Change in German Social Structure 
Erwin K. Scheuch* 
Germany: An Enigma? 
U n c e r t a i n Knowledge and Defini te Beliefs 
D u r i n g the last two decades , G e r m a n y has been one of the most fre-
quent ly s tudied societies. Yet the re is less ag reemen t a m o n g social resear-
chers today than earl ier about t he p r e s u m e d character is t ics of G e r m a n y 
(1). No recent social science t rea t ise has t he au tho r i ty of Lowie 's The Ger-
man People, wh ich dealt wi th pre-World War I social s t ruc ture (2). Empi-
rical r esea rchers a re m o r e and m o r e p r o m p t e d to confess l imi t a t ions to 
the i r knowledge . At the s a m e t ime , however , a great m a n y peop le in a 
great m a n y coun t r i e s hold very s t rong beliefs abou t wha t they cons ider to 
be the u n i q u e features of G e r m a n y . T h e r e is a p l e tho ra of b o o k s and 
art icles on c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n y , and in the fall of 1964, in o n e of those 
r ecu r ren t burs t s of interest , t h e Federa l Repub l i c b e c a m e a favori te topic 
of m o r e or less intel lectual magaz ines (3). 
On the one h a n d , then , we observe a widespread cer ta in ty tha t G e r m a n y 
is not mere ly a n o t h e r indus t r ia l society, tha t i t has (most ly d i s tu rb ing) 
features set t ing i t apar t as a social system. On the o ther h a n d , t h e r e are 
relat ively few a t t e m p t s to exp lo re t he subject systematical ly. Th i s pa radox 
is a symptom tha t in itself is in need of exp lana t ion . 
Despi te t h e v o l u m e of pub l i ca t ions on pos twar G e r m a n y , the interest 
displayed has been highly selective. W h a t the wor ld usually wan ted to 
k n o w abou t G e r m a n y was h o w Naz ism was possible, o r—wi th t he benefi t 
of h i n d s i g h t — w h y it was inevi tab le , and w h e t h e r i t was l ikely to recur in 
one form or ano the r . Some of t he theor ies abou t t h e causes of Naz i sm 
gained wide acceptance , and accordingly those aspects of the G e r m a n so-
cial s t ruc tu re tha t were bel ieved to be respons ib le for Nazism (or, m o r e 
general ly , for the fai lure of democracy) received a t t en t ion . As features that 
a re p r e s u m a b l y character is t ic for G e r m a n society, sociologists and psycho-
logists t ended to single out a rigid class system, an au tho r i t a r i an family 
system, and a dis t inct ive » m o d a l pe r sona l i ty« p lus a pa r t i cu la r va lue sy-
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stem (4). H i s to r i ans and polit ical scientists, on the o the r h a n d , concentra-
ted on t h e effects of polit ical ins t i tu t ions and on the s t ruc ture and the 
va lue system of t he elite (5). D e p e n d i n g on the observer ' s theor ies of hi-
storical causa t ion , any one of these aspects could be t rea ted as an expla-
na t ion of G e r m a n y as an a n o m a l o u s case of an indust r ia l society (6). 
A close look at the t h e m e s of such wri t ings shows that it is not G e r m a n y 
as a case of an industr ia l society which social scientists try to ana lyze ; 
r a the r , they p u r p o r t to see a nat ion-s ta te of possibily u n i q u e and definitely 
undes i r ab l e features. Consequent ly , in t rea t ing present-day G e r m a n y it is 
less t he d r ama t i c changes in th is society by itself that c o m m a n d interest 
t h a n it is the quest ion of w h e t h e r all this change leaves una l t e red the 
causes for earl ier dangerous political deve lopments (7). Fo r very good rea-
sons, G e r m a n y does not present itself as an object of sociological or social 
psychological invest igat ions ana logous to Bri tain or F r a n c e or Italy, but 
un fo r tuna te ly this also leads to r e m a r k a b l e n a r r o w i n g of focus when de-
f ining the scope of analysis. 
React ion to such p h e n o m e n a as Nazism or G e r m a n imper i a l i sm, or an 
ant i -Semit ism of unpara l l e led violence accounts for only a par t of th is 
selective a t t en t ion . T h e r e is in addi t ion to these political p h e n o m e n a — a n d 
intensif ied by t h e m - - a cer ta in t rad i t ion of G e r m a n o p h o b i a a m o n g We-
stern inte l lectuals . Social scientists in Western democrac ies are not im-
m u n e to th is G e r m a n o p h o b i a . Qui te the cont ra ry . Some t imes th is Ger-
m a n o p h o b i a comes close to be ing simply racist, m o r e f requent ly it is a 
consequence of a recur r ing historical pa t te rn : wheneve r G e r m a n y was 
conf ron ted with a real test s i tuat ion which left it some choice , she tended 
to opt for an t i -democra t ic solut ions (8). In G e r m a n y , t he Boulangers or 
M c C a r t h y s r e m a i n e d no t a m e r e threat but often a t ta ined polit ical domi-
n a n c e . Such dicta as » G e r m a n y is at your feet or at your t h r o a t « ( C h u r -
chil l) refer to an emot iona l reality. T h u s G e r m a n y has served and conti-
nues to serve for m a n y intel lectuals as a symbol of t he forces that are 
host i le to a l iberal , free, and h u m a n e society—a sen t iment tha t is shared by 
qui te a few G e r m a n intel lectuals (9). Obviously, th is does no t con t r i bu t e to 
a de tached assessment . 
No t ions about the un iqueness of G e r m a n y may persist longer with in-
tel lectuals than wi th o ther people . Surveys of a t t i tudes toward G e r m a n s do 
indeed show that these beliefs have changed in western count r ies : such 
fo rmer ly used a t t r ibutes as »crue l« are now out of use (10). Howeve r , 
s tereotypes about G e r m a n y are still bet ter »organ ized« in the West t h a n is 
t r ue of no t i ons about most o ther peoples with the except ion of such distant 
n a t i o n s as Japan and Ch ina . A good indicator for the »o rgan i za t i on« of 
such a na t iona l s tereotype is the f inding that in open-ended ques t ions a 
smal le r n u m b e r of words suffices to account for the percept ion of Ger-
m a n s t h a n is t rue , e.g., for A m e r i c a n s or F r e n c h . 
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Typical for the present s tereotype abou t G e r m a n s in Western E u r o p e 
and the U.S . are such a t t r ibutes as h a r d - w o r k i n g (effective work ing -hour s 
in G e r m a n y are a m o n g the lowest in Eu ro p e ) , discipl ined (traffic viola-
t ions and c r i m e rates are h igh) , scientific ( the share of s tudents in engi-
nee r ing and na tura l sciences is r a the r low) , consc ient ious , aggressive, boi-
s terous , stiff, obed ien t ; largely lacking a re n o w such a t t r ibutes as nat io-
nalis t ic , a r rogan t and mil i tar is t ic . Th i s list of a t t r ibutes would p r e sumab ly 
be different and m u c h less fr iendly were c o m p a r a b l e data avai lable from 
Eastern E u r o p e a n count r ies . Fo r Western Europe , however , the present 
s tereotype is a sort of simplif ied a n d unf r i end ly version of s tereotypes 
about t he Bri t ish. 
A m o n g inte l lectuals in Western coun t r i e s , t he s tereotype is, of course , 
m o r e var ied , and inc ludes the compl ica t ing no t ion that G e r m a n y is a uni-
quely complex and unpred ic t ab le society. Indeed , no t ions about G e r m a n y 
and the G e r m a n s have f luctuated m o r e t h a n i s t rue for beliefs about most 
o ther coun t r i es . T h e emphas i s of H e n r y A d a m s and M a d a m e de Stael on 
the p r e s u m a b l y e a s y g o i n g and reflective n a t u r e of G e r m a n s as against 
He in r i ch Heine ' s , Lord Acton 's , o r G e o r g e C lemenceau ' s emphas i s on the 
thought less energy and self-negation of G e r m a n s before the d e m a n d s of 
au thor i t i e s signify an unusua l d ivergency of op in ion , par t ly reflecting t h e 
differing political organisa t ions of t he very s ame G e r m a n society. A re-
cu r ren t t h e m e in the analysis of G e r m a n y by Western inte l lectuals has 
been the thesis of the two G e r m a n i e s : a peaceful , h u m a n e , and cul t ivated 
G e r m a n y ; and a cruel aggressor that rules despotical ly w h e t h e r at h o m e or 
as an occupa t ion power . In t he 19th cen tu ry Ernest Renan observed an 
uneasy coexis tence be tween the cu l t iva t ion of l ea rn ing and the ado ra t ion 
of power . T h e r e is no t m u c h use in now t ry ing to weigh the relat ive t r u t h 
of conf l ic t ing al legat ions by va r ious observers or to confront p o p u l a r ste-
reotypes about G e r m a n y with t h e results of research on the same p h e n o -
m e n a . T h e analyses of intel l igent observers do not refer to pure ly imagi-
na ry p h e n o m e n a , and even p o p u l a r s tereotypes often have some r e m o t e 
re l a t ionsh ip to real differences be tween social g roups (11). 
I t h ink tha t t he usual app roach if exp la in ing a na t ion or a na t iona l 
charac te r is itself ill-advised: to start wi th t he concre te political form of a 
society, t hen to infer from this t he s t ruc tu re of a society, and finally to use 
th is inferred s t ruc tu re to explain the poli t ical mani fes ta t ions at a part icu-
lar m o m e n t as a necessary consequence . I t should be obvious that not all 
aspects of a par t icu lar social s t ruc ture are expressed at a given m o m e n t , 
and the political and social p h e n o m e n a that h a p p e n to be in te rna t iona l ly 
visible at a pa r t i cu la r t ime do not cons t i tu te a count ry ' s total social struc-
tu re . F u r t h e r m o r e , the features that wr i te rs on na t iona l charac te r t ake as 
the i r po in t s of d e p a r t u r e are usually d e t e r m i n e d by the interests of t he 
observer ' s h o m e cons t i tuency. 
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In Search of an In tegra ted Social S t ruc ture 
G e r m a n y is a society apa r t—th i s is b o t h the conven t iona l wisdom and a 
widely shared a t t i tude a m o n g social scientists. However , a m o r e systematic 
analysis of any m o d e r n , indust r ia l ized society must always lead to the con-
clus ion: the respect ive society is b o t h un ique and a var ia t ion on a c o m m o n 
t h e m e ; w h e t h e r one or the o the r aspect i s stressed depends main ly on the 
poli t ical out look at a par t icu lar t ime and on the s tandards of compar i son . 
Even aside from this cons idera t ion , G e r m a n y r ema ins a society apar t : i t is 
no t even obv ious w h e t h e r the re is such a th ing as one G e r m a n society. 
A r e pre-World War I G e r m a n y , Weimar G e r m a n y , Naz i G e r m a n y , the 
p resen t Federa l Republ ic , and East G e r m a n y all one society? A n u m b e r of 
observers now ma in t a in that East G e r m a n y and West G e r m a n y have de-
veloped in to two different social systems (12). However , i t is implaus ib le to 
t reat a social system as be ing so fragile that we mus t th ink of a rapid 
succession of societies all called G e r m a n on the s ame terr i tory . Indeed , 
w h a t e v e r social science knowledge we possess about the last four decades 
does show con t inu i ty for most aspects of social s t ruc ture . In ou tward ap-
pea rances and political o rgan iza t ion , to be sure, the changes are drast ic . 
But in p r inc ip le th is is no th ing pecul ia r to G e r m a n society: a less drast ic , 
yet still qu i te d r ama t i c , succession of different political systems can be 
observed for F rance , wi thou t foreign observers doub t ing the con t inu i ty of 
a F r e n c h social s t ruc tu re . A m e r i c a n social scientists have been condi t ioned 
by the i r own na t iona l his tory to t h ink tha t only one political system (de-
mocracy or c o m m u n i s m ) fits a par t icu la r society ( the U.S.A. or Russia) 
(13). G i v e n the charac te r of A m e r i c a as the »first new na t ion ,« the present 
form of democracy is seen a necessary consequence (14). G iven the relat ive 
con t inu i ty of poli t ical systems in Anglo-Saxon count r ies , t he no t ion of only 
one type of stable re la t ion be tween a social system and a system of govern-
m e n t does indeed no t conflict wi th actual exper ience . T h e r e is, however , 
such a conflict be tween theory and f i r s t h a n d exper ience for Con t inen ta l 
societies wi th the i r t u rbu len t recent political his tory. I t should not be as-
s u m e d tha t social systems are as short-l ived as the i r successive forms of 
g o v e r n m e n t . 
T h e s a m e social system may pe rmi t in the shor t run (of several decades) 
several types of poli t ies: such an as sumpt ion fits m u c h be t te r the recent 
expe r i ence of Con t inen ta l nat ion-s ta tes . T h u s we observe for G e r m a n y as 
t he most e x t r e m e case of changing systems of g o v e r n m e n t at the same t i m e 
a re la t ive stabili ty of basic social a t t i tudes (e.g., an »an t i -democra t ic« pes-
s imism abou t h u m a n conduc t ) together with a rapid accommoda t ion to 
democra t i c f o rms of par t ic ipa t ion in the poli ty (15). Such s ta tements as 
» G e r m a n society is basically u n c h a n g e d , so tha t the factors which produ-
ced Naz i sm are still p resen t« and » G e r m a n s have accommoda ted to t he 
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democra t i c form of g o v e r n m e n t , for at the pol ls they have regular ly rejec-
ted na t iona l i s t ic par t i es« do no t cancel each o ther . T h e r e is some t ru th to 
b o t h asser t ions , and they need no t to be u n d e r s t o o d as con t rad ic to ry . T h e 
»basical ly« u n c h a n g e d society now h a r b o r s a r e m a r k a b l y stable democra-
tic system of g o v e r n m e n t . With o v e r w h e l m i n g major i t i es , voters reject 
polit ical par t ies tha t represent many of the i r feelings and wishes, and they 
endorse par t ies whose po l i c i e s do not conform to s t rongly held p re fe rences 
(16). T h e r e is no one- to-one re la t ionsh ip in G e r m a n y be tween processes at 
the level of the poli ty and popu la t ion charac ter i s t ics . In all l ike l ihood th is 
is t he preva i l ing state of affairs in most plural is t ic , m o d e r n societies, and it 
is the Anglo-Saxon and specifically the A m e r i c a n exper i ence that is the 
except ion . 
Social scientists a re , of course , m o r e eager to d e m o n s t r a t e in ter re la t ion-
ships be tween p h e n o m e n a t h a n to show a lack of r e l a t ionsh ip . Conse-
quent ly the i r concep tua l tools to account for indi rec t a n d compl ica ted re-
l a t ionsh ips be tween events are not too well deve loped . H o w e v e r , he re we 
need such concepts . 
Let us a s sume tha t the re is indeed a re la t ion be tween social s t ruc tu re 
and genera l regular i t ies (in t he sense of s t anda rds for everyday life), on the 
one h a n d , and be tween h igher level ins t i tu t ions and political systems at a 
pa r t i cu la r po in t in t ime , on the o the r h a n d . H o w e v e r , ins tead of b e h a v i n g 
as t h o u g h th is r e l a t ionsh ip were necessari ly o n e of m u t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 
we should tu rn the type of re la t ion be tween social s t ruc ture and the poli-
tical system into an object for research . As a m a t t e r of fact, t h e degree of 
fit be tween social s t ruc ture and polit ical process cons t i tu tes a m a j o r topic 
of th is chap te r . H e r e I try to account for the re la t ion in t e rms of the new 
concept of »degree of indif ference of system e lements .« 
In t he social sciences, t he concept of a system has proved to be a po-
werful analyt ical tool in specifying a mu tua l inf luence (funct ional rela-
t ionsh ip ) be tween factors . H o w e v e r , to t reat concre te societies as systems 
in the sense of a comple t e ne twork of i n t e rdependenc i e s m e a n s reifying a 
useful concept (and also s t re tch ing an analogy to biology) (17). 
We all k n o w from our exper ience that not every change in one sphere of 
a society (e.g., u r b a n i z a t i o n ) leads to changes of all o the r e l emen t s ; con-
crete societies a re no t tha t delicately m a d e . Usual ly , sociologists account 
for non - synch ron ized c h a n g e as »lag,« bu t th is again assumes a c o n t i n u o u s 
state of equ i l ib r ium as a n o r m a l condi t ion (18). 
If cond i t ions in o n e sphere (e.g., in l abor re la t ions) are unaffected by a 
change in a n o t h e r sphe re (e.g., au thor i ty p a t t e r n s in the family) , we can 
speak of » indi f ference of system e lements .« Such an indifference may 
charac te r ize re la t ions be tween var ious ins t i tu t ional sectors (family, you th 
cu l tu re , f r i endsh ip pa t t e rns , vo t ing b e h a v i o r ) (19). 
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A h igh degree of indifference be tween system e lements obviously m e a n s 
tha t a greater n u m b e r of higher-level a r r a n g e m e n t s are compa t ib l e wi th 
the s a m e iower-level o rgan iza t ion . T h u s in a society such as the G e r m a n 
one of 1920-40, several types of au tho r i t a r i an polit ical systems migh t have 
been compa t ib le with the same strat if icat ion system and system of m a j o r 
c leavages; a stable democracy , however , was not compat ib le . Or in post-
World War II F rance , bo th a mul t ipa r ty pa r l i amen ta ry system and a highly 
indi rec t form of au thor i t a r i an i sm are bo th compat ib le wi th the same va lue 
system, the same family system, and the same an tagon i sms resul t ing from 
the stratif ication system (20). 
This is no t to deny that system e lements may be so jo ined at a pa r t i cu la r 
t i m e tha t changes in lower-level p h e n o m e n a call for equivalent changes in 
higher- level a r r a n g e m e n t s ; changes in the I tal ian system of social stratifi-
ca t ion and changes in labor re la t ions in Yugoslavia appear to be cases in 
po in t . T h e degree to which a var iety of higher-level a r r a n g e m e n t s (such as 
sys tems of g o v e r n m e n t ) are possible for the same social s t ruc ture may be 
t e r m e d the c o m p a t i b i l i t y of system levels.« 
Usual ly, indust r ia l iz ing societies and even industr ia l ized societies with 
r e m n a n t s of older s t ructures , are charac ter ized (in the short run of several 
decades) by high degrees of compat ib i l i ty . T h e direct re la t ionship be tween 
such aspects of the social s t ruc ture as value systems a n d the polit ical sy-
stem (which behaviora l ly or iented political scientists have usually a s sumed 
to exist) is merely a marg ina l case. 
Hi s to r i ans have been accused of m a k i n g sense of his tory after t he event 
by in te rpre t ing the ou tcome in any given ins tance as the only possible 
c u l m i n a t i o n of past processes; ex-post facto in te rpre ta t ion leads, of course , 
to always changing insights in to p r e sumed de te rmin i sms . An ana logous 
fallacy could be charged against political observers who infer from a na-
t ion-state 's political system at a given t ime the charac te r of a social system. 
T h i s is one reason why there is l i t t le poin t in ma tch ing asser t ions on t h e 
order of »hard -work ing ,« »bois terous,« »aggressive,« etc. wi th informa-
t ion based on systematic research. I t would imply as k n o w n the »degree of 
indif ference between system e l e m e n t s , « which actually should be a m a j o r 
object of invest igat ion in a macro-social analysis (21). 
G e r m a n y as a N o r m a l and U n i q u e Case 
T h e recent political his tory of G e r m a n y is cer ta inly un ique . It is not so 
very u n i q u e for an indust r ia l society to have an uns tab le democracy ; i t is 
no t even u n i q u e for an industr ia l society to exist with an a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
poli t ical s t ruc ture . However , the au thor i t a r i an regime in G e r m a n y certain-
ly was u n i q u e in its ruthlessness , and its imper ia l i sm is u n m a t c h e d . Within 
t h e l i fe t ime of the average individual the very same society has had an 
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uns t ab l e democracy , a powerful d ic ta torsh ip , and now a r a the r well-func-
t ion ing democ racy side by side wi th a so-so C o m m u n i s t system. Even com-
pa red to t h e recent poli t ical his tory of o ther Con t inen t a l societies, Ger -
m a n y is u n m a t c h e d in t h e scope of changes in the political sys tems. 
Never the less , in c o m p a r a t i v e research of in te rna t iona l scope we do not 
f ind m a n y features tha t seem to be long only to t he G e r m a n social system 
(22). Societies such as England , F rance , and G e r m a n y appea r to be mere ly 
va r i a t ions of a c o m m o n type: Western industr ia l societies (23). Cer ta in ly 
t h e s imi lar i t ies of the i r social systems are m u c h greater than the dissimi-
lar i t ies be tween the i r systems of g o v e r n m e n t . T h u s the often-cited » G e r -
m a n fami ly« t u r n s out in a sense no t to exist. Fami ly o rgan iza t ions differ 
in e m p h a s i s f rom c o u n t r y to coun t ry wi th in t he indust r ia l ized g roup , but 
they are no t m o n a d s (24). 
A sociological analysis gives l i t t le suppor t to the c o m m o n a s sumpt ion 
tha t the u n i q u e poli t ical his tory of G e r m a n y is the express ion of a u n i q u e 
social system. W h a t e v e r knowledge we possess from cross-cul tural com-
pa r i sons p o i n t s to differences only in degree be tween G e r m a n y and o the r 
Western indus t r ia l ized societies. Probably th i s is in par t a result of the 
coarseness of sociological analyses, bu t if th i s is so, then it should also be 
doubtful tha t fas tening on some differences tha t a re manifes t to an intel-
l igent observer would adequate ly account for t he cha rac te r of the social 
system and its re la t ion to the poli ty. Let t he re be a m o r a t o r i u m on ci t ing 
some ins tances w h e r e G e r m a n y appears to differ from a n o t h e r Western 
indus t r ia l ized c o u n t r y as exp la in ing by itself he r p r e s u m e d un iqueness . 
As an o rgan iz ing s cheme for the evidence of s imilar i t ies and dissimi-
lar i t ies an analysis by system levels r e c o m m e n d s itself. In basic G e r m a n 
social o rgan iza t ion—i .e . , such ins t i tu t ions as the family and o ther functio-
nal ly diffuse p r i m a r y r e l a t i o n s - - t h e differences from o the r Western in-
dustr ia l societies a p p e a r to be r a the r smal l . They are m o r e i m p o r t a n t in t h e 
system of s t ra t i f ica t ion; differences are largest for the u p p e r m i d d l e class 
and h ighe r level ins t i tu t ions such as mass c o m m u n i c a t i o n s med ia and po-
litical pa r t i es . Cor respond ing ly , s t anda rds of everyday b e h a v i o r and g roup 
s tereotypes inc lud ing na t iona l p re jud ices do not differ sharp ly from those 
of o the r coun t r i e s (25). Differences are m o r e p r o n o u n c e d for beliefs with-
out an i m m e d i a t e re levance for behav io r—such as ideas abou t mora l s ; and 
those differences are largest for ar t icula te op in i o ns in poli t ics and aesthe-
tics. T h u s i t is fair to postula te- that differences be tween G e r m a n y and 
o the r Western indus t r ia l societies t end to be m o r e p r o n o u n c e d the h igher 
the system level . This pos tu la te , by the way, appea r s to hold for indust r ia l 
societies in genera l , whose un iqueness then reduces itself largely to pecu-
l iar i t ies of h ighes t level ins t i tu t ions . 
F requen t ly in macro-social observa t ions the in te rna l he terogenei ty of 
m o d e r n indus t r ia l societies is unde re s t ima ted . Func t iona l ly different ia ted 
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and chang ing as these societies are , n o n e is as in tegrated as observers using 
the no t ion of a system usually imply . T h e degree of indifference var ies 
qui te a bit f rom society to society and may proper ly be unders tood as a 
charac ter i s t ic of a social system. In surveys we may observe s imilar i t ies in 
family s t ruc tu re , c o m m u n i t y organiza t ion , labor relat ions, mobi l i ty rates, 
etc.; yet t he consequences of dissimilar i t ies t h a t - - t a k e n by t h e m s e l v e s - - a r e 
r a the r smal l , m a y be vast given diverse degrees of indifference be tween 
system e l emen t s . 
G i v e n the resul ts of cross-cultural invest igat ions by sociologists, the uni-
queness of G e r m a n y as a poli ty may be largely explained by two related 
p roper t i e s of its social system: 1) h igh compat ib i l i ty of m a n y different 
political o rgan iza t ions with the same social system, and 2) an unusua l 
degree of indi f ference be tween system e lemen t s . A common-sense expres-
sion of the same p h e n o m e n a would be t he s t a t ement that th is society is less 
well in tegra ted t h a n most o ther indus t r ia l ized societies, hence has few 
checks against e x t r e m e behav io r ar is ing in o n e sector or ano the r . Histo-
rically and phi losophica l ly incl ined readers m a y equate this assert ion wi th 
t he older d i c tum, tha t G e r m a n y ' s p rob lem has always been her lack of a 
p r o p e r ba l ance be tween order and anarchy , wi th au thor i t a r i an i sm as the 
easy way out . Th i s , by t he way, is u n i q u e only for a society of such a large 
size. 
As an event to be be t t e r unders tood from this perspect ive, let us consi-
der t h e most repuls ive and least c o m p r e h e n s i b l e aspect of the Nazi system: 
t he concen t r a t i on c a m p s of the ex t e rmina t i on variety (Vernichtungslager). 
T h i s unpa ra l l e l ed ins t i tu t ion tells us very li t t le but in a sense a great deal 
about » G e r m a n society.« Systematic ex t e rmina t ion of Jews has been ex-
p la ined as a necessary consequence , given the specific charac te r of Ger-
m a n society and the G e r m a n s . However , a l though ant i-Semit ism of the 
rabble- rous ing k ind , with boycot ts of Jewish stores and a n ight of b r e a k i n g 
w indows and o the r hood lumism (Kristallnacht) can be l inked up wi th spe-
cific features of G e r m a n y , this does not account for a met icu lous and 
unadver t i sed genocide . T h e incredible »yel low stars« to be worn by anyone 
w h o m t h e Nazis defined as Jewish was cer ta inly no necessary consequence 
of t h e G e r m a n social s t ruc ture , bu t the apathet ic reception of th is ut ter ly 
fantast ic m e a s u r e was undoub ted ly such a consequence . T h e r e is not even 
reason to suppose tha t th is society in which an a t t empt to ex t e rmina t e all 
Jews occurred was m o r e ant i-Semit ic t han m a n y other European societies: 
If we chose as a s t andard jus t the s en t imen t s of the individual ci t izens, the 
degree of ant i -Semit ism was probably jus t a bi t h igher than is unfor tuna-
tely » n o r m a l « in Europe , and i t is now jus t somewha t less than usual by 
the s a m e s t anda rds (26). In G e r m a n y , a l though pe rhaps less so t han in 
o ther societies, it is very ques t ionable to infer from persecut ion of mino-
rit ies an a b n o r m a l l y h igh level of p re jud ice or to explain persecut ion by a 
h igh level of p re jud ice . 
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In t h e s tudies by the U.S . Strategic B o m b i n g Survey, only 10 per cent of 
t h e p o p u l a t i o n were ident i f ied as »ideological Nazis« and 33 pe r cent as 
» sympa the t i c to the Naz i r eg ime« (27). F r o m the var ious surveys d u r i n g 
t h e last decade and a half, th is percentage of »ideological Nazis« has n o w 
been reduced by s o m e w h a t m o r e t h a n half, and yet no par ty us ing Nazi 
symbols has ever had m u c h success in e lect ions (28). Again accord ing to 
t he Strategic B o m b i n g Survey, 16 per cent of t h e G e r m a n s regarded World 
War II lost from its beg inn ing , and by a r o u n d 1943 a major i ty bel ieved t h e 
w a r lost, even t h o u g h th i s did not not iceably affect the efficiency of t h e 
wa r m a c h i n e (29). 
T h e n o t i o n of a h o m o g e n e o u s , even mono l i t h i c , G e r m a n social system 
shou ld no t be deduced from the func t ion ing of a mi l i ta ry m a c h i n e or a 
poli t ical sys tem. To u n d e r s t a n d a par t i cu la r poli t ical system, it is adv i sab le 
to look at the social system as a necessary bu t no t a sufficient c o n d i t i o n . 
Viewed from this perspec t ive , G e r m a n y ceases to be an en igma a n d beco-
mes an e x t r e m e case of a loosely in tegra ted indust r ia l society with a h igh 
capaci ty for different ins t i tu t ional a r r a n g e m e n t s . 
Such cons ide ra t ions also change the p rob lem formula t ion w h e n we ask 
w h e t h e r present -day G e r m a n y has the same social s t ruc ture as t he Ger -
m a n y of the 1930's, 1920's, and earl ier . In addi t ion to no t ing changes in t h e 
family, in t he s t rat i f icat ion system, in le isure behav io r , or in any o t h e r 
subs tan t ive aspects , we shall also have to look for changes in t he degree of 
indif ference of system e l emen t s (i.e., in t h e relat ional charac ter i s t ics of 
society). T h e ques t ion of w h e t h e r G e r m a n society is still t he s a m e c a n n o t 
be answered by jus t c i t ing percentages of popu l a t i on character is t ics tha t 
changed or else did not ; th i s quest ion also calls for a diagnosis as to whe-
the r the capaci ty of th is social system for widely different political sys tems 
has changed . An answer to t he la t ter query i s p robab ly most i m p o r t a n t to 
satisfy the l imi ted interest tha t mos t outs ide observers have in th is society. 
Howeve r , wi th presen t sociological t echn iques , it is also a most difficult 
ques t ion to answer . W h a t e v e r pos twar research i s avai lable on G e r m a n y 
shows tha t t h e r e are m a n y con t rad ic t ions charac te r i z ing this society, m o r e 
t h a n is t r ue for most o the r indust r ia l ized and chang ing social sys tems. 
D u r i n g the last h u n d r e d years, G e r m a n y has been charac te r i zed by 
s t rong cleavages. His tor ical ly , some of the most i m p o r t a n t ones were : ma-
nua l versus n o n - m a n u a l wage ea rne r s ; ar is tocracy versus bus iness ; u n i o n s 
versus employer s ; Ca tho l ics versus Pro tes tan t s versus secularists; » y o u n g 
g e n e r a t i o n « versus the rest; rura l versus u r b a n . Not the least of m a n y 
cleavages was a s t rong regional di f ferent ia t ion, wh ich caused some obser-
vers (such as F r a n k l i n Roosevel t ) to doubt w h e t h e r the G e r m a n i c t r ibes 
had ever a m a l g a m a t e d in to a na t ion (30). In the past , several of these 
cleavages wi th in G e r m a n society potent ia l ly t h r ea t ened the very ex is tence 
of t h e social system. Resolv ing cleavages often used to mean ach iev ing 
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d o m i n a n c e over o p p o n e n t s , from w h o m submiss ion was d e m a n d e d . T h e 
most d rama t i c , basic social change tha t has occur red since the beg inn ing of 
World War II is the different a r r a n g e m e n t of cleavages, and especially a 
different style in deal ing with t hem (31). 
By now it is b e c o m i n g fash ionable for G e r m a n s to cons ider themse lves 
m e m b e r of a plural is t ic society (32). For G e r m a n y , this is a revo lu t ionary 
change in self-conception: as against the s o m e t i m e s hysterical assert ion of 
Gemeinschaft, the no t ion of l iveand- le t - l ive was never very popu la r . In a 
la ter discussion of the system of stratif ication and the organiza t ion of the 
elite, I shall try to show tha t G e r m a n y is still no plural is t ic society in the 
usual sense of the t e rm . T h e s t rong di f ferent ia t ions wi th in the G e r m a n 
society are related to each o ther r a the r in the form of par t icu lar i sm than in 
t he form of a to le rant (or agnost ic) p lu ra l i sm. Never the less , tha t p lura l i sm 
should be looked on as some th ing acceptable and even good m a r k s a great 
change . 
T h e way in which cleavages are defined and a re related to each o the r is 
in my op in ion largely responsible for wha t appea r s to be t he pecul ia r fea-
tu re of G e r m a n society: the high compat ib i l i ty of this social s t ruc ture with 
different fo rms of polit ical o rganiza t ion . Accordingly , in a discussion of 
subs tan t ive features of G e r m a n society I e m p h a s i z e two topics which are 
most likely to show G e r m a n y as a near ly u n i q u e case a m o n g o ther We-
stern indust r ia l ized societies: the system of social s trat if icat ion and the 
organiza t ion of the elite. 
Systems of Inequality and Social Stratification 
Ritual and Reality in Pa t t e rns of Defe rence 
T h e rigidity and the explici tness of the G e r m a n system of strat if icat ion 
is one character is t ic of G e r m a n society tha t p r e sumab ly sets it off from 
o ther Western indust r ia l ized coun t r i es (33). If we bel ieve repor t s by fo-
reign observers , the wife of a m i n o r civil servant is supposed to address t he 
wife of his super ior by t he ti t le of her h u s b a n d : »Jawohl , F r au Ober in -
spektor .« Visitors to G e r m a n univers i t ies say they have hea rd s tudents 
address the i r teachers as » H e r r Professor Dr . ,« and they repor t a t h o m e 
tha t a G e r m a n Ord ina r iu s may be spoken to only by G o d , and then only 
by a p p o i n t m e n t . 
Alas , life in G e r m a n y is not that p ic turesque . These exaggerated stories 
lead outs ide observers to a t t r ibu te a h igh degree of rigidity to the G e r m a n 
system of strat if icat ion bu t do not show t h e m the actual n a t u r e of the 
system of inequal i ty . 
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In genera l i za t ions about o ther count r ies i t is un fo r tuna t e ly c o m m o n to 
confuse p a t t e r n s of deference wi th effective inequal i ty (in the sense of 
d is tances be tween stages in h ie rarch ies ) . The s ame b e h a v i o r in different 
cu l tu ra l con tex t s may obviously m e a n different feelings of real respect and 
imply different degrees of power of one person over the o the r . Just as 
A m e r i c a n observers may over-react to the formal i ty in s ta tus-or iented be-
hav io r in G e r m a n y , Eu ropean observers c o m m i t an equ iva len t e r ro r w h e n 
r epo r t i ng abou t t h e U.S . E u r o p e a n s are frequently impressed with the fact 
tha t in the U.S . a subo rd ina t e may be on a f i r s t -name basis wi th his su-
p e r i o r — a l t h o u g h the general i ty of this is widely exaggera ted in E u r o p e ; a 
s u b o r d i n a t e may even argue with his super ior before a defini te decision 
has been m a d e . Th i s leads foreign observers to t h e conclus ion tha t t he re 
are few class differences in the U.S. (34). And then t h e very s a m e observers 
declare t hemse lves to be puzzled by the A m e r i c a n p e n c h a n t for t i t les and 
pres t ige symbols in general (35). 
W h a t really sets off the G e r m a n system of s t rat i f icat ion is t he formali-
zat ion of re la t ionsh ips . Sets of rules are laid down for b e h a v i o r be tween 
unequa l s , a n d explicit p resc r ip t ions for pa t t e rns of deference are t aught . 
Th i s is no t j u s t specific to class differences bu t also charac te r i s t i c for o the r 
re la t ions be tween unequa l s in G e r m a n y — s u c h as t h e re la t ions be tween an 
older and a younger person , be tween a ba rbe r and a cus tomer , be tween a 
physician and an art ist , and be tween a man and a w o m a n . 
Such r i tuals of a symmet ry in face-to-face re la t ions are actual ly no t a 
charac ter i s t ic of a class system: they are typical for feudal is t ic societies. 
W h a t foreign observers often take as a d i s t inguish ing fea ture of the Ger -
m a n strat i f icat ion system is t hus a sign of the degree to w h i c h p r e i n d u -
strial rules a re re ta ined in such a highly indus t r ia l ized c o u n t r y (36). 
Th i s a s y m m e t r y does no t deno te the degree of con t ro l over the su-
b o r d i n a t e tha t it would in a pure ly class re la t ionsh ip . In a re la t ion be tween 
pe r sons w h o are fundamen ta l l y equals and are mere ly unequa l wi th regard 
to power , tha t p o w e r may be used at t he discret ion of the super ior . Cri-
mina l you th gangs are an e x t r e m e example of th is , and 19th-century re-
la t ions be tween capi ta l owner s and worke r s are a n o t h e r . Th i s power to use 
p o w e r does not charac te r ize re la t ionships that a re general ly defined as 
a s y m m e t r i c a l - - s u c h as t he re la t ionsh ip be tween m a n and wife or pa r en t s 
and ch i l d r en . I t is no accident tha t in feudal ism inequal i t ies was idealized 
as a » n a t u r a l « extens ion of re la t ions between family m e m b e r s and that 
th is analogy was also invoked in defense of slavery (37) . These past usages 
and t h e e m o t i o n a l react ion to t h e m have obscured t h e fact that a feudal 
r e l a t ionsh ip does no t imply despot ic cont ro l . Q u i t e t h e con t r a ry , the cha-
racter of such ascr ibed status differences is one of a b a l a n c e of mu tua l 
r ights and obl iga t ions . These obl igat ions restrict t h e super io r in a relat ion-
sh ip often qui te severely in m a k i n g use of his supe r io r pos i t ion . 
41 
T h e fea ture tha t Amer i can observers especially are really react ing to-
whi le be l iev ing they are observing a character is t ic of the G e r m a n system 
of social s t ra t i f ica t ion—is the combina t i on of feudalist ic f o r m s gove rn ing 
face-to-face in te rac t ions in general (and not jus t be tween actors of diffe-
rent s tatus) and n o r m s specific to the industr ia l sett ing. It is, of course , 
i m p o r t a n t to recognize tha t bo th p r e i n d u s t r i a l and indust r ia l cr i ter ia de-
t e r m i n e the posi t ion of an individual in a social pyramid , to real ize that 
t h e G e r m a n system of social stratif ication is still not iceably inf luenced 
b o t h by t rad i t iona l r ank (ständische) and by class e lements . Th i s mé lange 
of feudal is t ic a r r a n g e m e n t s and character is t ics of indust r ia l ized societies is 
o n e of t he dis t inct ive features of the G e r m a n social system, bu t it is no t a 
u n i q u e o n e (38). 
T h e Mean ing of Occupa t ion 
T h e single most i m p o r t a n t de t e rminan t of social s tatus in G e r m a n y is 1) 
occupa t ion (or for the wife, husband ' s occupat ion) . Occupa t ion a lone is 
m o r e pred ic t ive for s tatus than all o ther status criteria c o m b i n e d (39). 
F u r t h e r factors in decl in ing order of impor t ance are ( ignor ing for a mo-
m e n t the second most impor t an t one) : 3) level of educat ion; 4) social s ta tus 
of f r iends and acqua in tances ; 5) personal i ncome; and 6) social s ta tus of 
p a r e n t s (40). Th i s s ta tement holds bo th for s tudies of pe rcep t ions of class 
difference a n d for object ive differences. T h e only truly pre- indust r ia l fac-
to r a m o n g these is social status of parenta l family, and th is is of some 
i m p o r t a n c e ma in ly in percept ions bu t qui te insignificant in d e t e r m i n i n g 
actual behav io r . T h e r ema in ing cr i ter ia a re—with the one except ion still to 
be men t ioned—iden t i ca l in o rder of impor t ance , with those repor ted for 
o the r Western indust r ia l ized societies (41). 
A favor i te gr ipe against the U.S. by European obse rve r s—and it is in-
tel lectual ly really no more than a g r ipe—has been its p r e s u m e d mater ia-
l i sm. G e r m a n cul tura l critics now find reason to dep lore the s a m e ma-
ter ia l ism at h o m e wh ich p resumably leads to a p reoccupa t ion of people 
wi th t h e status va lue of goods (42). Adver t i s ing executives a n d social cri t ics 
a l ike po in t to o w n e r s h i p of certain goods (h o me , s w i m m i n g pool , yacht , 
p r iva t e p l ane ) as new status cr i ter ia . Research shows, however , tha t such 
goods are no t d e t e r m i n a n t s of status but merely symbols (43). W h a t passes 
as u n i q u e a m o n g crit ics of the Federal Republ ic is merely a formal feature 
in an indust r ia l society. 
T h e r e is one factor, however , which is idiosyncrat ic for t he percept ion 
of s ta tus var iab les in G e r m a n y : factor n u m b e r 2 in o rder of i m p o r t a n c e is 
abil i ty p lus accompl i shmen t (Tüchtigkeit) in one 's occupat ion . At first th is 
f ind ing is qui te perp lex ing , but it can be used as a key for a reappraisa l of 
t he G e r m a n stratif ication system. Th i s we shall t ake up again later . 
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W h i l e occupa t ion is t h e most i m p o r t a n t general d e t e r m i n a n t of s ta tus in 
G e r m a n y , as it is in all Western indust r ia l ized count r i es , t he r a n k i n g of 
ind iv idua l occupa t ions differs from coun t ry to coun t ry (44). In a g r e e m e n t 
wi th s tereotypes abou t G e r m a n y we find that the univers i ty professor 
ho lds first r ank in pres t ige ra t ing , a l t hough he is about to sha re th i s p lace 
of h o n o r wi th t h e big indust r ia l i s t ; qui te r ightly, m a n y observers of post-
wa r G e r m a n y cons ider th is h igh s tatus of bus iness leaders a m a n o r social 
change (45). C o n t r a r y to his r a n k i n g in the Uni t ed States, t h e phys ic ian 
r u n s a very poor th i rd . A n d the proverbia l civil servant (Deutsche B e a m -
te)? H i s s ta tus differs drast ical ly according to his t i t le, for today a low-
r a n k i n g civil se rvant is ra ted even slightly be low a highly qual if ied w o r k e r 
and qui te a bit be low a factory fo reman (Werkmeister). To be in t he service 
of the state, regardless of pos i t ion , leads to a h igh level of pres t ige aspira-
t ions for t he civil se rvan t himself bu t not au tomat ica l ly to an equiva len t 
ra t ing by o thers . H e r e we do indeed observe a s t rong change , and p e r h a p s 
an i m p o r t a n t one ; and in th is respect the Federal Republ ic n o w differs 
from o the r na t ion-s ta tes wi th a G e r m a n cu l ture , especially Aus t r ia . 
A l t h o u g h some ind iv idua l occupa t ions are ra ted s o m e w h a t differently 
in va r ious Western societies, closer inspect ion shows tha t t h e p r inc ip les 
d e t e r m i n i n g occupa t iona l prest ige are pract ical ly ident ical . In all these so-
cieties those occupa t ions receive a h igher ra t ing than appea r s p laus ib le by 
t he n a t u r e of work w h e r e 1) long t r a in ing per iods are usual , 2) w h e r e t he 
p rac t i t ione r is self-employed and de t e rmines his own work schedule , 3) 
w h e r e he is no t paid for a specific opera t ion bu t receives an h o n o r a r i u m 
for services r ende red , and 4) whe re mis takes in pe r fo rming the work have 
i m p o r t a n t consequences . 
Prest ige scales of occupa t ions can be unders tood as indirect express ions 
of cent ra l va lues held in a society. O n e d o m i n a n t c r i te r ion for o rde r ing 
occupa t ions a long a pres t ige h ie ra rchy is the p r e sumed power tha t an oc-
cupa t iona l posi t ion impl ies over people or resources . Specifically in indu-
strial societies, an unde r ly ing d imens ion is the degree of a u t o n o m y that 
such an occupa t ion affords in the pursu i t of one 's life goals. Viewing pre-
stige scales of occupa t ion as express ing general s tatus p r inc ip les , G e r m a -
ny's s trat if icat ion system again appea r s to be jus t a ( m i n o r ) va r i a t ion of a 
pa t t e rn c o m m o n to all indus t r ia l ized societies. 
H o w e v e r , in add i t ion to these manifes t and la tent s imi lar i t ies , we do 
find i m p o r t a n t differences in the in te rpre ta t ion of pos i t ions in a h ie ra rchy , 
in t h e m e a n i n g assigned to be ing »h igh« or »low.« Preva len t in t h e Un i t ed 
States i s t h e belief tha t t h e h ighe r t h e posi t ion on the pres t ige scale, t he 
grea ter t h e success of the ind iv idua l . Converse ly , be ing successful is pre-
s u m e d to express itself in ach iev ing a h ighe r occupa t iona l pos i t ion or in 
acqu i r ing m o r e of s o m e o the r s tatus cr i ter ia . Th i s is in a g r e e m e n t wi th t he 
belief t h a t social s ta tus expresses success and tha t success is t h e result of an 
ind iv idua l ' s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t (46). 
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In this respect, G e r m a n society differs considerably from other Western 
societies and con fo rms to the s tandards of »ascr ipt ive« societies. In ascrip-
t ive social systems it is no t general ly bel ieved that upward social mobi l i ty 
is possible for everyone of sufficient abili ty. A rise in status is a t t r ibuted to 
o the r factors , such as the help of one 's family, luck, or a ru th less and 
despicable personal i ty (47). In this case the in te rpre ta t ion of different so-
cial s ta tus changes from that preva len t in the U.S.: posi t ions of high status 
are no longer taken to express necessarily a super ior accompl i shmen t bu t 
a re seen as different social r anks (48). R a n k s need to be respec ted—hence 
the r i tuals of defe rence—but thei r occupan ts may not c o m m a n d respect . 
Only in a society w h e r e h igher posi t ion is supposed to express a personal 
qual if icat ion does deferential behav io r express respect toward the parti-
cular person . 
T h e different evaluat ion of high status and upward mobi l i ty canno t be 
expla ined by different mobi l i ty rates. In te rna t iona l compar i sons of social 
mobi l i ty are no tor ious ly difficult, and m e a s u r e m e n t s are fairly c rude . 
However , all s tudies show that t he re is present ly no great difference in 
over-all mobi l i ty rates be tween most Western industr ia l ized count r ies , and 
most cer ta in ly no great difference be tween the U.S. and G e r m a n y (49). 
T h e only r e m a i n i n g difference is p robab ly the speed at which indiv iduals 
change status, bu t the net result at t he end of a life does not seem to differ 
m u c h . There fore , i t is the in te rp re ta t ions that differ and not the reali t ies to 
wh ich these in te rp re ta t ions refer. 
After po in t ing to the in te rpre ta t ion of status as » r a n k « and after identi-
fying the eva lua t ions of mobil i ty , we are ready to m a k e use of a f inding 
tha t appeared at first as a mere oddity: the extremely high i m p o r t a n c e that 
in G e r m a n y is a t tached to Tüchtigkeit. The respect for Tüchtigkeit wi thin 
a given occupat ion can be in terpre ted as a second r ank ing system for in-
dividuals . Posi t ions deserve deference, Tüchtigkeit respect. T h u s the re is a 
s t rong contras t be tween at t i tudes toward an incompe ten t m a n a g e r and to-
ward a highly compe ten t fo reman . T h e incompe ten t manage r will be trea-
ted with the pa t t e rns of deference re levant to his pos i t ion , but he will 
receive litt le respect; t he highly compe ten t foreman will still be t rea ted as 
a fo reman , but he will be accorded a high respect (50). 
In G e r m a n y , satisfaction wi th in one 's occupat ional life may therefore 
be der ived from two sources: the prest ige that is due to the rank of a 
posi t ion and t h e respect due to a compe ten t pe r fo rmance . Rat ing by re-
spect for Tüchtigkeit is no t merely a m i n o r modif icat ion of h ie ra rch iza t ion 
by r anks ; i t leads to marked ly different t r ea tmen t , apar t from the treat-
m e n t assigned to the rank of a posi t ion. Success in the Uni ted States is 
p r imar i ly expressed in a posi t ion of h igh r ank ; in G e r m a n y it may express 
itself also in a repu ta t ion for Tüchtigkeit. 
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A prest ige r a n k i n g due to an occupa t ion and a respect that is accorded to 
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t wi th in an occupa t ion are, of course , not equiva len t . Ac-
c o m p l i s h m e n t wi th in an occupa t ion can be h o n o r e d only by those w h o 
k n o w about th is r e p u t a t i o n - - i . e . , co-workers , f r iends , ne ighbor s , and o the r 
pe r sons tha t ca re to look at J o h n D o e as an ind iv idua l . Th i s usually small 
wor ld of a pa r t i cu la r pe rson can be called his » p r i m a r y e n v i r o n m e n t s as 
against t h e secondary e n v i r o n m e n t w h e r e anyone is t rea ted as an occupant 
of a cer ta in pos i t ion , such as physician or professor (51). Respect due to 
Tüchtigkeil is a reward tha t is accorded p r imar i ly in this p r i m a r y envi ron-
m e n t and s u p p l e m e n t s the prest ige that i s a t tached to par t i cu la r occupa-
t ional categories . I t is my c o n t e n t i o n that in the U.S . occupa t iona l prest ige 
d o m i n a t e s b o t h t he secondary and t h e p r i m a r y e n v i r o n m e n t , whi le in Ger-
m a n y rank and a c c o m p l i s h m e n t b r i n g separa te rewards . T h e consequences 
of th is doub le ra t ing a re r a t h e r great . A low ra t ing on one of t h e di-
m e n s i o n s (respect or prest ige) may be compensa t ed by a h ighe r r a n k i n g on 
the o the r (except of course whe re i ncompe tence coincides with an occu-
pa t ion of low prest ige) . Such a difference in reward systems m e a n s also 
tha t for the ind iv idua ls the differences be tween the »smal l wor ld« of t h e 
p r i m a r y e n v i r o n m e n t and t h e secondary o r publ ic wor ld are accen tua ted . 
T h e r e is still a n o t h e r d imens ion cross-cutt ing t he r ank -o rde r ing of oc-
cupa t ions a long a scale of p r e s t i g e - - a d imens ion which at first seems clo-
sely re la ted to Tüchtigkeit. If occupa t ions are r a n k e d by the respect (Ach-
tung) t ha t t h e skill they requ i re deserves, we a r r ive at a still different 
o rde r ing of occupa t iona l ca tegor ies (52). Most of t he academic professions, 
also high on a scale of occupa t iona l prest ige, re ta in the i r high r a n k i n g . 
Howeve r , we do n o w find skil led worke r s occupying one of the highest 
r anks , even above some of the self-employed and academic occupa t ions . 
T h u s in a n a t i o n w i d e survey in 1963, t he r e sponden t s rated the occupa-
t ions of bo th m i n e r s and judges ( the la t ter an occupa t iona l category with 
less prest ige in G e r m a n y t h a n in t he U.S.) as deserv ing the s a m e respect 
and be ing equal ly i m p o r t a n t ; bo th were ra ted very m u c h h igher t h a n t h e 
occupa t iona l category s u p e r i n t e n d e n t of a h igh school . F o r those w h o be-
lieve n o t h i n g has changed in G e r m a n society, i t should be ins t ruc t ive to 
learn tha t on this scale one of the lowest r a n k i n g s is given to professional 
soldiers . 
T h e r a n k s of occupa t ions by prest ige and by skill do not coincide in 
o ther coun t r i e s , e i ther . F r a n c e is a coun t ry w h e r e t h e m a n u a l worke r is 
given b o t h l i t t le prest ige and accorded li t t le respect , whi le the j onc t i on -
naire has t h e h igh r a n k i n g on b o t h scales tha t was t rad i t iona l ly p r e s u m e d 
to be charac te r i s t ic for G e r m a n y . In Eng land , be ing self-employed is a 
m u c h m o r e d o m i n a n t va lue t h a n in the two o the r coun t r i e s (53). In Eu-
ropean societies, however , r a n k i n g s of occupa t ions a long different di-
m e n s i o n s a p p e a r to co inc ide less t h a n is t rue for t he U n i t e d States. A n d in 
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G e r m a n y the dif ferences in rank ings be tween the prest ige of, and the re-
spect for, an occupa t ion appear to be still a bit greater t han in e i ther 
F r a n c e o r Eng land . 
In feudal societies, a difference between the social prest ige and the re-
spect in t e rms of social significance of an occupat ion was a n o r m a l feature 
of t h e system of inequal i ty . T h u s a cour t ier or scr ibe or personal servant of 
a n o b l e m a n enjoyed cons iderab ly h igher social prest ige than social respect. 
To meet a s t rong dis t inc t ion be tween those two d i m e n s i o n s p lus a fur ther 
different ia t ion accord ing to the p r e sumed individual p e r f o r m a n c e shows 
how s t rong feudal p r inc ip les of social s t ruc ture still are in G e r m a n y and in 
F r a n c e . A m a j o r consequence of this coexis tence of several p r inc ip les of 
r a n k i n g is a b l u r r i n g of the significance of inequal i ty along any one of the 
d imens ions . Social prest ige and respect for occupat iona l categories may 
par t ly neu t ra l i ze each o the r in the emot iona l s ignif icance that inequal i t ies 
will h a v e in t he secondary e n v i r o n m e n t ; and inequal i t ies in the secondary 
e n v i r o n m e n t are fu r ther cush ioned in the i r effect by an add i t iona l r ank ing 
system tha t is effective in p r ima ry e n v i r o n m e n t s . 
G e r m a n y appea r s at first sight to be a coun t ry w h e r e the d i s tance bet-
ween different social classes is especially great . On closer inspect ion we 
conc lude n o w tha t for a large par t of t he popu la t ion the difference bet-
ween social classes is not d ramat i c (54). Various prest ige d i m e n s i o n s (ac-
ceptabi l i ty of occupa t ion , »no rma l i t y« of style of life, respect accorded to 
p e r f o r m a n c e , social r ank of posi t ion) cross-cut each o ther . There fo re an 
ind iv idua l ' s low r a n k i n g on any one of the d i m e n s i o n s may be neu t ra l i zed 
in pa r t by a h ighe r r a n k i n g on o ther prest ige d imens ions . Especial ly im-
p o r t a n t and unusua l is the wide differentiat ion of r a n k s be tween different 
types of m a n u a l labor , and in general t he lack of a gap be tween m a n u a l 
and n o n - m a n u a l occupa t ions (55). 
We do not have c o m p a r a b l e data for earl ier per iods , but i f we are to 
bel ieve descr ip t ions of G e r m a n y before World War I and du r ing the Wei-
m a r Republ ic , t hen th is differentiat ion of prest ige and life s i tua t ions wit-
h in va r ious occupat iona l categories represents a m a j o r social change . 
Rank differences have by no m e a n s d isappeared , as some p r o p o n e n t s of a 
»leveled society« (nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschajt) advise us to bel ieve, 
bu t a cross-cut t ing of ra t ings cer ta inly m a k e s r a n k differences less divisive 
(56). 
T h e Stratif ication Pyramid 
As is t rue for most Western industr ia l ized societies today, G e r m a n y is 
empha t i ca l ly a middle-class society. In the s implest sense, th i s m e a n s that 
near ly a ma jo r i t y of G e r m a n s are middle- class by wha teve r cr i ter ion class 
is m e a s u r e d (57). Midd le posi t ions are the least con t rovers ia l , and persons 
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in these pos i t ions are less of a target for host i l i ty than is t rue for pe r sons in 
o the r pos i t ions . T h e va lue system is d o m i n a t e d by middle-class concep-
t ions . In th is respect, G e r m a n y closely resembles the U.S. 
Charac te r i s t i c for pre- indust r ia l and early capital ist societies is a distri-
b u t i o n of its m e m b e r s a m o n g social classes tha t resembles in s h a p e an 
inver ted funne l . Equal ly charac ter i s t ic for present-day Western indust r ia-
lized societies wi th a relat ively » m a t u r e « e c o n o m y is the so-called » m i d d -
le-class bulge .« This m e t a p h o r is not m e a n t to descr ibe the preva i l ing sha-
pe of the m a l e m e m b e r s of such societies; i t refers to t he his tor ical ly uni-
que occur rence tha t the ma jo r i ty of pe r sons are no longer in the lowest 
social pos i t ions bu t have moved into the m i d d l e of t he strat if ication r ange . 
In West G e r m a n y th is middle-class bu lge is by no m e a n s as s t rong as in 
t he U.S. , b u t it is the re , and it is increasingly p r o n o u n c e d , as a posi t ion of 
re la t ive aff luence i s enjoyed by m o r e and m o r e G e r m a n s . Accord ing to my 
studies, abou t 20 per cent of the popu la t ion a re definitely lower class, and 
about 30 per cent are in t he pecul iar s i tuat ion of upper - lower class tha t so 
closely r e sembles t he life condi t ion of the fo rmer petit bourgeois ie (58) . 
F rom the m i d d l e on , the strat if ication p y r a m i d th ins rapidly. A r a t h e r 
len ien t def ini t ion for uppe r -midd le and for u p p e r class places approxi -
mate ly 7 per cent of adult G e r m a n s in to these pres t ig ious pos i t ions . W h e n 
us ing a strict c r i t e r ion for upper-class m e m b e r s h i p , hard ly 1 per cent of t h e 
popu la t i on qualif ies. All in all, t he re is n o t h i n g pecul iar ly » G e r m a n « 
about such a d i s t r ibu t ion , and all ind ica t ions po in t to an ever-closer ap-
p r o x i m a t i o n to the present s i tuat ion in t h e Un i t ed States. A n d jus t as in 
t he U.S. , a large ma jo r i ty of G e r m a n s perce ive themse lves as a l ready be-
longing to the midd l e class. 
In con t ras t to a t t i tudes d u r i n g the W e i m a r per iod , the rise of m e m b e r -
sh ip in t h e m i d d l e class and the e s t ab l i shmen t of a kind of na t iona l midd-
le-class va lue system has lowered hosti l i ty toward those pa r t s of the lower 
classes about to acqui re middle-class s ta tus . In his 1932 analysis of t he Nazi 
par ty , T h e o d o r Geiger could show that the a t t rac t ion of t he Nazi m o v e -
m e n t was in par t based on the fear of m e m b e r s of the »old midd l e class« 
tha t they were abou t to lose or have to sha re the i r s tatus with »ups t a r t s « 
(59). T h i s r e s e n t m e n t was p r imar i ly d i rec ted towards those g roups of ma-
nua l w o r k e r s that were beg inn ing to m o v e in to middle-class s ta tus . Indeed , 
Nazism at tha t t i m e appealed s trongly to those w h o felt t h r e a t e n e d by a 
loss of s ta tus because of changes in t he indus t r ia l e conomy. These senti-
m e n t s , especially a r e luc tance to share middle-class s tatus wi th new m e m -
bers , a re still exis tent ; however , quant i t a t ive ly they are now of m i n o r im-
por t ance . T h u s one m a j o r source of ins tabi l i ty for the poli t ical system has 
v i r tua l ly d i sappeared ; no t even the f a r m e r s ' u n i o n or refugee associa t ions 
have been able to revive such sen t imen t s . 
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Evalua t ions of Inequal i t ies 
In any society, the re la t ions be tween social classes and the a t t i tudes in 
general toward stratification are strongly inf luenced by social mobi l i ty . 
Most s tudies have shown that actual rates of mobi l i ty in Western indu-
str ial ized socie t ies—including G e r m a n y — a r e qui te comparab l e . However , 
despi te these s imilar i t ies in object ive condi t ions , the differences in the 
degrees to which societies are perceived as e i ther p e r m i t t i n g or h a m p e r i n g 
social mobi l i ty are qui te d rama t i c . 
All Western indust r ia l ized societies (with t he possible except ion of 
G r e a t Br i ta in) have far m o r e upward mobi l i ty than downward mobi l i ty . 
However , only in the Uni ted States is the re a general op t imism that every-
o n e (at least every whi te Amer i can ) has a chance to be u p w a r d mobi le and 
tha t one 's pos i t ion in the strat if ication system is p r imar i ly the result of 
one ' s capabi l i t ies . T h e major i ty of G e r m a n s , too , bel ieve that a d v a n c e m e n t 
t h r o u g h capabi l i ty and ha rd work is possible, bu t they also bel ieve that 
mos t likely this advancemen t will be l imited in scope. Inher i t ed posi t ion , 
fami ly connec t ions and f r iends , and a good measu re of luck are also seen 
as i m p o r t a n t cond i t ions for any advancemen t that i s m o r e than mode ra t e . 
T h i s is a m o r e opt imist ic appraisal of chances for advancemen t than is 
charac ter i s t ic for F rance , and this evaluat ion is qui te » n o r m a l « in Western 
societies, t he U.S. be ing distinctly ex t reme . Most G e r m a n s do not th ink 
tha t everyone wi th in thei r system could m a k e i t from rags to riches, but 
they do bel ieve that most could advance from ord ina ry clerk to the he ights 
of the exis tence of an accountan t . A larger ma jo r i ty t han in the U.S. also 
bel ieve tha t they have no real chance to ever jo in the e l i te—and studies of 
actual mobi l i ty show they are r ight . 
L imi ts in social mobil i ty , however , do not t roub le most G e r m a n s . They 
do have a real chance for a mod icum of upward mobi l i ty , and this l imi ted 
ascent is all that is being asked for, if we go by the percen tage of G e r m a n s 
w h o th ink they have a t ta ined or are going to at ta in most of what they set 
themse lves to accompl ish (60). A n d even if no mobi l i ty is achieved, even if 
t h e occupat iona l life is ended pret ty m u c h in the s ame slot whe re t h e 
worke r s tar ted out 45 years earl ier , this does not seem to lead to s t rong 
dissat isfact ion. 
Why do t h e m e m b e r s of var ious indust r ia l ized societies perceive and 
eva lua te the s a m e object ive condi t ions so differently? Why is i t in some 
coun t r i e s and at some stages in his tory that dissatisfaction wi th social mo-
bil i ty arises and leads to a polit ically explosive s i tuat ion? O n e m a j o r factor 
is t he eva lua t ion of the stratification system, especially the percept ion of 
mobi l i ty chances . If upward social mobi l i ty is bel ieved to be bo th frequent 
and a t t a inab le t h rough the individual ' s abil i t ies p lus a por t ion of good 
luck, then indiv iduals tend to b l a m e themse lves for a fai lure to achieve 
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u p w a r d mobi l i ty . T h e locus of b l a m e is shifted to »social cond i t ions« or 
»society« if t h e s trat i f icat ion system is perceived as an ascr ipt ive o n e - - i . e . , 
as a system w h e r e a posi t ion does not reflect on an indiv idual ' s abil i ty (61). 
W h e t h e r , in a society whose strat if ication system is bel ieved to be largely 
ascr ip t ive , inequal i ty of social posi t ion will lead to political conflict based 
on class di f ferences depends on the actual rates of mobi l i ty and the 
s t reng th of dissatisfaction with own status: in strat if icat ion systems that 
a re perce ived as be ing de t e rmined by ach ievemen t , dissatisfaction with 
own s ta tus is m o r e likely to lead to personal d isorders inc lud ing c r ime . 
W h i l e in a social system such as G e r m a n y ' s s tatus inequal i ty is in p r inc ip l e 
m o r e l ikely to lead to political act ion, th is type of c leavage is now m u c h 
reduced in i m p o r t a n c e — t h e result of r a the r l imited asp i ra t ions for mobi-
lity a n d object ively very high rates of upward mobil i ty . 
T h e po ten t ia l for conflict that is usual ly inhe ren t in s trat i f icat ion sy-
s tems wi th s t rong inequal i t ies is fur ther reduced by the type of expec ta t ion 
for mobi l i ty . In the U.S., the individual usually hopes to achieve mobi l i ty 
for himself, a n d success and fai lure are j u d g e d by c o m p a r i n g one ' s actual 
s tat ion in life wi th one ' s expecta t ion . But in most Eu ropean societies the 
system is also j u d g e d by the chances of one 's ch i ld ren to ach ieve a h igher 
pos i t ion than one ' s own. Surveys show tha t at p resent a ma jo r i ty of t he 
p o p u l a t i o n in E n g l a n d as well as in G e r m a n y expects tha t the i r ch i ld ren 
will get fu r the r in life t han they themse lves (62). 
In addi t ion to these factors wh ich at p resen t con t r ibu te to t he dec l ine of 
tens ion be tween strata and to the gradua l d i sappea rance of class-based 
polit ics in E u r o p e , some specifically na t iona l factors fur ther r educe t h e 
impac t of inequal i ty of status in G e r m a n y . Let us recall that in G e r m a n y 
prest ige resul t ing from one 's occupat ion and the self-respect associated 
wi th i t can be der ived from several cr i ter ia . T h e effects of this cr isscrossing 
of s ta tus d i m e n s i o n s are far-reaching. Obvious ly , t he re will be relat ively 
few m a k e s in c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n society w h o have to cons ider 
themse lves as over-all fai lures. At the s a m e t ime, most ind iv idua l s mus t 
admi t par t ia l fa i lure (63). With an eva lua t ion of success in w o r k i n g life 
a long several d imens ions , t h e chances for o v e r a l l success obviously di-
m i n i s h . By the same logic, th is feeling of fai lure is l imi ted wi th respect to 
social mobi l i ty , s ince the asp i ra t ions are no t too far r emoved from the 
possibil i t ies. ( C o n t i n u e d possibil i t ies of course depend upon expans ion of 
t he economy a n d upgrad ing of j o b skills.) 
F o r a G e r m a n , par t of the feeling of success derives from ach iev ing a 
h igh s t andard of p e r f o r m a n c e in his j o b — a l t h o u g h this t ends to be less 
and less t rue for unsk i l l ed jobs . I t is th is emphas i s on measur ing up to an 
ideal wi th in t h e j o b — r a t h e r t h a n jus t t ry ing to qualify for a next h igher 
pos i t i on—tha t charac te r izes t he affective re l a t ionsh ip with one ' s work . 
Th i s i n t e rp re t a t ion accounts for the s o m e w h a t compuls ive i n v o l v e m e n t in 
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j o b p e r f o r m a n c e (which is of course not necessarily equiva lent to efficien-
cy) tha t s t r ikes m a n y foreign observers . Whi le con t r ibu t ing to reduc ing the 
c leavage effect of inequal i t ies , the emphas i s on Tüchtigkeit is also a source 
of t ens ion in the w o r k e r - - a k i n to the worry about upward mobil i ty in t he 
U .S . As Dav id McCle l l and po in t s out , a cons tan t fear of Überforderung (of 
no t ach iev ing perfect pe r fo rmance ) is character is t ic for G e r m a n males of 
m i d d l e class b a c k g r o u n d (64). 
T h e crisscrossing of reward d imens ions , t he possibil i ty of cons ider ing 
oneself successful on a l te rna t ive d imens ions , plus the i nvo lvemen t in one ' s 
j o b , all con t r i bu t e to the peacefulness in employer -employee re la t ions that 
is a n o t h e r charac ter i s t ic feature of the G e r m a n social s t ruc ture . No m a j o r 
indus t r ia l power has had so few str ikes. Then in the spr ing of 1962 em-
ployers and t r ade u n i o n s in the metal industry , the bu i ld ing t rade , and 
m i n i n g poised for th ree successive real tests of s t rength (one side p repa r ing 
for indus t ry-wide walk-outs , t he o ther for lock-outs) , bo th sides were for-
ced by the consensus of all those not directly involved to a b a n d o n the i r 
coll ision course (65). Publ ic op in ion poll after publ ic op in ion poll shows a 
cons tan t avers ion to str ikes and a belief that the re are no legi t imate con-
flicts of in teres ts that have to be settled by a test of s t rength . T h e Nazi idea 
of a single docile l abor organiza t ion (Arbeitsfront) and a s imi lar organi-
za t ion in East G e r m a n y now fit qui te well into this G e r m a n inc l ina t ion to 
disclaim differences tha t may be inheren t in different social posi t ions . Th i s 
is of course also a basic weakness of G e r m a n society: it is still badly pre-
pa red to meet open conflict. 
T h e p r e sumab ly rigid and explicit G e r m a n system of social stratifica-
t ion , wh ich so often str ikes foreign observers , is not an emot iona l reali ty 
for the G e r m a n s themselves . T h e very no t ion of social classes, or of r ank 
o rde r ing of pos i t ions apar t from the Tüchtigkeit of the i n c u m b e n t , is re-
pel lent to a major i ty of the popu la t ion , however m u c h they have to admi t 
t he exis tence of classes. T h e r e is an unreconc i led cont rad ic t ion be tween 
the e m p h a s i s on status-specific pa t t e rns of deference and the a t t emp t to 
deny the legi t imacy of any posi t ional difference. 
G e r m a n ideas about an acceptable re la t ionship be tween different strata 
(as we learn from surveys) cor respond essentially to p r e i n d u s t r i a l no t ions , 
specifically feudalist ic ones. T h e average person would l ike to bel ieve in an 
o rgan ic i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e be tween strata and in t he exis tance of a c o m m o n 
interes t (66). Tradi t ional ly , the appeal to na t iona l i sm has been the mos t 
effective way to establ ish s t rong emot iona l ties in the face of a real conflict 
of in teres ts . Especially a m o n g persons u n d e r 40 years of age, these fee-
l ings—which in the past were of ma jo r polit ical re levance in t imes of 
c r i ses—are losing the i r impor t ance . 
T h e m a j o r change from condi t ions dur ing the Weimar Republ ic has 
been an increas ing differentiat ion of work s i tuat ions and life chances wit* 
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hin b r o a d occupa t iona l categories. I n c o m e s , t r e a t m e n t by super iors , inde-
p e n d e n c e of work , l eng th of t r a in ing , and social s ta tus differ cons iderably 
wi th in t h e old j o b categories of skil led w o r k e r and whi te-col lar worke r 
(Angestellter)--probably m o r e so t h a n is t r ue for o the r European societies 
(67). Th i s d e v e l o p m e n t has drast ical ly r educed the polit ical re levance of 
t ens ions resul t ing from inequal i t ies in social s ta tus . New topics for bargai-
n i n g p r o d u c e c h a n g i n g coal i t ions in acco rdance wi th t he shifting al l iances 
of in teres ts . T e m p o r a r y g roups r a the r t han large, fixed blocs n o w face each 
o the r in social confl ic ts . 
Th i s d e v e l o p m e n t m e a n s a reduc t ion of tens ion , a n d so does the increa-
se of j o b securi ty. G e r m a n y is en joying a long per iod of o v e r e m p l o y m e n t . 
In add i t ion , t he welfare state has been dras t ical ly ex tended , and the system 
of old-age p e n s i o n s in the Federa l R e p u b l i c is n o w probably one of the 
mos t generous and definitely one of t he mos t inf lat ion-proof in the wor ld . 
M a n y of t h e c o n n o t a t i o n s of unequa l s ta tus have t h u s lost thei r anxiety-
p roduc ing effects. 
These r a the r drast ic changes have r educed the po ten t ia l for i m m e d i a t e 
socio-political conflict a long s tatus l ines bu t h a v e not e l imina ted tens ions 
caused by s tatus inequal i t ies as such. Just as in the U.S. , these tens ions are 
n o w exper ienced largely as ind iv idua l p r o b l e m s . T h e n a t u r e of the pro-
b l e m s , however , differs from those m e n t i o n e d above as typical for t he 
U.S. ; and th is is a result of t h e eva lua t ion of occupat iona l roles tha t is 
p r eva l en t in G e r m a n y . 
Accord ing to the t rad i t iona l G e r m a n va lue system, a person ' s involve-
m e n t in an occupa t ion was of centra l i m p o r t a n c e . H e r e he was to express 
his » t rue self« a n d a t the same t ime tha t he was ea rn ing his l ivel ihood, he 
was p r e s u m a b l y serving the c o m m o n good. Of course these values—es-
sent ial ly a fusion of t h e ar is tocrat ic and ar t i san s t anda rds of a feudalis t ic 
s o c i e t y - w e r e no t accepted by most m a n u a l worke r s . Howeve r , unt i l t he 
W e i m a r Repub l i c th i s was one of t h e t w o p reva i l ing legi t imate ideologies. 
Needless to d e m o n s t r a t e , t he re was a g ro tesque dispar i ty be tween t h e rea-
lity a n d this va lue o r i en ta t ion . 
As indus t r ia l i sm proceeded; a second ideology developed: tha t t he t r ue 
persona l i ty did no t have a c h a n c e to real ize itself wi th in the economic 
wor ld or in genera l by par t i c ipa t ing in society. F o r an an t ido te against 
a l i ena t ion , one had to tu rn inward to a p r i va t e w o r l d — t o fr iends, family, 
and p e r h a p s c o n t e m p l a t i o n (68). T h e d is t inc t ion be tween a reward system 
for p e r f o r m a n c e in work and one 's s ta tus in the society at large con t r ibu ted 
fu r the r to th is d is t inc t ion be tween a mean ingfu l p r i m a r y world and an 
official »pub l i c« sphere . O n e la tent func t ion of this second ideology was to 
de -emphas ize t h e f rus t ra t ions resul t ing from class difference, from a stra-
t if icat ion system in wh ich » the t rue self« was not involved, which affected 
mere ly t h e a rb i t r a ry (uneigentliche) »social self.« 
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Natura l ly , these no t i ons were only ar t icula ted by a minor i ty , and they 
were crucial merely for segments of the uppe r -midd l e class. In a di luted 
fo rm, however , t he feeling of a l ienat ion in the industr ia l world and the 
pe rcep t ion of publ ic affairs as essentially i r re levant can be t raced in the 
lower classes. T h e s t rength of this ideology can be inferred from the fact 
tha t in par t i t pe rvades even the wri t ings of c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n socio-
logists themse lves (69). Many G e r m a n s still do no t feel qui te at h o m e in an 
industr ia l society. They give Moloch ( the » e c o n o m y « and its lu re of a 
h igher »s t anda rd of l iv ing«) his due, but they exper ience this as a fur ther 
ins tance of m a n ' s i n e v i t a b l e ad ju s tmen t to reali ty after a fall from grace. 
T h e polit ical consequences of such a va lue system are obvious . In t imes 
of d ispleasure with events in society at large, o n e may s imply w i t h d r a w 
in to t he p r iva te wor ld and try to live an exempla ry life the re . To live a 
» m o r a l « life, pay taxes, a n d educate the i r ch i ld ren wel l—these cons t i tu te 
for m a n y people t he most i m p o r t a n t con t r i bu t ion they can conceive of 
m a k i n g to society. 
Insofar as this m o r e or less vague feeling of a l ienat ion t rans la ted itself 
in to a general o r ien ta t ion toward society and inh ib i ted invo lvemen t in 
publ ic affairs, i t was indeed of ma jo r polit ical re levance in G e r m a n y ' s 
past . M a n y wel l -meaning cit izens never asserted the i r views about polit ics 
and pub l ic life. A n d such an or ien ta t ion restr icted the invo lvemen t of 
those very strata which in o the r poli t ies set l imi ts to the ac t ions of politi-
c ians . T h i s lack of engagement in publ ic life in a b l o o d - a n d g u t s sense-
howeve r dutifully formal c i t izenship n o r m s a re carr ied o u t — m a k e s of 
course a m u c h wider range of political systems compa t ib l e wi th the s ame 
va lue system (70). 
T h e Compat ib i l i ty of the Sta tus System 
Up to World War II , th is ambiva l ence toward an indust r ia l society was 
ex t remely i m p o r t a n t for poli t ics in G e r m a n y . Present ly i t is no t . Did basic 
a t t i tudes change? Is t he re now a wil l ingness to no longer preceive publ ic 
life as a l ien? T h e answer is that a t t i tudes toward the strat if ication system 
began to change appreciably only after t he war , and the strat if ication sy-
stem itself has change least of all. Wha t has changed marked ly is the re-
lat ion of the system to polit ics. 
It may seem s t range that World War II caused so few changes in Ger-
m a n social s t ruc tu re . H o w could the vast re locat ion of popu la t ions , the 
des t ruct ion of p roper ty , and the m o v e m e n t of impover i shed refugees in to 
West G e r m a n y have so little effect on the strat if icat ion system? Con t r a ry 
to c o m m o n beliefs, research shows that World War II itself and the im-
med ia t e pos twar polit ical deve lopmen t s had a surpr is ingly l imited impact 
on the surv ivors . T h e changes that were m e n t i o n e d ear l ier in this chap te r 
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occur red ma in ly d u r i n g the last decade, and m a j o r s t ructura l changes h a v e 
jus t got ten u n d e r way. 
As of 1966, the ma jo r i ty of surv iv ing older G e r m a n s are in t he s a m e 
pos i t ions as they were before the holocaust of the years 1943-58. Penn i less 
as all refugees may have been w h e n they entered what is today the Fede ra l 
Republ ic , these same refugees are n o w by and large in the s ame pos i t ions 
as they would have been had no popu la t ion m o v e m e n t occurred . I m m e -
diately after the end of World War II, the re was general conce rn tha t re-
fugees would b e c o m e a new G e r m a n underc lass ; by now the re are few 
status differences that can be a t t r ibu ted to the accidents of his tory such as 
w h e t h e r p rope r ty was lost or not or w h e t h e r one had to leave one 's n a t i v e 
area or no t (71). World War I and its a f t e rmath had an i n c o m p a r a b l e 
grea ter effect on t he strat if icat ion system t h a n World War I I—wi th a con-
sequent poli t ical t u r m o i l . T h e re la t ive stabili ty of the Federa l Repub l i c in 
no small m e a s u r e s tems from the absence of violent changes in the stra-
t if ication system. Th i s exper ience gives g r o u n d s for a reappra isa l of t h e 
p r e s u m e d re la t ion be tween the G e r m a n strat if ication system and the suc-
cess of au tho r i t a r i an poli t ical m o v e m e n t s . 
U n d o u b t e d l y the G e r m a n system of s t ra t i f ica t ion—or the pecu l ia r eva-
lua t ion of th i s no t very unusua l system by m a n y G e r m a n s — w a s a source 
of s t ra in for t h e social system. H o w e v e r , th is by itself does no t account for 
the success of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . P re sumab ly the tens ions associated wi th 
t he s trat i f icat ion system and wi th t he m e a n i n g of work lead mere ly to a 
diffuse feeling of uneas iness ; th is po ten t ia l for social conflict could be 
ut i l ized for polit ical purposes only after these feelings had b e c o m e in-
tensif ied. T h e historical ly observed degrees of intensi ty of dissat isfact ion 
and of feelings of hosti l i ty be tween strata, hovever , are no t a necessary 
consequence of the strat if ication system itself. 
F r o m t h e perspec t ive advocated here , addi t iona l cond i t ions were nee-
ded. As ide from economic distress, t he most i m p o r t a n t were a rapid chan-
ge in t h e re la t ion be tween social s t rata and a defini t ion of one ' s in teres ts as 
d e t e r m i n e d by a pos i t ion in the s tatus system. These cond i t ions are n o w 
absent . W h a t e v e r danger the system of strat if icat ion in G e r m a n y may still 
imply for a stable democracy , it is m o r e in t he n a t u r e of p rov id ing causes 
for a p a t h y toward publ ic affairs, no t of causing general conflict be tween 
g roups . 
T h e compat ib i l i ty of the G e r m a n system of social s trat i f icat ion wi th 
different fo rms of poli t ical o rgan iza t ion and wi th different political goals 
is still r a t h e r h igh , bu t t h e po ten t ia l for aggressive responses toward out-
g roups is m u c h reduced . In such a cons te l la t ion , elite g roups can still de-
t e r m i n e policy and polit ical s t ruc ture to an extent that is unusua l for in-
dus t r ia l ized societies, bu t since t he beg inn ing of the 1960's even th is ap-
pears to be chang ing . 
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The Elite in West Germany 
T h e C h a n g i n g G e r m a n Elite 
T h e ear l ier G e r m a n eli te—at least those who publicly passed for an 
elite, such as the proverbia l Prussian J u n k e r s — w e r e ma jo r source of con-
cern for foreign observers . It has often been asserted that the elite in the 
Weimar Republ ic helped to end this G e r m a n exper iment wi th democracy, 
and the re is widespread consensus that the elite by and large cooperated 
( though in par t uneasi ly) with the Nazi m o v e m e n t , con t r ibu t ing to the 
effectiveness of its con t ro l . In passing, it should be re-emphasized that 
m e m b e r s of the elite led a bela ted resis tance m o v e m e n t and that the Nazi 
Par ty itself was dedicated to the ex te rmina t ion of par t of th is elite. But, 
whi le the ties between Nazism and the G e r m a n elite were less s t rong than 
is often ma in t a ined , the re is no doubt that in the past the elite in G e r m a n y 
t ended to oppose a t t empt s to ins t i tu t ional ize democracy. T h e very groups 
that in most Western indust r ia l ized societies are a m o n g the strongest sup-
po r t e r s of democra t ic g o v e r n m e n t con t r ibu ted in G e r m a n y to the fai lure 
of democracy (72). 
W h o a re the elite in the Federal Republ ic? Has the present select class 
changed in compos i t ion and pa t t e rns of r ec ru i tment? T h e elite should be 
different, and rec ru i tment pa t t e rns should have changed , if t he policies of 
the Mil i ta ry G o v e r n m e n t and some of the policies of the Nazi Party itself 
were at all effective. 
Fo rmer ly , the most conspicuous par t of the G e r m a n elite was the ari-
stocracy, especially the Prussian nobi l i ty . Up to the end of the W 7eimar 
Republ ic , the aristocracy played an i m p o r t a n t role in G e r m a n politics and 
the h igher civil service and a d o m i n a n t one in the mil i tary . To a diminis-
h ing degree after 1933 the aris tocracy con t inued as an impor t an t par t of 
the elite. However , the Nazis themse lves were not e n a m o u r e d with the 
t rad i t ional aristocracy (especially the Pruss ians) ; they a t t empted to broa-
den the base for r ec ru i tmen t of mi l i tary leadersh ip (73). 
Today the aris tocracy plays an insignificant role in G e r m a n y , despite a 
few r e m n a n t s of fo rmer impor t ance (e.g., in Bavaria and the foreign ser-
vice). It was the very identif icat ion of t he G e r m a n elite wi th mil i tary ser-
vice tha t was a m a j o r cause for its decl ine . Probably no o the r popu la t ion 
g roup suffered as heavy losses in t he war as the aris tocracy; m a n y m o r e , 
especially from some of the most i l lustr ious families, lost thei r lives in the 
unsuccessful coup d'etat of July 20, 1944 (74). Those ar is tocrats left in the 
par t of G e r m a n y east of the Elbe were fur ther dec imated by the Russian 
Occupa t ion , and the r e m a i n d e r lost thei r economic base t h rough the agra-
r ian re forms of the D D R . Th i s largely obl i terated the t radi t ional aristo-
cracy, since in the ter r i tor ies that are now the Federal Republ ic nobi l i ty 
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has neve r been of m a j o r significance. T h e lack of success of any political 
m o v e m e n t to b r i n g back m o n a r c h y testifies to this change . 
T h e mi l i ta ry , character is t ical ly so i m p o r t a n t in G e r m a n y , has shared the 
fate of t he ar is tocracy. Its m e m b e r s were largely d rawn from the aristo-
cracy, but even beyond that i t fell in to obl ivion dur ing the d i scon t inua t ion 
of G e r m a n y ' s mi l i t a ry t rad i t ion . T h e Federa l Republ ic is today the m a j o r 
coun t ry whe re t he mi l i tary are least inf luent ia l (75). H e r e , too , the Nazis 
had a l ready begun to b reak the es tab l i shment . 
Whi l e the fate of t he aris tocracy and of t he mi l i ta ry was main ly decided 
in World War II and its i m m e d i a t e a f te rmath , the th i rd ma jo r change in 
elite compos i t i on , the increased i m p o r t a n c e of big business , occurred wit-
hin t he Federa l Repub l i c and is a fea ture genu ine to this pol i ty (76). Ow-
ners and m a n a g e r s of i m p o r t a n t indus t r ies are n o w m o r e immedia te ly 
involved in publ ic life than were the i r c o u n t e r p a r t s in earl ier per iods . Of 
course , m a n y indust r ia l i s t s still prefer to » o w n « a deputy or a sha re in a 
par ty ins tead of pa r t i c ipa t ing directly; bu t the t rend is u n m i s t a k a b l y for 
b u s i n e s s m e n to b e c o m e m o r e involved in pub l i c life. 
Within bus iness , t he single most active a n d most influential g roup du-
r ing t he 1950's was f inance (and not heavy indus t ry , as in the Weimar 
Republ ic ) . In t h e wr i t ings of G e r m a n social scientists , th is ap p ro x i ma t i o n 
to t h e cond i t i ons in most Western indus t r ia l ized societies has p robab ly 
been o v e r e m p h a s i z e d , a n d it is definitely an exaggerat ion to call th i s grea-
ter i nvo lvemen t of bus iness—as D a h r e n d o r f d o e s — o n e of the m a j o r gua-
ran t ies of t he stabil i ty of G e r m a n democracy (77). Never the less , th i s is a 
m a j o r change , and today bus inessmen cons t i tu te t he largest pa r t of t h e 
G e r m a n elite. 
T h e r e p robab ly has been a four th change : an increased i m p o r t a n c e of 
h igher civil se rvants . Such officials are cons idered to be the second or th i rd 
most n u m e r o u s g r o u p wi th in the elite. A l t h o u g h as ind iv idua ls they usual-
ly do not wield significant power , they can often claim super ior exper t ise , 
and they are i m p o r t a n t as a g roup . The i r homogene i ty of b a c k g r o u n d and 
out look exerts a s t rong inf luence on t h e cha rac te r of political deba te . Pro-
bab ly some of t h e s t rong legal f lavor of present political concepts and 
a r g u m e n t a t i o n even in foreign policy c o m e s from th is g roup (78). 
Even a l lowing for these changes , tha t t h e compos i t ion of t he elite 
should still be in m a n y ways s imi lar to that of the Weimar Republ ic—ex-
cept for t he v i r tua l d i sappearance of t he a r i s t oc r acy - - s eems jus t as remar-
kab le as t he differences which have appeared since t hen . In accordance 
wi th t he par t icu lar i s t ic s t ruc ture of G e r m a n society, the most d iverse 
g roups are now all r epresen ted a m o n g the elite: the chu rches , t r ade u n i o n s , 
j ou rna l i s t s , professors , t he academic profess ions , the ar ts (largely t h r o u g h 
art is ts wi th civil se rvant status) , f a rmers (via owners of estates), and of 
course polit ical o rgan iza t ions . O n e may be a m e m b e r of the elite t h r o u g h 
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na t iona l i m p o r t a n c e but equally as a regional digni tary; res idence in West 
G e r m a n y ' s capital is certainly no prerequis i te . It is only in compar i son 
wi th the strat if icat ion system in general that the shift in the elite appears 
p r o n o u n c e d . 
To overs ta te a change for the sake of clarity: World War I s trongly af-
fected the strat if icat ion system, whi le World War II did not . T h e reverse is 
t rue with regard to t h e elite. Still, i t would be wrong to consider this chan-
ge as a real b reak in cont inui ty . The weight of g roups may have changed , 
and some g roups may no longer be represented , but the organiz ing prin-
ciple of the system has r ema ined . Any cu r ren t changes are probably stron-
ger t han those that occurred dur ing the 1950's, s imply because the lat ter 
were so m o d e r a t e . 
T h e G e r m a n Discussion of »Eli te« 
Some analysts of c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n society, no tab ly Dahrendor f , 
doub t w h e t h e r the re is now any th ing left deserving the t e rm »elite.« T h e 
elite as a social p h e n o m e n o n is bel ieved to be a casualty of the changes in 
G e r m a n society. T h e absence of such an elite is both proc la imed and 
m o u r n e d by m a n y G e r m a n s — b o t h inside and outside pol i t i cs—who by 
any objec t ive c r i te r ion should be called m e m b e r s of the elite themselves . 
Of course , differences in power , status, prest ige, p rominence , a n d / o r no-
tor ie ty are recognized; but i t is usual to deny that var ious groups with 
super ior pos i t ions should be called »eli te« (79). Th i s discussion itself, whe-
the r the re is at present such a th ing as a G e r m a n elite, is qui te ins t ruct ive: 
i t reflects the p r e i n d u s t r i a l values and ideologies that still prevai l a m o n g 
the most highly educated G e r m a n s . As to the real facts, a cont roversy over 
w h o is at t he top and what quali t ies the top people have is itself a good 
ind ica tor of rapid social change. 
Reflect ions on the na tu re of an elite character is t ical ly confuse analytical 
and value o r i en ta t ions . Some observers of G e r m a n y differ as to w h o has 
power . It is indeed no easy task to reach any consensus on such a quest ion 
in a society tha t has u n d e r g o n e and is con t inu ing to unde rgo rapid political 
and economic change . O the r s a m o n g the intell igentsia th ink they k n o w 
w h o ho lds p o w e r and carry on a lively debate about the quali ty of those in 
pos i t ions of l eadersh ip . Th i s debate is chiefly Utopian, remin iscen t of Pla-
to's p resc r ip t ions for an ideal society. As usual in h u m a n history, the i r 
answer to the quest ion of whe the r the best men rule is an accusing »No.« 
Short of an omnisc ien t and absolute definit ion of » the b e s t « the only 
reasonab le way to phrase a question about the quali ty of those in top po-
si t ions is: given the funct ions of a par t icu la r posi t ion at a specific point in 
t ime , do t he i n c u m b e n t s have the necessary qualif icat ions? T h e funct ions 
of a posi t ion are the s tandards against which the quali t ies of an i n c u m b e n t 
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are to be j u d g e d . G i v e n a high degree of funct ional d i f ferent ia t ion , we 
shou ld expect different qual i t ies to be re levant for different pos i t ions . A n d 
given c h a n g i n g tasks , different qual i f icat ions are re levant at different ti-
mes . 
G e r m a n s and F r e n c h m e n tend to be impressed by pol i t ic ians w h o have 
a c o m m a n d of classical scho la rsh ip , and A m e r i c a n s by and large r a the r 
distrust such m e n in poli t ical office. H o w e v e r , at t imes t he U.S . has been 
led by m e n of cons ide rab le scholarsh ip and phi losophica l inc l ina t ions . 
O n e need only t h ink of t he found ing per iod and such men as Jefferson, 
F r a n k l i n , A d a m s , M a d i s o n , and H a m i l t o n . Yet dur ing o the r pe r iods t h e 
pol i t ic ians in t h e U.S . have been d is t inguished chiefly—if they were dis-
t ingu i shed at a l l - - b y the i r abil i ty to act as b r o k e r s for confl ic t ing interes ts 
and by the i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of cur ren t p o w e r pos i t ions . W h e n no m a j o r 
p r o b l e m s of social s t ruc tu re or of t he polit ical system were at s take, t he 
U.S . has done qu i te well w i th t he la t ter k ind of pol i t ic ian. A b u s i n e s s m a n ' s 
c o m m a n d of social ph i lo sophy is usual ly no prerequis i te for a l eade r sh ip 
pos i t ion in f o r m u l a t i n g economic policy; bu t his abil i ty to d iagnose eco-
n o m i c t endenc ie s and to react p ragmat ica l ly to economic conflict a re 
usual ly re levant . In add i t ion to these special qual i f icat ions , t he re is pro-
bably such a qual i ty as l eade r sh ip abil i ty un re l a t ed to a specific content-
bu t th is is ce r ta in ly not c o n c o m i t a n t wi th a professor 's n o t i o n s of intellec-
tual and cu l tu ra l e m i n e n c e . 
T h e degree to wh ich those funct ions a re adequate ly pe r fo rmed tha t a re 
called for at a pa r t i cu la r t i m e and in a pa r t i cu la r posi t ion depends in par t 
on the qual i t ies of t he i n c u m b e n t s . H o w e v e r , i t is qui te unrea l i s t ic to base 
one ' s j u d g m e n t abou t the effectiveness of the elite of a coun t ry on some 
»average« qual i f ica t ion . Fo r an elite, too, t he who le is not equ iva len t to t h e 
sum of its pa r t s . Dec is ions in one sphere of society affect o the r spheres , 
and the top pos i t ions of a society accordingly can be viewed as a system. 
T h e way in which the top pos i t ions are re la ted to each o ther and specifi-
cally t h e way in wh ich decis ions in one sphe re are m a d e wi th re ference to 
a n o t h e r sphere can be called the elite system. T h e qual i ty of an elite is jus t 
as m u c h a consequence of this system as it is a consequence of some aver-
age qual i f ica t ion. 
T h e te rm »el i te« is used he re as i t is usual ly employed in A m e r i c a n 
wr i t ing , i.e., s imply as deno t ing all those w h o are in a pos i t ion of leader-
sh ip regardless of the i r e m i n e n c e with respect to o the r cr i ter ia . T h e te rm 
» l eade r sh ip« is m e a n t to s imply refer to the process of be ing deferred to , 
imi ta ted , and obeyed (80). 
W h e t h e r l e ade r sh ip is the legi t imate consequence of a posi t ion (i.e., »au -
t ho r i ty« ) or mere ly de facto is a second and secondary p rob lem (81). A t o p 
pos i t ion m a k e s i t l ikely tha t t he i n c u m b e n t will be inf luent ia l , b u t th i s i s 
p rope r ly an empi r ica l ques t ion , no t one to be decided a priori. Converse ly , 
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an inf luence may be exerted by those not in a top posi t ion (e.g., the emi-
nences grises). W h e t h e r de jacto impor t ance and impor t ance of office 
usually coincide is one of the p roper t i e s of an elite system as a system. T h e 
Brit ish es tab l i shment is a p r i m e example of a leadersh ip s t ruc ture where 
pos i t ion and actual inf luence frequently do no t coincide, whi le the reverse 
t ends to be t rue for the F rench elite. The elite system in G e r m a n y appears 
to be a bi t closer to the system in F r a n c e than to that in Eng land (82). All 
th is is k n o w n as par t of everyone 's life exper ience; and yet in the i r pro-
fessional treatises sociologists and polit ical scientists tend to ignore the i r 
own knowledge as pr iva te persons (83). 
C a n those wi thou t power bu t h igh prest ige be counted a m o n g the elite-
»newswor thy« ph i l an th rop i s t s and film stars? W h a t about a recipient of 
t he Nobel Prize such as Rudolf Mossbauer , a powerful f igure in f inance 
such as Rudolf M i i n e m a n n , a regionally powerful pol i t ic ian with na t iona l 
impact such as F r a n z Meyers (P r ime Minis te r of Nor th Rhine-Westpha-
lia)? H o w these var ious forms of e m i n e n c e are to be sorted in to types is 
one of t he m a i n topics in G e r m a n wri t ings about elites (84). Th i s is no t 
merely a t rad i t ional G e r m a n preference for systematizing instead of em-
pirical analysis bu t also reflects reality: namely , a low degree of over lap 
be tween va r ious forms of eminence . T h e lack of over lap and not t h e ab-
sence of l eade r sh ip groups as such is the cause for the m a n y doub t s as to 
w h e t h e r G e r m a n y has an elite. 
W h a t e v e r t he re may be left in G e r m a n y of »society« as an e x a m p l e of 
elegant and cul t ivated l iving is not identical with the g roups that hold 
pos i t ions of power in polit ics and in the economy. Intel lectual l eadersh ip is 
concen t ra t ed in still a different set of persons . T h e t rad i t ional no t ions of 
»el i te« in G e r m a n y and France d e m a n d tha t t he va r ious fo rms of emi-
nence all be concen t ra ted in the s ame g roup , and the Brit ish es tab l i shment 
is seen as an e x a m p l e of wha t G e r m a n y n o w lacks. G i v e n also a consi-
derab le regional dispersion because of t h e lack of a cosmopol i t an capi tal , it 
becomes u n d e r s t a n d a b l e why the existence of an elite is so widely re jected. 
In surveys of G e r m a n s in l eadersh ip posi t ion one frequent ly encoun te r s a 
great re luc tance to use the t e rm »el i te« and a preference for the term 
l e a d e r s h i p g roups« (Fuhrungsgruppen). 
W h e t h e r G e r m a n y has a vestigial uppe r class and some Fiihrungsgrup-
pen in place of an elite is not merely a quest ion of semant ics a n d defini t ion 
tha t we m a y safely ignore. Within G e r m a n y i t would be just i f ied to argue 
for a m o r a t o r i u m in using the te rm »el i te« in view of the m a n y undesi-
rable va lue c o n n o t a t i o n s of this t e r m — t h e m o r e so when au tho r s apply the 
word only to the type of elite system tha t is to the i r l iking. In an interna-
t ional context , however , one cannot s imply present t he s ta tement » G e r -
m a n y has no elite,« and hope that i t will be unders tood as a consequence 
of a subjec t ive defini t ion. If, as I have argued , the elite in G e r m a n y is 
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segmenta l i zed and regional ly dispersed, for such an a r r a n g e m e n t i t does 
m a t t e r wh ich def ini t ion and t e r m s one chooses . 
T h e n o t i o n of elite will be of interest he re s imply insofar as i t deno te s 
pe r sons in a posi t ion of l eadersh ip with regard to processes on the level of 
the pol i ty and the social system. These va r ious l eade r sh ip pos i t ions and 
g roups are in ter re la ted in such a way tha t they form a system. Both t he 
system and the aggregate of pe r sons in l eadersh ip pos i t ions may be called 
»el i te .« In this sense we shall c o m p a r e the compos i t ion of t he elite and the 
cha rac t e r of th is system wi th tha t of o the r indus t r ia l ized Western demo-
cracies . G iven def ini t ion, the diagnosis will differ somewha t from tha t of 
o the r inves t iga t ions of G e r m a n y ' s elite. 
C o m p o s i t i o n of t he Present G e r m a n Eli te 
T h e few recent empir ica l s tudies of the elite in G e r m a n y all p roceed 
from an analysis of d e m o g r a p h i c character is t ics of those w h o hold posi-
t ions tha t officially are of m a j o r impor t ance . T h e most recent a n d mos t 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e of these s tudies f inds that t he G e r m a n elite shows t h e fol-
lowing charac ter i s t ics : 
1) a long fo rmal educa t ion , usually a univers i ty degree in an appl ied 
subjec t ; 
2) long careers unt i l elite pos i t ions are reached; charac ter i s t ic for those 
n o w in elite pos i t ions are 20 to 30 years exper ience in one pa r t i cu l a r oc-
cupa t i on ; 
3) a consequent ly r a the r h igh age, wi th most m e m b e r s of the elite be ing 
be tween 45 to 60 years old; 
4) a lmost total exclusion of w o m e n (85). 
Such results a re par t ly t rea ted by the m e t h o d s used to identify eli te 
s ta tus . Unfor tuna te ly , whi le t he m e t h o d for s tudying rep resen ta t ive cross-
sect ions of who le p o p u l a t i o n s is well developed, the t echn iques to identify 
elite g roups are no t . Polit ical scientists in G e r m a n y and F r a n c e h a v e usual-
ly s tudied the elite by s o m e h o w defining cer ta in n o r m a l pos i t ions as ha-
v ing eli te cha rac te r and then descr ibing the character is t ics of those w h o 
occupy the pos i t ions . Th i s approach ignores the quest ion of how o n e can 
p r o v e the re levance of the pos i t ions that were selected and w h e t h e r t he 
i m p o r t a n c e of the office ma tches the actual inf luence of the i n c u m b e n t -
p rov ided that m e m b e r s of the elite even hold fo rmal office. Fo r some elite 
g roups the results m a y not be effected by the m e t h o d of select ions, bu t th is 
only reflects a pa r t i cu la r o rganiza t ion of the elite. P rov ided an elite in t h e 
sense of l eadersh ip opera tes from formal pos i t ions tha t are equ iva len t in 
i m p o r t a n c e to the actual in f luence of i n c u m b e n t s , p rov ided fu r the r that 
t h e r e is cons ide rab le over lap between var ious elite sectors, and also pro-
vided tha t t he re exists a s t rong concen t ra t ion of such elites in a capi ta l , 
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then the par t icu lar m e t h o d of selection p robab ly does not mat ter . T h e 
G e r m a n elite is at present very different from this type of organiza t ion , 
and m e t h o d s of selection do mat te r . Of course , th i s does not b e c o m e ap-
pa ren t as long as everyone uses the same formalis t ic approach . 
T h e descr ipt ion given in this chap te r of the compos i t ion of the cu r ren t 
G e r m a n elite and its system of in teract ion is ma in ly based on four recent 
invest igat ions , th ree of which are as yet unpub l i shed . T h e one publ i shed 
study, by sociologists at the Univers i ty of Tub ingen , relied on the t radi t io-
nal approach and carr ied it out with great precis ion. In a first step about 
300 top pos i t ions were selected from the rea lms of polit ics, publ ic admi-
n i s t ra t ion , the judic iary , economic interest g roups , large co rpora t ions , 
churches , and mass media . Between 1919 and 1961 these near ly 300 posi-
t ions were occupied by m o r e than 2000 persons , and the main emphas i s of 
the s tudy was on t rac ing the ra te and direct ion of change in the incum-
bency of a posi t ion (86). In pr inc ip le the s ame approach was also used in a 
study of leaders in bus iness that was commiss ioned by Der Spiegel and 
car r ied out in 1963-64 by the m a r k e t research organiza t ion I F A K (87). 
Al toge ther , 500 m e m b e r s of the top m a n a g e m e n t in G e r m a n industry were 
selected, 400 of w h o m served in p roduc t ion and 100 in dis t r ibut ion and 
services. 
A very different approach was chosen by the Ins t i tu te for C o m p a r a t i v e 
Social Research of t he Univers i ty of Cologne in a survey of the G e r m a n 
elite in 1965. In pr inc ip le , th is approach was a combina t ion of two of t he 
t h r ee most f requent ly used m e t h o d s in studies of c o m m u n i t y power struc-
tu re (88). T h e Inst i tute 's researchers began with quotas giving c o m b i n e d 
specifications of posi t ions bo th by region of the coun t ry and by b r a n c h of 
the elite (analogous to the subdivis ions used by Zapf) . For example , a given 
n u m b e r of in terviews was assigned to the M u n i c h region, and this n u m b e r 
was fur ther subdivided in to such categories as publ ic admin is t ra t ion and 
business . T h e quotas were in par t der ived from past surveys of elite g roups 
in G e r m a n y and in par t based on j u d g m e n t . Fo r each of 300 cases bo th the 
t i t le of an organiza t ion and the n a m e of a specific person were listed. In a 
second step about 24 »knowledgeab les« were in terviewed; they were de-
f ined as pe r sons occupying posi t ions at in tersect ions of var ious elite sec-
tors . Each of these »knowledgeables« wi th in one of the six regions amen-
ded t h e local list of pos i t ions and names , add ing new posi t ions or substi-
tu t ing t he n a m e of a par t icu la r person suggested for a posi t ion (e.g., recom-
m e n d i n g for an in terview the assistant undersec re ta ry of a minis t ry r a the r 
t h a n the undersecre ta ry) . Th i s p rocedure was self-weighting in the sense 
tha t ini t ia l quotas were substant ia l ly changed , (e.g., fewer top political lea-
ders were identified in a city such as Berlin than was originally anticipa-
ted.) Al toge ther about 400 top » inf luent ia ls« were thus identified, of 
w h i c h 366 were actually in te rv iewed. 
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A fou r th c o m p a r a t i v e study of the elite, th i s t ime deal ing with G e r m a n y 
and F rance , was organized by Karl Deu t sch and conduc ted in G e r m a n y by 
Louis Ed inge r in 1964, using a p r o c e d u r e that was in between the usual 
pos i t iona l approach and the m e t h o d developed at Co logne . In a first s tep, 
12 G e r m a n »knowledgeab les« were asked to suggest n a m e s for elite inter-
views. At the s ame t ime , t rad i t iona l sources for selecting pos i t ions of con-
sequence were consul ted , and a n u m b e r of i n c u m b e n t s of such pos i t ions 
were ident i f ied. Th i s led to a roster of 650 elite m e m b e r s , out of which 173 
pe r sons were selected for actual in terv iews. 
T h e p rocedures used in the 1965 study led to somewha t different fin-
dings about t he compos i t ion and the s t ruc ture of the G e r m a n elite than 
t h e o the r studies. T h e type of differences was pred ic tab le a l ready from 
exper iences du r ing data col lect ion. A substant ia l ma jor i ty of the Cologne 
Ins t i tu te ' s r e sponden t s were associated with pos i t ions that would also have 
been identif ied in a straight posi t ional app roach . Howeve r , qui te often a 
different pe rson than the one in posi t ion of formal l eade r sh ip was identi-
fied as the m o r e influential one . T h u s one of the »cour t ph i lo sophe r s« of 
G e r m a n indus t ry held an in t e rmed ia ry posi t ion in the indus t ry ' s public-
re la t ions ins t i tu te ; a senior vice pres iden t of a c o m p a n y was r e c o m m e n d e d 
as m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the official p res ident ; a specific employee of the 
na t iona l h e a d q u a r t e r s of one of t he m a j o r par t ies was cons idered to be at 
least as inf luent ial as the v ice-cha i rman of this par ty; a specific official of 
t he Defense Minis t ry (Bundesministerium jiir Verteidigung) was bel ieved 
to be the single most powerful m a n in p r o c u r e m e n t even t hough his t i t le 
was less t h a n awe- inspi r ing. Especial ly those of ma jo r intel lectual influen-
ce would often not be ident i f iable at all via a s traight posi t ional app roach . 
A n d i t is pe rhaps of equal i m p o r t a n c e that the posi t ional approach loads 
any s imple wi th a large n u m b e r of i r re levant persons . 
In G e r m a n y lists of pe rsons and lists of pos i t ions of top inf luence in 
na t iona l affairs diverge accord ing to the par t icu la r m e t h o d employed , and 
th is can be in te rpre ted as an ind ica tor tha t elite compos i t ion in G e r m a n y 
is chang ing . Appa ren t ly , m a n y younger pe r sons have al ready achieved po-
si t ions of cons iderab le actual inf luence , whi le represen ta t ives of the p r e -
war genera t ion con t inue to serve formal ly in high office. Also the Cologne 
sociologists ' a s sumpt ion of a regional and sectoral segmenta t ion of the elite 
was s t rongly conf i rmed . Qui te knowledgeab le m e m b e r s of the elite usually 
knew only a very small n u m b e r of pe r sons from o ther elite sectors even 
wi th in the i r region. T h e G e r m a n elite inc ludes very few w o m e n . T h e r e are 
a few w o m e n in pos i t ions of i m p o r t a n c e in the mass med ia , in art , and in 
n o n p r o f i t associat ions bu t a lmost n o n e in polit ics or bus iness . Roughly 
t he s ame ho lds t rue for Eng land , F rance , and the U.S. 
Before going on to pick out and c o m p a r e f indings from the four surveys 
on which this section is based, i t may be co nve n i en t to n a m e the surveys 
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again . T h e work d o n e by Univers i ty of Tubingen researchers is dated 1961 ; 
t h e s tudy sponsored by Der Spiegel, 1963; the invest igat ion organized by 
Kar l Deu t sch , 1964; and the Univers i ty of Co logne sociologists 1 contr ibu-
t ion to Dan ie l Lerner ' s three-count ry project , 1965. In the discussion that 
follows, these dates appear in paren theses to show the source of var ious 
da ta . 
T h e r e are con t rad ic tory f indings about the age compos i t ion of the elite. 
In a pos i t ional approach , the elite may appear s o m e w h a t over-aged (1961). 
M e m b e r s of the intellectual elite and especially leaders in public admini-
s t ra t ion are indeed very often older than 55, but in polit ics and in business 
va r ious age g roups are all s trongly represented . At present , a ma jo r change 
is u n d e r w a y for pos i t ions of economic leadersh ip , and according to the 
n e w e r s t anda rds a m a n that by 40 years of age is not a cand ida te for a 
pos i t ion of m a j o r impor t ance , and who has not reached such a posi t ion by 
a r o u n d 45, will p robably never m a k e it to the top (89). In polit ics, too , a 
m a j o r change is t ak ing place, and by about 1970 most of the pe rsons 
k n o w n from pos twar G e r m a n politics will have been replaced largely by 
m e n in the i r 40's and 50's. However , because of the con t inu ing high age of 
l eaders in publ ic admin i s t r a t ion , the average age for the elite will not d rop 
accordingly . Zapf (1961, p. 170) f inds 58 years to be the average age for the 
G e r m a n elite, and in later surveys the average is p e r h a p s 56 years (1965). 
By about 1970 th is average will have dropped to about 52 years and will be 
cons iderab ly lower in some sectors. Pe rhaps m o r e indicat ive than the aver-
age age is the age spread, and here we may expect that the lower age l imi t 
general ly acceptable for elite status will d rop to about 40 years. 
Most elite m e m b e r s are mar r i ed , a l though d ivorce rates are near ly th ree 
t imes as high for them as in the popula t ion at large (1965). Given the low 
G e r m a n divorce rates, this still means that t he elite person in G e r m a n y 
will in most cases have one mar r iage . T h e n u m b e r of chi ldren is a bit 
h igher t han average in the popula t ion but smal ler than appears to be t rue 
for the U.S. ; large famil ies (5 chi ldren and more ) are very rare . 
Ca thol ic g roups have always compla ined tha t ever since t he found ing of 
the Second G e r m a n E m p i r e the na t ion has been domina ted by pro tes tan ts . 
T h e Federa l Republ ic is the m o r e Cathol ic par t of the fo rmer Reich, now 
inc lud ing b o t h m a j o r d e n o m i n a t i o n s in near ly equal p ropor t i ons . T h e r e is 
widespread consensus that the Cathol ic C h u r c h is a vastly m o r e influential 
body t h a n the Pro tes tan t chu rches combined . However , all recent investi-
ga t ions of the G e r m a n elite (1961, 1964, 1965) agree that in leadersh ip 
pos i t ions Pro tes tan t s are considerably m o r e n u m e r o u s than Cathol ics . 
A m o n g leaders Protes tant usually means L u t h e r a n . T h e p ropor t ion of Pro-
tes tants to Cathol ics differs considerably by sector of the elite, wi th Ca-
thol ics be ing n u m e r o u s in polit ics and ext remely under - represen ted in bu-
siness (1961 , 1965). 
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T h e n u m b e r of those w h o do no t be long to one of the c h u r c h e s is m o r e 
t h a n twice as high a m o n g t h e elite as in the general popu la t ion . G iven the 
r a t h e r au toma t i c m e m b e r s h i p in one of the c h u r c h e s that is a consequence 
of G e r m a n law, not be ing a m e m b e r is t a n t a m o u n t to a publ ic dec la ra t ion 
of a n t i c l e r i c a l s e n t i m e n t s . T h e G e r m a n elite is no t ant i-rel igious in o the r 
ways, however . C h u r c h a t t e n d a n c e is a bit lower t h a n usual for c o m p a r a b -
le g roups , but again not m u c h so (1965). 
In mar i ta l s tatus and in rel igious behav io r the G e r m a n elite does not 
differ radical ly from the popu l a t i on in general , bu t in educa t ion i t does . 
On ly about 2 per cent of adul t G e r m a n s have a univers i ty educa t ion , but 
app rox ima te ly 2 out of 3 m e m b e r s of the elite have . A posi t ional app roach 
(1961) leads to a h ighe r pe rcen tage for those tha t have merely a t t ended 
g rade s choo l—the level of educa t ion typical for the popu la t ion in genera l . 
T h i s is largely because a larger n u m b e r of Social D e m o c r a t s and of t rade-
u n i o n leaders a re inc luded t h r o u g h posi t ional s amp l ing and u n i o n s and 
t h e S P D are the two o rgan iza t ions whose leaders tend to have a m u c h 
lower level of formal educa t ion . A univers i ty educa t ion is of course no 
g u a r a n t e e for an elite pos i t ion ; t he re is no »el i te« educa t iona l career in 
G e r m a n y c o m p a r a b l e to t h e system in Eng land or F rance (90). H o w e v e r , a 
un ivers i ty educa t ion is b e c o m i n g a r equ i r emen t for en t r ance in to the pool 
of eligibles. Th i s is increas ingly t rue even for bus iness and the mi l i ta ry . 
A l ready today m o r e t h a n one- th i rd of the elite hold a P h . D . or an equi-
va len t doc tora te (1965) (91). 
A univers i ty educa t ion for t he G e r m a n elite used to be largely equiva-
lent to the s tudy of law. W h i l e law still r ema ins the single mos t i m p o r t a n t 
field of s t u d y - e s p e c i a l l y a m o n g the political and the admin i s t r a t ive elite 
(as is also t rue for t he U.S . and F r a n c e ) — t h e sciences, l iberal ar ts , and 
economics and bus iness admin i s t r a t i on are of increasing i m p o r t a n c e . The-
re is no s t anda rd c o m b i n a t i o n of subjects any m o r e akin to t he f a m o u s 
P E P in Bri tain or the appl ied sciences as in F rance . By a r o u n d 1970, the 
increas ing n u m b e r of those t ra ined in economics may already have an 
effect on the style of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g in G e r m a n y , which so far has been 
d o m i n a t e d by legal t r a in ing . By th is date , t he G e r m a n elite will be even 
m o r e diversified in b a c k g r o u n d t h a n i t a l ready is. 
T h e local and regional b a c k g r o u n d of G e r m a n leaders is even m o r e 
diverse t han thei r educa t iona l careers . Th i s is largely a consequence of 
h a v i n g an ad hoc capital a n d a n u m b e r of s t rong regional centers . Just as 
in m a n y o the r Western coun t r i e s , about two- th i rds of the G e r m a n leaders 
have been bo rn and raised in cit ies (1965); a pos i t ional app roach , however , 
places th is sha re closer to 50 pe r cent . In cont ras t to the s i tuat ion in Eng-
land a n d F r a n c e , no single u rban region con t r ibu te s a la rge sha re of all 
l e a d e r s — a n d this is t r u e for t he past as well . 
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T h e elite in the Federa l Republ ic is m o r e West G e r m a n than ever be-
fore. This is not jus t a consequence of a shift of the center of g o v e r n m e n t 
to the western par t s of G e r m a n y . Al ready du r ing the Weimar Repub l i c , 
and c o n t i n u i n g du r ing the Nazi per iod, the percentage of leaders b o r n in 
western pa r t s of t he coun t ry was increasing, wi th a d i sp ropor t iona te ly 
s t rong decrease of t he t rad i t ional leadersh ip from the eastern pa r t s of Ger-
m a n y (92). T h u s G e r m a n leadersh ip has b e c o m e m o r e »Western E u r o -
p e a n « over a long per iod . T h e relat ive numer i ca l impor t ance of foreign-
born G e r m a n s — s o charac ter i s t ic for the elite of the Nazi pe r iod—is now 
gone , too . 
Civil se rvants and the jud ic ia ry are the most h o m o g e n e o u s g roups wit-
h in the G e r m a n elite in age, educat ion , and regional and local b a c k g r o u n d . 
Elites in these fields are usually somewha t older , they come m u c h m o r e 
often from rural areas , and a m u c h greater n u m b e r of t h e m stem from the 
eastern pa r t s of G e r m a n y , as c o m p a r e d to o ther elite groups . Eli tes in all 
fields of civil service usually have a t r a in ing in law. These differences in 
b a c k g r o u n d from tha t in o ther elite sectors, toge ther wi th the re la t ive ho-
mogene i ty in age, educa t ion , and place of origin may con t r ibu te to t he 
sense of » a p a r t h e i d « that seems so preva len t a m o n g t h e m . 
T h e social basis from which the G e r m a n elite is recrui ted is p robab ly 
b r o a d e r than tha t of F r a n c e and definitely far b roade r than is t rue for the 
Brit ish elite (93). Of course , r ec ru i tmen t is still qui te selective: all recent 
elite s tudies agree tha t cons iderably m o r e t h a n 50 per cent of the elite 
c o m e from the app rox ima te ly 5 per cent of families which cons t i tu te up-
per- and upper-middle-c lass G e r m a n s (1964, 1965). Using a less res t r ic t ive 
defini t ion for u p p e r and upper -midd le class to inc lude about 10 per cent of 
the popu la t i on , we f ind about two-thirds of all elite m e m b e r s c o m i n g from 
these s trata (94). Politics, civil service (excluding the jud ic ia ry) , and non-
bus iness pressure g roups are those sectors of the elite that are most acces-
sible to pe rsons from lower social s trata . Nobi l i ty is by now fairly irrele-
van t except in the m o r e ce remonia l pos i t ions . 
Educa t ion , as previous ly suggested, affords one ma jo r avenue for ente-
r ing t h e elite: t he re is a d rama t i c difference be tween educat ional s ta tus of 
elite m e m b e r s and tha t of the i r fa thers . A n o t h e r avenue is ma r r i age : 
a m o n g the elite, t he social s tatus of fathers-in-law is somewha t h igher than 
the s tatus of the average m e m b e r ' s own father , a l though not d ramat ica l ly 
so (1965). Surpr is ingly, elite m e m b e r s prefer to mar ry wives wi th mere ly a 
high-school educa t ion (mhtlere Reije). T h e Cologne researchers found 
tha t t h e percen tage of wives with a univers i ty educa t ion is lower t h a n 
w a r r a n t e d by the ra t io of ma le to female s tudents . Intel lectual wives or 
highly educated wives are not par t of G e r m a n elite cu l tu re . 
Prov ided a m a n is fo r tuna te in the choice of a father , is b o r n in an 
u r b a n area tha t offers easy access to secondary educa t ion , and is able to 
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a t t end the univers i ty , t he re is one fur ther strategic po in t in his career: the 
choice of an occupa t ion . A d v a n c e m e n t is largely wi th in one occupa t ion , 
wi th l i t t le o p p o r t u n i t y for a c r o s s o v e r pr ior to r each ing a posi t ion of some 
c o n s e q u e n c e (1965). A n u m b e r of occupa t ions offer an o p p o r t u n i t y to j o in 
t h e eli te, bu t two qui te dist inct approaches are used to win access. T h e 
asp i ran t may c l imb to the top of an i m p o r t a n t firm or office, or he may 
first ach ieve p r o m i n e n c e in a smal ler sphere and then work t h r o u g h a 
n a t i o n w i d e organ iza t ion where inf luence increases fu r the r w i thou t con-
comi t an t increase in occupat ional posi t ion. A d v a n c e m e n t via publ ic office 
in the specific m e a n i n g of this te rm is, however , qu i te ra re (1965). Ra the r , 
t h e r e is a b ranch ing -ou t in to publ ic life after a pos i t ion of some impor tan-
ce has a l ready been achieved (95). M e m b e r s h i p in associa t ions is c o m m o n , 
bu t mos t m e m b e r s h i p s are conf ined to pressure g roups ope ra t ing on a 
na t i ona l level, and m e m b e r s h i p in m o r e than two vo lun t a ry associat ions i s 
no t f requent (1965). All th is po in t s to a very different func t ion of vo-
l u n t a r y associa t ions for the G e r m a n elite t h a n is t r u e for the i r U.S. 
c o u n t e r p a r t s . 
Mos t ca reers of cu r ren t G e r m a n d e c i s i o n m a k e r s were in t e r rup ted by 
mi l i t a ry service, and only in bus iness and a m o n g cul tura l l eaders were less 
t h a n two- th i rds of t he present elite affected by th is . C o n t r a r y to s o m e of 
t h e suspic ions abroad , I bel ieve tha t th is exper i ence has con t r ibu ted to the 
cons ide rab le fear of war and the distrust of an act ive mi l i ta ry policy that is 
p reva len t a m o n g the G e r m a n elite (96). Most of t h e G e r m a n elite did not 
at ta in officer status, and approx ima te ly one- th i rd r e m a i n e d in the lowest 
r an ks . G iven a length of mi l i ta ry service in most cases of m o r e than 3 
years ( f requent ly up to 7-9 years), and given also t he policy of m o r e or less 
draf t ing a n y o n e for officer s tatus w h o had comple ted secondary educa t ion , 
th i s is a r a t h e r r e m a r k a b l e f inding, a l though p e r h a p s in pa r t i t reflects t he 
high casual ty ra te of officers. In spite of the p re fe rence of some large 
indus t r ia l c o m b i n e s for fo rmer staff officers in selecting top m a n a g e m e n t , 
1 t h ink these figures reflect a r a the r r e m a r k a b l e lack of en thus ia sm for t h e 
mi l i ta ry . 
A side-effect of t h e p reva lence and length of mi l i ta ry service is that 
pe r sons of qui te different age have been m e m b e r s of t he elite for the s ame 
n u m b e r of years . T h e average n u m b e r of years in an elite posi t ion is ap-
p rox ima te ly 10 years (1964), and in m a n y sectors of the elite 15 years 
a p p e a r to be t h e l imit at wh ich a defini te dec l ine of actual inf luence be-
gins . G i v e n the fact tha t m e m b e r s of t he present G e r m a n elite did not fill 
pos i t ions as they con t inua l ly b e c a m e vacan t , bu t reached elite status m o r e 
or less s imul taneous ly , we can expect a m a j o r r e t i r emen t wi th in the next 
years . T h i s i s a l ready u n d e r way for the e c o n o m i c elite, w h e r e wi th in th is 
decade t he o v e r w h e l m i n g major i ty of pos i t ions will be occupied by new 
p e r s o n n e l . 
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A sizable i ncome is usually a c o n c o m i t a n t of elite s tatus in G e r m a n y , 
bu t o w n e r s h i p is usual ly not . Pos twar tax legislation did favor the accu-
mula t ion of capi ta l , and several h u n d r e d pe r sons in G e r m a n y managed to 
amass cons ide rab le for tunes wi thin a per iod of about 15 years. T h e extre-
mely large for tunes , however , are still t he result of inher i t ance , and by and 
large the re is less of a concen t ra t ion of i n c o m e and weal th than is t rue for 
present-day Bri ta in (97). The re are approx ima te ly 20,000 pe r sons w h o own 
p rope r ty va lued in excess of $ 250,000 in Bri ta in as against 13,000 such 
pe r sons in G e r m a n y , a l though G e r m a n y ' s G N P has been higher for se-
veral years. 
By i n c o m e and s tandard of l iving, however , the elite is different iated 
m o r e sharp ly from the popula t ion in general than is t rue wi th regard to 
the i r p roper ty-ho ld ing . Much less t han in C o m m u n i s t coun t r i e s and m o r e 
t h a n in the U.S. , a cons iderable par t of t he mater ia l rewards for elite s tatus 
is der ived from benefi ts other than cash income . T h e »mag ic« lowest 
th resho ld for elite i ncome in bus iness , academia , the mass med ia , and 
pressure g roup representa t ives i s by n o w a r o u n d 50,000 Deu t sche m a r k s 
( D M ) a year. Transferred into dol lars at t he official ra te , th is may not 
s t r ike A m e r i c a n observers as an elite i n c o m e , bu t in goods and services 
th is is p robab ly equivalent to $ 20,000. With approx imate ly DM 100,000 a 
year, at least in business , benefi ts begin to a m o u n t to an increas ing share 
of the r e m u n e r a t i o n . In addi t ion to the usual expense accounts , stock op-
t ions , and indiv idual pens ions , the re a re chauffeur-dr iven l imous ines and 
c o m p a n y m a n s i o n s rented at n o m i n a l cost . However , a large par t of the 
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g elite appears to feel underpr iv i leged in compar i son to the 
rest of t h e popu la t ion and especially in compar i son with the i r foreign con-
freres. Indeed , of the 2,539 m e m b e r s of the boa rds of d i rectors of G e r m a n 
co rpo ra t i ons (Aktiengesellschaften) in 1963, only 249 received an i n c o m e 
in excess of DM 200,000 per a n n u m (officially: $ 50,000) (98). It is b o t h a 
consequence of the lack of homogene i ty of t he G e r m a n elite and a con-
t r ibu t ing factor to this state that i ncomes differ sharply by sector, and so 
does the effective s tandard of l iving. Also beyond DM 100,000, i ncomes 
are set r a the r arb i t rar i ly , and differ sharp ly for the same type of act ivi ty. 
Eli te s tatus in G e r m a n y means hav ing a good s tandard of l iving, bu t it 
does not necessari ly mean being r ich, and i t cer ta inly does not mean ow-
n ing p roper ty . I t does m e a n contro l over p rope r ty or the i n c o m e of o thers 
e i ther directly or indirect ly by m e a n s of legislation. However , th is influen-
ce canno t easily be t ransfer red in to large mone ta ry rewards wi thou t con-
siderable risk. 
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R e c r u i t m e n t and Social izat ion 
Decis ive for t he cha rac t e r of an elite a n y w h e r e are pa t t e rns of recruit-
m e n t a n d social izat ion in to t he ways of a dist inct subcu l t u r e—prov ided 
such a subcu l tu re exists. T h e ear l ier the selection for fu ture elite s ta tus and 
t h e m o r e effective the social izat ion in to a g roup set par t from t h e »rest ,« 
t h e s t ronger is t h e sense of cohes ion in an elite, t he be t te r the c o m m u n i -
ca t ion , and the grea ter the in formal social con t ro l . I t is difficult to i m a g i n e 
two d e c i s i o n m a k i n g elites w h o are fur ther apar t from each o ther in these 
respects than the Brit ish and the present G e r m a n elite. In a c o m p a r i s o n 
wi th t h e r a the r ex t r eme cha rac te r of the Bri t ish system, the equally ex-
t r e m e n a t u r e of the presen t system in G e r m a n y becomes most obvious . 
In all Western indus t r ia l ized count r ies , t he ma in factors fu r the r ing a 
pe r son ' s chances to j o i n the elite are: 1) a h igh social s tatus of the pa r en t s ; 
2) univers i ty educa t ion ; 3) a prest igious mar r i age ; 4) choice of an occu-
pa t ion wi th high vert ical mobi l i ty ; 5) res idence in the capi tal region or one 
of t h e me t ropo l i t an a reas ; 6) p rope r k ind and degree of rel igious senti-
m e n t s . In G e r m a n y , a favorable c o m b i n a t i o n of these factors mere ly 
m e a n s a be t te r c h a n c e of j o i n i n g the pool of eligibles. A l t h o u g h the ma-
jo r i t y of elite m e m b e r s are recrui ted from the u p p e r and the u p p e r - m i d d l e 
classes (i.e., about 5 to 10 pe r cent of t he popu la t i on ) , this is still a very 
large and diverse base for r ec ru i tmen t . Fo r m a n y decades i t has been qui te 
ra re in G e r m a n y for a child to grow up in the expecta t ion that his back-
g r o u n d would gua ran t ee e n t r a n c e in to the elite. 
In G e r m a n y a m a n in his early 20's will still not k n o w w h e t h e r he has a 
good c h a n c e to reach an elite posi t ion, even t hough he may have a favor-
able c o m b i n a t i o n of b a c k g r o u n d factors and be a t t end ing an univers i ty . 
A s s u m i n g that th i s young m a n has comple ted his univers i ty educa t ion in 
o n e of the m o r e p o p u l a r fields, that he has mar r i ed a wife c o m i n g from 
s o m e w h a t h igher s ta tus bu t hav ing only a modes t educa t ion , and that he 
has b e e n offered a p romis ing posi t ion in the civil service, t he jud ic ia ry , 
academia , bus iness , or t he mass media , he will still not cons ider himself as 
a defini te cand ida t e for an elite pos i t ion . Such a des ignat ion will c o m e by 
and large a r o u n d the age of 30-35 years, usual ly as a result of 7) technica l 
mas te ry and 8) a modes t skill in in te rpersona l re la t ions in general and a 
super io r skill in cu l t iva t ing super iors , p lus 9) a largely conven t iona l per-
sonal i ty with some u n c o n v e n t i o n a l aspects. As a m a n a g e m e n t consu l t an t 
in G e r m a n y said recent ly: »We are looking for the super ior average« 
(überdurchschnittlicher Durchschnitt). At t he age of a r o u n d 35, most fu ture 
m e m b e r s of t h e elite see themse lves as cand ida tes for d e c i s i o n m a k i n g 
pos i t ions and in c o m p e t i t i o n for this s ta tus with a relat ively few bu t not 
a lways persona l ly k n o w n o the r cand ida tes . A n d from he re on , luck plays 
an even greater role t h a n i t has a l ready. 
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W h i l e the age of 35 or so appears to be a kind of threshold in most elite 
sectors , t h e speed of careers from here on differs by fields. In bus iness , 
poli t ics, and in the mass media , most cand ida tes t ake approximate ly 7 1 0 
years to reach a posi t ion of consequence , and they are in this posi t ion 
ready to replace the No . 1 person in their firm or office wheneve r his t ime 
comes to r e l inqu i sh effective cont ro l . In academia , the judic iary , a n d in 
t he civil service t he way to the top takes longer . Careers in pressure g roups 
seem to follow less of a pa t te rn . 
Thus , a l lowing some downward correct ion for age, the G e r m a n pa t t e rn 
of elite career m o v e m e n t is s imilar to the A m e r i c a n . But c o m p a r e d to 
e i ther Eng land or F r a n c e there certainly is a cons iderable difference. In 
Eng land , most future m e m b e r s of the elite will have jo ined the pool of 
eligibles for elite s ta tus by the age of 10. The type of secondary school 
chosen for a chi ld is a l ready of m a j o r consequence for his future chances . 
A few pub l ic schools such as Eton, H a r r o w , Westminster , Winches ter , and 
Rugby supply a very large percentage of all elite m e m b e r s (99). F r o m these 
publ ic schools the boys pass on not jus t to Oxford and C a m b r i d g e but to a 
new i m p o r t a n t colleges wi th in these universi t ies : Chr i s t chu rch , King's 
College, Balliol, All Souls, St. Magdalen . Of course, Lord Samuel exag-
gerated a bit w h e n he stated: »Life is one Balliol man after a n o t h e r « ; after 
all, 14 out of 44 British P r i m e Minis ters c a m e from Chr i s t chu rch . A n d 
from t h e r e on the »old boys« pass on to a few clubs such as the Reform 
Club , Travel lers , A t h e n e u m , Savile, or Ca r l ton . By the t ime a cand ida t e for 
t he elite in Bri ta in s tar ts in his professional life, he has k n o w n many of the 
fu ture elite m e m b e r s and most of his i m m e d i a t e compet i to r s qui te well for 
about 15 to 20 years. 
In F r a n c e the chance for an elite posi t ion is de te rmined later in a young 
m a n ' s life. The re is no direct equivalent of the famous publ ic schools of 
Bri ta in , bu t the re is indeed an approx ima t ion to Oxford and C a m b r i d g e : 
the »grandes ecoles.« Most of the later dec is ion-makers have gone to one 
of these schools: Poly technique , Ecole des Mines , Ecole des H a u t e s E tudes 
Commerc i a l e s , St. Cyr, Ecole Libre des Sciences Poli t iques, Ecole Natio-
na le d 'Admin i s t r a t i on . T h u s the c o m m o n exper ience in the b a c k g r o u n d of 
F r e n c h d e c i s i o n m a k e r s is g radua te study in a subject of appl ied l ea rn ing . 
T h e i m p o r t a n t a d v a n c e m e n t s then take place in Paris , and, given the phy-
sical p rox imi ty and very often the b a c k g r o u n d of c o m m o n school ing , mos t 
compe t i to r s k n o w each o ther . After the initial choice of occupa t ion , ra tes 
of a d v a n c e m e n t differ considerably. Un l ike G e r m a n y , where bus iness now 
offers qu i te rapid careers and the civil service especially slow ones , F r a n c e 
quickly p r o m o t e s gifted young men in the civil service, whi le bus iness is 
r a the r tardy in compar i son . Politics, too, is somewhat slower t h a n in Ger-
many , and here t he background of d e c i s i o n m a k e r s is unusua l ly hetero-
geneous except for t he prevai l ing c o m m o n t ra in ing in law. Th i s is largely a 
68 
resul t of one pecul iar i ty : tha t in contras t to near ly all o ther elite careers in 
F rance , poli t ical careers a re first m a d e in the provinces . U n d o u b t e d l y , th is 
diversi ty in t h e b a c k g r o u n d of political d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , and in cont ras t to 
th i s t he homogene i ty a m o n g civil se rvants cont r ibu tes to t he power of 
h ighe r civil se rvants in F rance . 
In Eng land , dec i s ion-makers often will have k n o w n each o ther as boys, 
and qui te often the i r famil ies were a l ready acquain ted before t he boys met 
at school . In F rance most dec is ion-makers will have first hea rd about each 
o the r by the age of 22-25. In G e r m a n y d e c i s i o n m a k e r s will often become 
acqua in t ed for the first t ime upon reach ing elite s tatus. Immed ia t e ly after 
t he war , such g iant co rpo ra t i ons as K r u p p , M a n n e s m a n n , A E G , and Bayer 
p r o m o t e d to top m a n a g e m e n t persons w h o were u n k n o w n to near ly anyo-
ne in the i r field. T h e s a m e is t rue for several of the now i m p o r t a n t »young 
m e n « in G e r m a n pol i t ics . 
In his book on The European Executive, David G r a n i c k headed a chap-
ter on G e r m a n y » T h e Land of the Fami ly F i rm.« Whi le i t is t rue that 
s o m e of t he largest c o r p o r a t i o n s are owned and control led by famil ies , and 
whi le a relat ively small n u m b e r of famil ies con t ro l s a very large par t of 
G e r m a n indust ry , top m a n a g e m e n t is no longer selected wi th family as a 
m a j o r cons ide ra t ion . (By way of cont ras t , of t he 200 most i m p o r t a n t 
F r e n c h co rpo ra t ions , only 28 are stock-issuing companies . ) Most elite 
g roups eve rywhere at all t imes recruit via co-opta t ion. T h e field from 
which new m e m b e r s of the elite are co-opted is somet imes qui te n a r r o w , as 
in Br i ta in . In G e r m a n y , an established m e m b e r of t he elite will have a 
r a t h e r wide field from which to choose his successor. Qui te often, a large 
sha re of luck seems to enter , and persona l predi lec t ions (and s o m e t i m e s 
even a rb i t ra r iness ) play a r a the r large role . Personal preferences are said to 
h a v e d e t e r m i n e d the choice of the top men at K r u p p and Mercedes : de-
cis ions tha t p roved satisfactory in one case and unsat isfactory in the o ther . 
O n e of G e r m a n y ' s top execut ives in adver t i s ing—and by c o m m o n consent 
an ex t remely able m a n — i s a qui te b iza r re example of th is inf luence of 
pe r sona l factors: the owne r -manage r of one of t he largest agencies was 
vaca t ion ing at a spa and chose for his d r i n k i n g c o m p a n i o n a head wai ter ; 
th i s c o m p a n i o n b e c a m e so close to his hear t tha t he appo in ted h im to a 
second-l ine m a n a g e m e n t posi t ion in his own agency—and th is was t he 
start of a me teor i c career . 
W h i l e co-opta t ion is the preva i l ing m o d e in most Western count r ies in 
p r o m o t i n g cand ida tes to elite s tatus, coun t r i es differ by type of co-opta t ion . 
In mos t sectors of the G e r m a n elite, a m e m b e r is able to pick his successor 
a n d to exercise some b lack-ba l l ing power over t h e admiss ion of a dis-
agreeable cand ida t e w h o never the less seems acceptable to his peers . Ho-
wever b lack-ba l l ing is ra re , and the system is not very well suited to h a n d l e 
d i sag reemen t s be tween equals . By and large, a m e m b e r expects that his 
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cho ice will not be cha l lenged , and he will take some care in selecting a 
successor to avoid such a cha l lenge; cor respondingly the peers of a deci-
s ion -maker will tend to suppress m i n o r misgivings in order to preserve 
u n a n i m i t y . Th i s m e a n s tha t in p r o m o t i o n the m o r e controvers ia l charac-
ters a re often bypassed. Th i s is a usual ou t come of commi t t ee decisions, 
bu t t he preva i l ing m o d e in G e r m a n y produces a s imi lar result in the ab-
sence of commi t t ee s and wi thou t the extensive and often frank discussion 
tha t is character is t ic in t h e U.S. At the same t ime this system tends to 
crea te a re la t ionship of dependency upon a »crea tor .« This dependency or 
» feuda l« re la t ionsh ip is weaken ing now, bu t it is still of major impor t ance 
in the civil service and in academia . 
Cons ide rab le heterogenei ty in backg round , late appo in tmen t to elite 
candidacy , a ra ther large pool of eligibles w h o are often not acqua in ted 
wi th each o ther , a h a r d t o p r e d i c t chance of succeeding, personal de-
p e n d e n c e as t he road to b e c o m i n g heir appa ren t—these are some of the 
charac ter i s t ics of the G e r m a n pa t te rn of r ec ru i tmen t . An addi t ional strain 
is caused by a p h e n o m e n o n qui te c o m m o n in upward mobil i ty: the cri teria 
for a d v a n c e m e n t change d u r i n g the progression to ever higher posi t ions . 
Technical c o m p e t a n c e is p robab ly most i m p o r t a n t for the earl ier stages of 
a career bu t becomes increasingly supp lemen ted and then replaced by in-
te rpersona l skills and j u d g m e n t . T h e real impor t ance of some kind of 
c o m p e t e n c e of an applied sort, the relatively late selection, and the un-
cer ta in t ies in view of a large n u m b e r of u n k n o w n compet i to r s all contri-
b u t e to the »official« defini t ion that d e c i s i o n m a k i n g status is a t ta ined by 
ach ievemen t in the sense of a super ior expert ise in some subject mat te r . 
Indeed , in in terviews with t he elite, the r e sponden t s tend to justify the i r 
pos i t ion—jus t as thei r Amer i can coun te rpa r t s do—wi th reference to achie-
v e m e n t (100). 
T h e ma jo r except ions from this pa t te rn are jobs with pressure g roups 
and some careers in the Social Democra t i c Party and the mass media . H e r e 
careers are often made or ru ined by posing as the speaker for some faction, 
by fash ion ing coal i t ions be tween factions, and by rising to impor t ance with 
t h e increas ing power of such coal i t ions. These careers frequently resemble 
qui te closely the pa t t e rn for the run-of-the-mill Amer ican poli t ician w h o 
emphas izes » k n o w i n g people ,« s lander , and the t rad ing of rewards . Ex-
per t i se i s ne i the r c la imed nor granted , and consequent ly power becomes 
m o r e of an end in itself and the only defense for an inherent ly uns tab le 
pos i t ion . Therefore it is not surpr is ing that representa t ives of pressure 
groups , and m a n y representa t ives of the mass media and the SPD, are 
mere ly to lera ted by other elite figures bu t not accepted. Together with the 
t radi t ional G e r m a n disl ike of pressure groups , th is cont r ibutes fur ther to 
the avers ion in according them a definite place in political process (101). 
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Prov ided accep tance in to a pool of eligibles takes place as early as is t rue 
for Bri ta in , and p rov ided fur ther that fu ture d e c i s i o n m a k e r s will in mos t 
cases grow up toge ther for some 15 years, social izat ion in to a dist inct sub-
cu l tu r e - - ! . e . , a g r o u p charac te r ized by a dist inct way of life different from 
the rest of t h e p o p u l a t i o n — p o s e s no p r o b l e m . Effective social izat ion also 
m e a n s tha t such a subcu l tu re can largely rely on an implici t system of 
con t ro l s a n d rules . T h e G e r m a n system of late selection from a hetero-
geneous pool wi th an emphas i s on exper t ise cannot be effective in socia-
l iz ing elite m e m b e r s (except in t he civil service and the univers i t ies) . Such 
a system t ends to f ragment the elite and to compensa t e for this may lead to 
very explici t ru les of conduc t be tween »s t rangers .« Both f ragmenta t ion 
and rules are no t i ceab le in G e r m a n y , wi th t he shared and assert ive feeling 
of super io r c o m p e t e n c e as a unifying ideology. Indeed , the system needs 
such an ideology m u c h m o r e t han is t rue for the Bri t ish case. 
M e m b e r s of t h e G e r m a n elite have t radi t ional ly t ended to view the 
Brit ish e s t ab l i shmen t as as example , and there have been repeated at-
t e m p t s specifically to emu la t e t he Brit ish system of early selection (102). 
Unt i l t he Nazi per iod a few of the m o r e i l lustr ious univers i ty fraterni t ies 
served some of the funct ions of an Oxbr idge college. A long wi th the i r 
general r eve rence for m a n y aspects of Bri t ish social s t ruc ture , t he Nazis 
a t t emp ted to set up a system of elite boys schools, the Napo la . T h e present 
Federa l Repub l i c is p robab ly even fu r the r from the Bri t ish mode l than any 
p rev ious G e r m a n state . Selection is emphas i zed ever m o r e a t t h e expense 
of h o m o g e n e i t y and social izat ion. In this respect, the G e r m a n elite closely 
resembles t he U.S . system, except tha t in G e r m a n y even such approxi-
m a t i o n s to t h e »g randes écoles« as H a r v a r d , Yale, and P r ince ton are lak-
king (103). 
T h e St ruc ture of the Eli te: Segmenta t ion 
W h e n some observers ma in t a in tha t present-day G e r m a n y has no dis-
t inct eli te, they are r ight in one sense. T h e r e appears to be no dist inct elite 
s u b c u l t u r e - - a factor usual ly d e t e r m i n i n g the visibility of elites. T h e va lue 
system of t he elite is now largely ident ical with tha t of the t rad i t iona l 
u p p e r - m i d d l e class. I t is th is class from which most m e m b e r s of the elite 
are recru i ted ; and i t is th is class tha t the G e r m a n elite cons iders as its 
» re levan t pub l i c« a n d that i t largely identifies wi th . In in te rv iews respon-
dents f requent ly disclaim elite s tatus a n d prefer to th ink of themse lves as 
u p p e r - m i d d l e class (104). 
At the s ame t ime , some m e m b e r s of t h e elite pr ivate ly show consi-
de rab le d isdain for the general pub l ic and are often i r r i ta ted by the idea 
tha t th is genera l pub l i c might pass j u d g m e n t on elite b e h a v i o r . T h e » p u b -
lic« of t h e G e r m a n elite is b o t h larger and smal ler t han that of the elite in 
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other western count r ies : it is a small publ ic in the sense that p o p u l a r opi-
n ion (J'opinion des tous) is no t cons idered re levant ; it is large (approxi-
mate ly 400,000) and unusual ly he te rogeneous in the sense that the Ger-
m a n elite pays a t ten t ion to ar t icula te op in ion from the midd le r a n k s up . 
D u r i n g the i r 1965 survey of the elite, Univers i ty of Cologne sociologists 
found the very high regional dispersion of d e c i s i o n m a k e r s that they had 
ant ic ipa ted . In add i t ion , they encoun te r ed a surpr is ing lack of knowledge 
about elite pe rsons from the same region bu t from a different sector. Even 
wi th in such a self-contained city as West Berlin, an industr ia l leader would 
claim to h a v e practically no knowledge about elite m e m b e r s in the wor lds 
of art , academia , or in gove rnmen ta l agencies; no r would a political jour -
nal is t , for example , p rove m o r e knowledgeab le about leaders in bus iness 
or rel igion. 
T h e widespread feeling of m a n y m e m b e r s of the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g elite 
tha t at p resent there is no elite in G e r m a n y is par t ly the result of the 
absence of a h o m o g e n e o u s elite sha r ing a specific way of life. An additio-
nal m a j o r c o m p o n e n t of this self-perception is the lack of a » m o d e l « g roup 
(Vorbildlichkeit). T h e r e is no single g roup wi th power (such as the British 
e s t ab l i shment ) whose way of life would be general ly respected. Qui te the 
cont ra ry : the re is a widespread consensus that power , social prest ige, and 
an exempla ry way of life do not co inc ide for any one g roup (105). 
T h e m o r e reflective m e m b e r s of t he G e r m a n elite do not really m o u r n 
the absence of Vorbildlichkeit a m o n g d e c i s i o n m a k e r s ; after all, taste and 
d i sc r imina t ing m a n n e r s have hard ly been the ha l lmark of most o ther elite 
groups , as, for example , the British gentry. I t is r e m a r k a b l e , never the less , 
how li t t le general respect the G e r m a n elite c o m m a n d s , aside from respect 
for power and prest ige. T h e repea ted a t t empts to start some th ing l ike a 
»high society« have r ema ined inconsequent ia l and have met with some 
derision (106). 
This observat ion again reflects t he heterogenei ty of the elite, w h o , aside 
from inf luencing decisions in var ious spheres , h a v e — w i t h one i m p o r t a n t 
except ion to be discussed la ter—li t t le in c o m m o n . Conve r sa t i ons a m o n g 
G e r m a n d e c i s i o n m a k e r s from different sectors usually d e m o n s t r a t e that 
these persons really do not have to say m u c h to each other , n o r are they at 
ease wi th one a n o t h e r in small ta lk . Apar t from the quest ion of w h o gets 
wha t w h e n , given the i r variety of b a c k g r o u n d and differences be tween the 
circles in which they move , do Fr iedr ich Flick, Erwin Piscator , Ber thold 
Beitz, Rolf S ternberger , Alfred Nau , Bishop Dibel ius , Ludger Westrick, 
Pfarrer Hess, and Admi ra l Ruge have any th ing to say to each o ther? 
This r a the r self-contained exis tence wi th in sectors and regions can be 
called segmenta t ion (107). Fo r a European count ry , such segmenta t ion of 
the elite is r a the r a n o m a l o u s . Some observers insist that as a consequence 
one shou ld conc lude tha t G e r m a n y does not have an elite in the sense that 
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other developed na t ions have one . However , if 1) a highly differential 
access to actual power and 2) restr ic t ion of legi t imacy to employ resources 
accord ing to one ' s own j u d g m e n t are impor t an t , then G e r m a n y definitely 
has an e l i t e—only one that i s differently organized t h a n usual . T h e unu-
sual o rgan iza t ion is no t un ique , however , and this is one of t he a r g u m e n t s 
against a second school of t hough t which sees t h e cu r ren t state of deci-
s i on -mak ing in G e r m a n y as a typical t rans i t ion a r r a n g e m e n t . 
In t h e segmenta t ion by sector and by region, the G e r m a n elite system 
actual ly resembles that of t he U.S. (108). T h e extent of different ia t ion is 
p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t grea ter in spite of the smal le r size of the count ry , and 
t h e consequences also differ. M a n y of the effects of elite segmenta t ion are 
neu t r a l i zed in the U.S. by the publici ty focused u p o n personal i t ies and 
act ions , m o r e t han is the case for G e r m a n y , and by at least an aquiescence 
to p o p u l a r op in ion serving as a cour t of last resort . T h e ac t ions of va r ious 
pa r t s of an elite may be cont ro l led by ei ther the elite themse lves (presup-
pos ing t h e exis tence of a subcu l tu re exer t ing a m e a s u r e of effective social 
cont ro l over its m e m b e r s ) or by a large publ ic . In G e r m a n y , bo th cont ro l 
m e c h a n i s m s are largely miss ing. If the re is a t endency to correct this , t hen 
i t is in t h e d i rec t ion of t he U.S . m o d e l — n a m e l y by b e c o m i n g m o r e wil l ing 
to heed p o p u l a r op in ion , however , th is has not yet gone very far. 
O n e i m p o r t a n t ob jec t ive condi t ion for G e r m a n segmen ta t ion i s the ab-
sence of a capi ta l . G e r m a n y had always had a series of regional capi ta ls 
r a t h e r t h a n o n e na t iona l center . Only a t the t u rn of t h e cen tu ry were these 
regional cen ters beg inn ing to b o w to t he ascent of Ber l in . After 1945, t he 
t rad i t iona l pa t t e rn once m o r e r e e s t a b l i s h e d itself, and by n o w such regio-
nal capi ta ls as M u n i c h , Stut tgar t , F rankfur t , Co logneDi i s se ldor f , H a n n o -
ver , and H a m b u r g have regained the i r fo rmer i m p o r t a n c e . Most of these 
midd l i ng cities have me t ropo l i t an areas of 1 to 2 mi l l ion i nhab i t an t s and 
are t hus large e n o u g h to suppor t a var ied intel lectual life and cons iderab le 
economic activity bu t no t large e n o u g h to do so on a scale of in t e rna t iona l 
i m p o r t a n c e . T h e r e i s no one cul tura l center , no o n e cen te r w h e r e most of 
t he m a j o r economic decis ions are made , and the re i s no one center of 
poli t ics. Even the mass - commun ica t i on system is organised a r o u n d these 
regional capi ta l s (109). The re is no Paris or L o n d o n or Brussels in Ger-
m a n y , bu t t he secondary cities a re of greater i m p o r t a n c e than the se-
conda ry cities of F rance , Eng land , and Belg ium. 
G e r m a n cri t ics of this regional d ivers i ty—and they are b o t h n u m e r o u s 
and p r o m i n e n t — p r o b a b l y overs ta te its i m p o r t a n c e for the s t ruc ture of the 
G e r m a n eli te. Even wi th in the same city contac ts be tween m e m b e r s of t he 
dec i s ion-mak ing elite of different sectors across the b o u n d a r i e s of the i r 
small wor lds are not good and are possibly even s o m e w h a t less developed 
than is t rue for t he U.S. O t h e r factors in addi t ion to regional diversifica-
t ion have to be cons idered . T h e pa t t e rns of r e c ru i tmen t to d e c i s i o n m a k i n g 
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groups and the type of socialization are of p r ima ry i m p o r t a n c e in this 
contex t . 
G iven the increas ing i m p o r t a n c e of a universi ty educa t ion , the absence 
of a leading univers i ty for the na t ion has a ma jo r significance. Again, at 
the beg inn ing of the century, it began to look as t hough a concen t ra t ion of 
academic excel lence would finally assert itself in G e r m a n y , too; Heidel-
berg, Berl in , Go t t ingen , and Mun ich were the most likely candida tes for 
»na t iona l universi t ies .« Somewha t dated impress ions in o the r count r ies 
no tw i th s t and ing , this t rend is by now complete ly reversed, and it was al-
ready d i sappear ing dur ing the Nazi per iod. What has r e m a i n e d are diffe-
rent types of univers i t ies and a few colleges that fall short of those . 
In Wi lhe lmine G e r m a n y and the Weimar Republ ic , s tudent f ra terni t ies 
were to some degree a funct ional equivalent to the c o m m o n univers i ty 
set t ings tha t are shared by the grea ter par t of the English and French elite 
and to some degree also by the Amer i can elite. In some ins t i tu t ional sphe-
res in G e r m a n y , m e m b e r s h i p in a par t icu lar s tudent f ra terni ty is still of 
i m p o r t a n c e , especially in the foreign service, in the jud ic ia ry , the coal and 
steel indus t ry , and a m o n g engineers (110). M e m b e r s h i p in a na t iona l net-
work of local f ra terni t ies—such as the CV, KV, Cdsener SC, and Wein-
h e i m e r SC—can help a career a long. 
T h e lack of concen t ra t ion of the count ry ' s talent in one city, the absence 
of » n a t i o n a l « centers of l ea rn ing , the want of one ma jo r popu la t ion 
cen te r—these lead many of t he Federa l Republ ic ' s h o m e critics to b e m o a n 
its mediocr i ty and to define lack of excellence as one of the count ry ' s chief 
p rob l ems . W h a t these critics and substant ia l pa r t s of the elite themse lves 
are really react ing to, however , is the organizat ion of the elite into a series 
of ra ther self-contained small wor lds . 
T h e b o u n d a r i e s of these litt le wor lds are main ly de t e rmined by occu-
pa t iona l spheres , i.e., sets of pos i t ions that are charac te r ized by s imilar 
career pr inc ip les and by related con ten t . This agrees with the earl ier des-
cr ip t ion of r ec ru i tment pa t t e rns in G e r m a n y and with the absence of a 
social izat ion in to an elite subcul ture . Since careers are p resumably based 
on ach ievement wi th in one occupat ional sphere (based in tu rn on some 
k ind of expert ise) , occupat ion assumes the impor t ance of a life pr inc ip le . 
With occupat ion and occupat ional success (which the elite shares with the 
popu la t ion at large) so i m p o r t a n t and an elite subcul ture vir tual ly non-
existent , in terac t ion across sectors is bo th difficult and little desired. 
Charac ter i s t ic of any elite system are the stages of a career and the m o d e 
w h e r e a cross-over occurs in to spheres o ther than the one where an elite 
m e m b e r s tar ted out. In t he Federa l Republ ic , professional special ization 
precedes elite status, and consequen t ly i t is unusua l—excep t for the war 
gene ra t i on—to have a b roade r b a c k g r o u n d . Only after elite status has been 
achieved is the re a cross-over in to activit ies o ther t han those of one 's oc-
74 
cupa t iona l specia l izat ion. Even t hen , such a c r o s s o v e r is c o m m o n only for 
top elite pos i t ions , and it is usually in the form of a co-optat ion of a »ge-
nera l i s t« by the specialist. 
Th i s res t r ic t ion to an occupat ional sphere is slowly giving way, bu t i t 
will be a long t ime before j u n i o r m e m b e r s in the G e r m a n elite will be 
asked as a p re requis i te to involve themse lves in civic affairs and vo lun t a ry 
associat ions to b r o a d e n the i r out look. Poli t ics is so far the one m a j o r ex-
cept ion from this insula t ion wi th in one 's own occupat ional wor ld . G e r m a n 
social s t ruc tu re has been described as the coexis tence of a m u l t i t u d e of 
py ramids , each represen t ing one occupat iona l sphere (111). Th i s m e t a p h o r 
is mis lead ing for the »base« of the py ramid ; i t does charac te r ize the struc-
tu re of elite g roups . 
Excel lence in one 's occupat iona l career is the official jus t i f ica t ion for 
ho ld ing an elite pos i t ion , and exper t ise is the p r e sumed basis for actual 
i n f l u e n c e - - e v e n to some degree in polit ics. If t he excel lence or t h e ex-
per t i se a re not real , they will be impu ted ex post from the presen t pos i t ion 
of excel lence and inf luence . T h e system requi res such c i rcular i ty in attri-
b u t i o n . Success as success, and no t based on exper t knowledge , is viewed 
wi th suspicion and uneas iness . T h e ambiva l ence toward a success s tory in 
poli t ics such as the one of Ra iner Barzel , t he pa r l i amen ta ry leader of t he 
C D U , is an expression of this a t t i tude . O t h e r »successes« in G e r m a n po-
litics and business , such as H e l m u t h Schmidt of t he SPD and Ber tho ld 
Beitz of K r u p p , are expla ined now by the exper t knowledge tha t these m e n 
possess in one field, even t hough th is knowledge may be of only l imi ted 
re levance for the i r present posi t ion (112). Th i s n o r m in the elite is a reflec-
t ion of the emphas i s on Tuchtigkeit in the G e r m a n value system in ge-
nera l , and in tu rn t he popu la t ion also sees professional c o m p e t e n c e as an 
i m p o r t a n t qual i ty even for its poli t ical leaders (113). 
T h e career of Franz-Josef Strauss may serve as an i l lus t ra t ion for th i s 
quest to p rov ide an »objec t ive« bas is for inf luence. Even before St rauss by 
his ac t ions p rov ided the basis for his present image as t he scarecrow of 
G e r m a n poli t ics, he was a l ready cont rovers ia l a m o n g pol i t ic ians as a m e r e 
exper t in success; his f r iends then a t t empted to legi t imize his inf luence by 
p o i n t i n g to his gift for rapid calculat ion and his excellent g rades at school . 
W h e n in 1964 Strauss staged an a t t empt at a comeback as cabinet min i s t e r 
he quickly read up on economics and del ivered in the Bundes tag a highly 
technica l speech on some economic p rob lem in order to now qualify as a 
real exper t . Fatal ly for his ambi t ions , exper t s in economic theory b r a n d e d 
his speech as the ill-digested work of a novice . 
U n l i k e the s i tuat ion in the U.S. , t he re is l i t t le romant i c i z ing of success 
in G e r m a n y . A m e r e vote-gett ing abil i ty such as Lindsay 's in New York 
would in G e r m a n y no t m a k e a m a n »respec tab le« in high office. T h e r e is a 
s imi lar es teem for t he exper t in F rance , but the re , expert ise is jus t i f ied by 
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an excellent record in one of the »grandes écoles.« Related to this F rench 
pa t t e rn bu t in par t ia l cont ras t to it, the expert ise in G e r m a n y is p roven 
wi th in an accepted occupat ion p lus co-optat ion as expert by those a l ready 
qualified as exper t s . Of course, the re are m a n y success stories in G e r m a n y , 
and in a good n u m b e r of cases success is not the result of technical com-
petence . T h e reali t ies in the different count r ies do not differ so m u c h as 
the modes of jus t i f ica t ion. However , these modes of just if icat ion do in-
f luence self-concept ions and in consequence behav ior . 
In p r iva te , relaxed conversa t ions , m e m b e r s of the G e r m a n e l i t e - - in-
c luding b u s i n e s s m e n - - o f t e n refer to some specialized knowledge that they 
acqui red in the pursu i t of thei r careers . Even if the topic of such a con-
versat ion shou ld be the ability of an unde rdeve loped coun t ry to increase 
its agr icul tura l p roduc t ion , a G e r m a n elite m e m b e r will never the less find 
an o p p o r t u n i t y to inject: »1 as a specialist in c i r c u i t - b r e a k e r s . . . « Th i s does 
not exactly foster in te rming l ing—excep t on the basis of some m o r e ear thy 
c o m m o n in teres ts or wi th reference to so-called basic quest ions requi r ing 
deep t h i n k i n g b u t no knowledge . 
T h e Bri t ish »cul t of the a m a t e u r « is the very ant i thes is of the self con-
cept ion of G e r m a n elites. In G e r m a n y , the »exper t« is venera ted every-
where , bu t t h e »cul t of the exper t« is n o w h e r e s t ronger than in the elite 
(114). Th i s set of cond i t ions de te rmines in terac t ion between m e m b e r s of 
the elite. In c o m p a r i s o n with F r a n c e a n d especially with Bri ta in, face-to-
face in te rac t ion outs ide the sphere of i m m e d i a t e compe tence is qui te low. 
T h e r e is m o r e in te rac t ion with subord ina tes t han is t he case in t he U.S. 
(a l though t h e cha rac t e r of in teract ion is m o r e inf luenced by hierarchical 
differences t h a n in t he U.S.) bu t less in terac t ion with peers . Th i s agrees 
with the t endency of elite m e m b e r s in G e r m a n y toward pa te rna l i sm in 
relat ion to the i r staff (115). 
Th i s emphas i s on c o m p e t e n c e as the p r e sumed basis for s tatus has im-
por t an t consequences for in t e rac t ion—mos t of which are obvious but some 
of which may appea r a bi t surpr is ing at first sight. Obviously , a mu tua l 
credi t for c o m p e t e n c e in one field provides a s t rong bond against »outsi-
ders« who lack th i s compe tence and is t hus bo th a basis and a r e i n f o r c e -
m e n t of s egmen ta t ion . As with the va lue placed on terr i tor ia l integri ty in a 
feudal f iefdom, elite m e m b e r s claim a u t o n o m y of j u d g m e n t wi th in their 
sphere of compe tence . Not all f iefdoms of compe tence are equally large or 
equally i m p o r t a n t , no r are they all equal ly safe. Professional compe tence 
in e i ther science or in one of the t rad i t iona l fields of l ea rn ing is a fiefdom 
relatively safe against ra ids by o ther feudal lords. T h e values of G e r m a n 
society are largely those of a society wi th scarce resources where produc-
t ion is a v i r tue in itself, and consequent ly engineer ing and related » p r o -
duct ive« knowledge is a respected ter r i tory . Business in the sense of selling 
is usual ly regarded wi th a bi t of d isda in ; it is a large, relatively safe but not 
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a respected fief (116). A n d finally the re are ter r i tor ia l d isputes which—gi-
ven the va lue tha t c o m p e t e n c e h a s — t e n d to genera te a great deal of fee-
l ing . Mos t of these d isputes occur in t h e sub jec t -mat te r fields of the social 
sciences. Economics , poli t ical science, sociology, and psychology d e m a n d 
tha t profess ionals t r a ined in o the r fields, and specifically those t r a ined in 
law, redef ine the i r areas . W h i l e th is has been par t ly accompl i shed in uni-
vers i ty set t ings, the re has not been any no tab le success wi th respect to t o p 
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g on pract ical ma t t e r s . 
Of course , actual c o m p e t e n c e may qui te often be lacking, bu t as long as 
each ind iv idua l moves wi th in his »field,« there is a p r e s u m p t i o n of rela-
t ive exper tness in in t e rac t ions be tween m e m b e r s of different elite seg-
m e n t s . I t would be shockingly bad m a n n e r s to v io la te an »exper t ' s« auto-
n o m y of j u d g m e n t . Such chal lenges can legi t imately be b r o u g h t fo rward 
only by one 's own col leagues , and qui te often they are . G i v e n t h e im-
p o r t a n c e of a p r e s u m p t i o n of c o m p e t e n c e , these cha l lenges are ser ious 
indeed ; the best strategy is to avoid such conf ron ta t ions . A n d the best way 
to avoid a cha l lenge is no t to coope ra t e with o ther exper t s and to s idestep a 
really ser ious professional a r g u m e n t . T h e r e is definitely l i t t le team spiri t in 
t h e G e r m a n elite: b o t h across a n d wi th in elite segments . In general t h e r e i s 
l i t t le free and easy in te rac t ion be tween equals ; and very often one senses 
an u n d e r c u r r e n t of th rea t . 
O p i n i o n F o r m a t i o n and Man ipu la t i on 
In dec i s ion-making processes in G e r m a n y , t he re is qui te f requent ly a 
confusion of t he role of t h e quaestio jacxi and of va lues to be set by t he 
dec i s ion-maker . G iven the lack of a h o m o g e n e o u s out look on life, resul-
t ing from the b road base for r e c ru i tmen t , and given t h e la te social izat ion 
m a i n l y in to a specific elite segment , t he system is not well equ ipped to 
h a n d l e dissent about va lues ; n o r can one p resuppose e i ther tacit o r open 
a g r e e m e n t on values . D i sag reemen t abou t (real or p r e s u m e d ) facts can be 
sett led by recourse to the j u d g m e n t of exper ts . Dissent abou t values , ho-
wever , is a danger po in t no t only of the system of dec i s ion-mak ing at t h e 
t o p but of G e r m a n social s t ruc tu re in genera l ; the difficulty is mere ly 
accen tua ted a t t he top . Consequen t ly , and in ag reemen t wi th t he e m p h a s i s 
on exper t ise , the re is a t endency to define p r o b l e m s as technical ques t ions 
(117). Redef ined in th is way, a large share of responsibi l i ty can be dele-
gated to the exper t . 
Def in ing a p rob lem as a technica l ques t ion and delegat ing it to t h e 
exper t may often reduce i m m e d i a t e conflict; i t does so at the pr ice of 
increas ing the difficulties in set t l ing the r e m a i n i n g d i sag reemen t s . T h e 
s t a n d a r d by wh ich the s t a t ement of an exper t is to be j u d g e d is scientific 
t r u t h : his s t a t emen t s a re in p r inc ip le e i ther t rue or false, and the remai-
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n i n g unce r t a in ty or e r ro rs are consequences of technica l p rob lems . Fo r the 
r e m a i n i n g d i sagreement , a m a n of some s ta ture will often try to accom-
m o d a t e his p a r t n e r even if the lat ter 's wishes are not really g rounded in 
» technica l cons idera t ions .« However , in pr inc ip le a definit ion of a pro-
b lem as a technical quest ion m a k e s t rue c o m p r o m i s e ext remely difficult. 
A real izat ion tha t no object ive s tandard is avai lable which would com-
mit b o t h pa r t ne r s in ba rga in ing and that two or m o r e c la ims are equally 
val id from different po in t s of view is for most m e m b e r s of t he elite in 
G e r m a n y qui te uncomfor t ab le . Such a real izat ion is, however , a pre-
cond i t ion for a t rue c o m p r o m i s e — n a m e l y , an ag reemen t between pa r t ne r s 
to f ind t he po in t of least r e m a i n i n g conflict. T h e very term » c o m p r o m i s e « 
in G e r m a n has t he conno ta t ion »shoddy« (jauler Kompromiss), and a 
c o m p r o m i s e is usual ly unders tood as a pos tponemen t of a conflict and not 
as its t e r m i n a t i o n . In the face of cons iderable d isagreement about values 
and wishes , t he »exper t society« buys peace and order by m e a n s of a de-
legat ion to exper ts . 
Th i s has qui te d rama t i c consequences for the process of op in ion for-
m a t i o n . In d i sagreements that a re defined as d i sagreements in wishes and 
in values , everyone is equally qualified to raise his voice; for ques t ions of 
fact, t he oppos i te is obviously t rue . T h e t ru th of a s t a tement of fact is not 
s o m e t h i n g to be decided by vote . Def ining an issue as one w h e r e ascertai-
n ing t h e facts will settle the a r g u m e n t automat ica l ly disqualifies all those 
no t t r a ined for exper t j u d g m e n t in the mat te r . Issues that can be decided 
by exper t ise are no t a m e n a b l e to democra t ic process, and defining a large 
n u m b e r of issues as p rob l ems of fact n a r r o w s the scope of democracy . 
Even in academic debate it is not always easy to define what is a tech-
nical j u d g m e n t a n d what const i tu tes a t rue va lue j u d g m e n t that c a n n o t be 
settled by ev idence (118). T h e very not ion that cont rad ic tory wishes and 
va lues canno t be decided by recourse to an object ive s tandard , b i n d i n g all 
disagreeing par t ies , is a qui te recent one . In societies with some absolu te 
p h i l o s o p h y - - b e i t Cathol ic i sm, C o m m u n i s m , or N a z i s m — t h e legi t imacy 
and i l legit imacy of con t rad ic to ry values can in pr inc ip le be deduced from 
t h e official ph i losophy . U n d e r these condi t ions , va lues are facts to be 
found ; the re are t rue interests and t rue values. Just wha t the t ru th is in 
view of confl ict ing s t a t ements can be settled by exper ts . Values and wishes 
as s ta tements tha t are evident and b ind ing only to those p r o n o u n c i n g 
t h e m , reduc ing them to express ions of op in ion—th i s is an u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
specific to Western industr ia l societies with a plural is t ic value system. A n d 
even in these social systems, m a n y values are excepted from this s tatus of 
op in ions . 
In mos t societies, those in power have declared themselves to be exper ts 
of va lues and the legit imacy of interests . To a larger degree than is t rue for 
most o the r Western indus t r ia l ized societies, th is is still t he claim of m a n y 
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segments of the G e r m a n elite. Significantly, a par t of the elite in G e r m a n y 
c la ims this au thor i ty not as a no rm-se t t ing elite; ra ther , they define 
themse lves as exper ts in some k ind of » n a t u r a l « law. T h u s t he Const i tu-
t ional Cour t exp la ins—not pos tu l a t e s—wha t the p rope r func t ions of t he 
family are and have been in h u m a n h is tory and what the » n a t u r a l « dif-
ferences a n d p rope r re la t ions be tween m a n and wife are. These p r o n o u n -
c e m e n t s m a k e ra the r h i l a r ious read ing for a family sociologist, bu t they 
are m e a n t by the cour t as expl icat ion of a na tu ra l law to which it c la ims a 
super ior access. Should a claim to exper t i se in values be h o n o r e d the scope 
for democra t i c process would be fu r the r drast ical ly reduced . For tuna te ly , 
the most t radi t ional segments of t h e e l i te—such as lawyers a n d physi-
c i ans—are now increasingly cha l lenged w h e n they m a k e such a c la im. 
An in teres t ing pa t te rn of c o m m u n i c a t i o n arises with respect to a seg-
m e n t e d elite, especially w h e n , as in G e r m a n y , dec is ion-makers hesi ta te to 
form definite op in ions outs ide the i r own field of c o m p e t e n c e by syn-
thes iz ing k n o w n facts (119). An add i t iona l and re inforc ing factor i s t he 
distrust of mass media , wi th the par t ia l except ion of a few prest ige pape r s . 
Gene ra l i z ing from thei r own occupa t iona l exper ience , whe re the re is al-
ways m o r e to every issue t han is released to outsiders , mos t elite m e m b e r s 
bel ieve tha t the re mus t always be a story b e h i n d the story. Ins tead of re-
lying on the media or on his own j u d g m e n t , a typical m e m b e r of the elite 
(especially of the bus iness elite) will have »h i s« favori te exper t s on va r ious 
topics: on foreign policy, on the t rue a ims of poli t ical par t ies , on mi l i ta ry 
affairs, on Eu ropean in tegra t ion , on ar t , e tc . 
P e r h a p s to fit t hemse lves for fol lowing »expe r t« discussion, the majo-
rity of the elite read two or th ree dai l ies , about one- th i rd follow publ ic-
affairs p resen ta t ions on TV, and abou t half listen daily to rad io news (120). 
Fore ign newspape r s a re the second most f requent ly m e n t i o n e d source of 
i n fo rma t ion , immedia te ly after domes t ic newspapers . I t is some sort of 
c o m m e n t on t he G e r m a n prest ige dai l ies tha t t he most i m p o r t a n t Ger -
man- l anguage newspape r in t e r m s of re l i ance placed upon it is the Swiss 
Neue Züricher Zeitung. Substant ia l m ino r i t i e s claim to read daily Le Fi-
garo, the New York Times, and t h e L o n d o n Times. A pecul iar i ty of t he 
G e r m a n elite is the low percen tage of magaz ine r eade r sh ip . In par t , t he 
func t ions of U.S. and Brit ish m i n o r i t y magaz ines are filled by weekly 
newspape r s which largely serve as j o u r n a l s of analysis and op in ion . 
These r a the r c o m m o n media of i n fo rma t ion are supp lemen ted by two 
sources that enjoy a high credibi l i ty: newsle t te rs and persona l contac t . 
Near ly one- th i rd of t he dec i s ion-makers (1965) claim to rely especially on 
o n e or a n o t h e r res t r ic ted-circulat ion newsle t ter . These pub l i ca t ions are 
avidly read, especially by bus iness leaders , and are qui te different in cha-
racter from most U.S . newsle t ters . In r e tu rn for a high pr ice , the confi-
den t ia l - in format ion services s o m e t i m e s repor t real news b u t m o r e often 
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organ ize efficiently t he vo lumes of a l ready avai lable news. Qui te often, 
such i n fo rma t ion services are employed to » leak« stories, and this may 
con t r i bu t e to the i r prest ige; however , a c o m p a r a t i v e reading of several 
good n e w s p a p e r s will often have a super ior in format ion value. Probably 
t he elite 's susceptibi l i ty to the merchand i s ing appeal of »conf ident ia l« 
newsle t te r s expresses an uncer ta in ty about the reliabili ty of the freely avai-
lable pape r s . 
Personal contac ts are p resumed to be a m a j o r source for rel iable infor-
m a t i o n . T h e efficiency of the person-to-person system of c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
differs cons iderab ly by area (1965). Whi l e less than a th i rd of the elite 
k n o w personal ly the pa r l i amen ta ry represen ta t ive (Bundestagsabgeordne-
ter) from the i r own const i tuency, pract ical ly everyone cla ims good perso-
nal contac t with some m e m b e r of b o t h the Bundestag and the Landtag. 
Equal ly f requent is access to key civil se rvants in the minis t r ies and to 
leaders of special interest associat ions. Near ly every one of the decision-
m a k e r s also c la ims good personal contac t with a leading journa l i s t and 
wi th at least one r enowned professor. Even less cult ivated than access to 
the represen ta t ive from one 's own const i tuency, however , are re la t ions to 
represen ta t ives of t he churches and (least of all) to artists and wri ters . 
These va r ious observa t ions can now be merged into a simplified mode l . 
G e r m a n dec i s ion-makers scan a cons iderab le variety of sources for infor-
ma t ion abou t cu r r en t events . The i r interest is by no means conf ined to 
domest ic events , and the re is a ra ther high degree of a t tent ion to interna-
t ional affairs. T h e pr in ted media are of special impor tance , but they are 
supp lemen ted bo th by some form of pseudo-privi leged writ ten c o m m u n i -
cat ion and by persona l contacts wi th o ther leaders . T h e elite of all sectors 
t end to m a k e personal contact with business leaders , uppe r civil servants , 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s executives, and academic ians . This personal contact is 
main ly with i m p o r t a n t figures in the respect ive fields, bypassing, e.g., the 
local pol i t ic ians and journa l i s t s . Most of these contacts have the charac te r 
of check ing some po in t of interest wi th an expert in ano the r field and of 
asking for a brief on new deve lopments . 
Whi le th is system of personal contac ts appears qui te efficient, i t does 
have s o m e defini te l imi ta t ions . Most result from the segmenta t ion of the 
elite, he terogenei ty of backg round , and the cult of the expert . The re is only 
a relatively small a m o u n t of easy social izat ion across elite segments in 
everyday l i f e—al though an impor t an t minor i ty deviates from this pa t t e rn . 
G i v e n the i r relat ively low level of educat ion and their lack of »stylishness,« 
the wives of m a n y dec is ion-makers do li t t le to correct this state of affairs. 
They do no t acqui re the chief -ofprotocol skills typical of graduates of 
Amer i can w o m e n ' s colleges; n o r do the h u s b a n d s press for frequent socia-
l izing at h o m e . T h e accessibility of elites across segments is really availa-
bili ty to specific requests and contacts du r ing frequent conferences. A good 
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v o l u m e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is avai lable to the elite, but not sufficient op-
p o r t u n i t y for eva lua t ive and exp lo ra to ry discussions across s egmen t s in 
o rde r to ach ieve a cons idered consensus . 
T h e system of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is also mis lead ing in a n o t h e r respect . 
S o m e t i m e s t he n u m b e r of »exper t s« for a field of compe tence is woefully 
smal l . E u r o p e a n in tegra t ion and a r m a m e n t policies are two p r i m e exam-
ples w h e r e the o p i n i o n s or j u d g m e n t s of p e r h a p s no m o r e t han two dozen 
exper t s largely d e t e r m i n e elite op in ion in genera l . A n d for such fields 
t he re a p p e a r s to be relat ively litt le cross-checking of exper t op in ion : the 
ques t ioner ' s fai th in an »exper t« is s o m e w h a t ak in to the trust p laced in a 
family doc tor . 
Such a c o m m u n i c a t i o n system obvious ly calls for some cor rec t ion , and 
at t he same t i m e i t i s qui te vu lne rab l e to m a n i p u l a t i o n . T h e r e have been 
efforts at b o t h . 
A t t e m p t s a t o v e r c o m i n g the unsa t i s fac tory c o m m u n i c a t i o n across elite 
s egmen t s have most ly t aken the form of es tabl ishing i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y 
o rgan iza t ions« and p rov id ing o p p o r t u n i t i e s for n o n c o m m i t t a l mix ing . A 
n u m b e r of specia l -purpose o rgan iza t ions expressly specify that the re 
shou ld be a ba l ance of m e m b e r s from different sectors. If such organiza-
t ions have s o m e m o d i c u m of p o w e r - - s u c h as t he boa rds of radio n e t w o r k s 
(Rundfunkrate) or the na t iona l science counci l (Wissenschaftsrat)—their 
m e m b e r s h i p is reserved to top inf luent ia ls . They indeed have a m p l e op-
p o r t u n i t y to keep on mee t ing each o the r in a var iety of func t ions (121). F o r 
the less i l lus t r ious m e m b e r s of t he elite t he r e are now a n u m b e r of social 
c lubs . C o u n t r y c lubs and the Free M a s o n s repor t increas ing m e m b e r s h i p s , 
and Rotary c lubs and Kiwanis in G e r m a n y at t ract a s o m e w h a t higher-
s ta tus c l ientele t han the i r pa ren t o rgan iza t ions in t he U.S . A n u m b e r of 
ins t i tu t ions have been founded as mee t ing g r o u n d s for represen ta t ives 
from different segments of society. Confe rences are organized for invi ted 
pa r t i c ipan t s to discuss some cu r ren t p rob l em or some general topic of 
inte l lectual mer i t , hopeful ly u n d e r a long-range perspect ive . T h e Prote-
s tant academies (evangelische Akademien) have been especially successful, 
and one of these a c a d e m i e s — L o c c u m — h a s organized a n u m b e r of mee-
t ings which signif icantly inf luenced la ter policies. T h e list of such insti-
t u t i ons is still g rowing , and the re seems to be no lack of d e m a n d . A n u m -
ber of these ins t i tu t ions are qui te self-consciously e l i t i s t - - such as t he Ber-
gedorfer Gesprachskreis, whe re a round- t ab le discussion on the effects of 
a u t o m a t i o n m a y be preceded by a M o z a r t f lute concer to (122). 
A bi t closer to chang ing the elite itself a re a n u m b e r of »circles« w h e r e 
elite f igures and elite candida tes are o rgan ized according to some shared 
o r i en ta t ion or interest bu t with different occupat ional special t ies. These 
a r r a n g e m e n t s t ake m a n y forms . F o r e x a m p l e , a p r iva te ad hoc commis s ion 
was o rgan ized a r o u n d a dissident bu t inf luent ial SPD deputy w h o ini t ia ted 
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some posi t ion pape r s for Willy Brandt (123). A p e r m a n e n t discussion 
g r o u p , Tönissteiner Kreis was organized by the »Nat iona l Associat ion of 
Manufac tu r e r s« (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie). Still one s tep 
fur ther to inf luencing concre te policies are topical study associat ions such 
as, in the field of foreign affairs, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige 
Politik. O n e ma jo r advan tage of these m a n y associat ions is precisely the i r 
n o n c o m m i t t a l charac ter , affording representa t ives of feuding g roups a 
chance to establish direct contac t . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t funct ion, especially 
of t h e informal »circles,« as the r ec ru i tmen t of new elite memb er s : he re 
older m e m b e r s have a bit of t ime for observing o therwise u n k n o w n candi-
dates. 
Most of the o rgan iza t ions m e n t i o n e d so far do not object to publ ic i ty , 
bu t some of the non-official g roupings that actually inf luence policy do . 
T h e most respectable and most visible of these groupings is p robab ly t he 
»Confe rence of Undersec re ta r i e s of State« (Staatssekretärskonferenz). 
Thi s p e r m a n e n t body was organized by the undersecre ta r ies themse lves , 
s ince they felt tha t the cabinet of the federal g o v e r n m e n t did no t suffi-
ciently coord ina te policies. In effect, th is »Conference« is an execut ive 
cabine t of the federal g o v e r n m e n t , probably a un ique ins t i tu t ion. T h e only 
puzz l ing aspect of th is association of top civil servants is that it should be 
necessary at all, given the s imilar i ty of backg round and office, res idence in 
a t iny capi ta l , and the small n u m b e r of pe rsons involved. 
T h e a l l iance of second-l ine executives is paral le led by s imilar a l l iances 
in poli t ics and business . Qu i t e effective is an unofficial association of back-
b e n c h e r s in the Bonn pa r l i amen t who call themselves » the sewer worke r s« 
(Kanalarbeiter). Af ter -hour socializing with d r inks and card games have 
sufficiently s t r eng thened a team spirit tha t on occasion may prevai l over 
the official pa r l i amen ta ry leadersh ip . For a n u m b e r of years A d e n a u e r had 
regular teas with a smal l circle of Bonn c o r r e s p o n d e n t s - - t h e Teekränz-
chen - - w h e r e repor ted ly in fo rma t ion policy, in addi t ion to that of the of-
ficial Bundespressekonferenz, was discussed. 
M o r e conspi ra tor ia l would be two o ther groupings , if they exist or did 
exist. I bel ieve they indeed are real, but thei r assumed m e m b e r s don ' t 
conf i rm this . P r e sumab ly u n k n o w n to Chance l lo r E rha rd , a g roup of uni-
onis ts and representa t ives of indust ry supposedly meet to discuss labor-
m a n a g e m e n t policies a n d especially wage levels. W h e t h e r this unofficial 
but policy-sett ing body exists or not , i t is k n o w n u n d e r the specific n a m e 
Lohnkränzchen ( roughly t rans la ted , the Kaffeeklatsch on wages). T h e r e is 
fairly general ag reemen t tha t an unofficial business associat ion, the K o n -
zentrationsausschuss did exist, a l though even very knowledgeable pe r sons 
are not able to n a m e m o r e t han 7 of its fo rmer 12 or so pu ta t ive m e m b e r s . 
In con t inua t ion of some not very enl ightened t rad i t ions of the Weimar 
Republ ic , the Konzentrationsausschuss p r e sumab ly p l anned for all indu-
82 
strial d o n o r s the size and con t r ibu t ion of funds to var ious polit ical grou-
pings , in o rde r to m a x i m i z e t he impac t of giving. Th i s g roup ing is n o w 
definitely defunct , and i t p robab ly has no direct successor. 
Even inte l lectuals and art ists have va r ious types of policy in f luenc ing 
o rgan iza t ions . Ant i -Nazi j ou rna l i s t s used to coord ina te the i r a t tacks on 
f o r m e r Nazis n o w again in official posi t ion t h rough the Club republika-
nischer Journalisten. T h e i r i n fo rma t ion sheets singled out a specific target 
at a t i m e for a coord ina ted attack in a great n u m b e r of dailies. A l t h o u g h 
the campa igns of the g roup were effective, i t is no longer very act ive. An 
equiva len t to the A m e r i c a n Civil Liber t ies U n io n is the Humanistische 
Union, wh ich uses publ ic re la t ions to inf luence op in ion . A most in formal 
b a n d of m o d e r n wri ters , G r o u p 47, has been accused by its enemies of 
m o n o p o l i z i n g l i terary cri t icism and m a n i p u l a t i n g l i terary success. O n e re-
sponse has been a rival G r o u p 65. A n d so o n — d o w n to such ad hoc grou-
p ings for a specific polit ical pu rpose as the Wahlkontor of a d m i r e r s of 
Willy Brand t . 
Poten t ia l ly m o r e p rob lema t i c are several a t t empts to organize wi th in 
th is f r agmented elite pe rsons wi th s imi la r b luepr in t s for a be t t e r society or 
wi th s imi lar cr i t ic isms against t he present one . T h e Abendländische Aka-
demie, for example , un i t ed in a d m i r a t i o n for a Franco- type a u t h o r i t a r i a n 
state (124). T h e Grünwalder Kreis un i t ed in its anger at the n u m b e r of 
f o rmer Nazis in pos i t ions of inf luence . Whi l e i t appea r s qui te possible to 
o rgan ize a g r o u p of bel ievers across elite sectors, subsequent a t t emp t s at 
widespread convers ions appea r pre t ty hopeless . T h e present s t ruc ture of 
t he elite seems to be qui te i m m u n e against conspiracies wi th b road a ims 
(e.g., advoca t ing a poli t ical ph i losophy) , and qui te vu lne rab le to conspira-
cies wi th l imi ted object ives (e.g., bu i l d ing up a poli t ician or a specific 
policy). Th i s is in my op in ion a consequence of the previous ly descr ibed 
pa t t e rn of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A n o t h e r eli te m e m b e r may be effective in his 
capaci ty as exper t ; but t h e scope of exper t ise is usually qui te l imi ted , and 
these l imi ts also prescr ibe t he range of effectiveness in proselyt iz ing. 
These n u m e r o u s a t t emp t s at o rgan iz ing the elite may be a symptom of 
t h e concern of the elite itself over segmen ta t ion , bu t they are also the cause 
for new confusion. These m a n y a t t emp t s to achieve via o rgan iza t ion what 
is l ack ing in the s t ruc ture often induce a feeling of in to lerable pressure for 
g iving t i m e to count less wor thy causes. W h a t is mean t as a he lp very often 
t u r n s in to a n o t h e r formal obl igat ion. 
In spite of all these p l a n n e d occasions for c o m m u n i c a t i o n , at least in the 
shor t r u n , t he c o m m u n i c a t i o n system affords very small minor i t i e s a chan-
ce a t op in ion m a n a g e m e n t . T h e campa ign tha t Franz-Josef Strauss con-
duc ted a m o n g the elite p r io r to the 1961 elect ion, es tabl ishing himself t hen 
as G e r m a n y ' s most p romis ing young pol i t ic ian, indicates the speed and the 
degree to wh ich op in ion can be inf luenced by a small g r o u p . 
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M e m b e r s of the elite w h o should and do consider themselves very well 
i n fo rmed abou t polit ical ini t ia t ives were never theless surprised at the re-
cent pos i t ion pape r of the G e r m a n Counci l of Churches (Evangelische 
Kirche Deutschlands) on the quest ion of G e r m a n y ' s Eastern policy. Th i s 
d o c u m e n t took most pol i t ic ians by surprise, a l though it was drafted over a 
per iod of t ime by a n u m b e r of par t - t ime pol i t ic ians w h o be long to the top 
elite. F r e q u e n t meet ings of a n u m b e r of key persons may give the i l lusion 
of a h igh t r ansparency of the s t ruc ture , bu t in reality it is no subst i tu te for 
a system affording u n p l a n n e d encoun te r s at var ious levels. 
O n e of t he most successful and most cur ious cases of opin ion manage-
m e n t occur red du r ing the c a m p a i g n of the 1965 federal e lect ions. I t was 
then the consensus of those high and low in t he elite s t ruc ture tha t th is 
c ampa ign would cu lmina t e in a neck-to-neck race between the C D U and 
the S P D ; by m a n y , the SPD was seen as hav ing a good chance to nudge the 
leading C D U from its posi t ion as the strongest par ty . So certain was the 
belief of l ead ing pol i t ic ians in the reliabili ty of these predic t ions tha t de-
fini te c o m m i t m e n t s were m a d e for a g o v e r n m e n t coali t ion be tween the 
C D U and the SPD ( the so-called Grosse Koalition), if possible with a 
Chance l lo r o the r t han E r h a r d . T h e Pres ident himself went on record as 
saying t ha t he would he lp such a coal i t ion to come into be ing if the C D U 
and the S P D proved to be not m o r e than 3 per cent apart in p o p u l a r 
votes—at tha t t ime a seemingly safe a s sumpt ion . Actual ly, the C D U re-
ceived 8.3 per cent m o r e in p o p u l a r votes t han the SPD and missed clai-
m i n g a ma jo r i ty in p a r l i a m e n t by only four seats. This was considered a 
m a j o r upset ; bu t a t the same t ime the two leading par t ies and the op in ion 
researchers were accused of hav ing misled the popu la t ion by p red ic t ions 
that they knew or should have k n o w n to be false (125). A publ ic s t a tement 
by the C D U manage r Dufhues on election night , admi t t ing that indeed the 
s t a t ements about a neck-to-neck contest had been a »war tr ick,« did not 
he lp ma t t e r s . 
Piecing together what really happened takes detect ive work (126). It is a 
fact t h a t all a long a l te rna t ive forecasts were avai lable to jou rna l i s t s and 
pol i t ic ians . A n u m b e r of respectable opinion-research inst i tutes had regu-
larly repor ted a difference in s t rength of the two par t ies that c a m e qui te 
close to the final bal lo t ing. Even the one ins t i tu te that dur ing the election 
itself still predic ted a tossup be tween the two par t ies had on August 21 
publ i shed a poll which showed the C D U with a safe lead. Why did the 
jou rna l i s t s not pounce u p o n the differences in predic t ion between var ious 
equally respectable pollsters? W h y were the con t rad ic t ions be tween results 
of the s ame opin ion- research ins t i tu te »over looked?« W h y did hardly an-
yone care to check the p ro tes ta t ions of the F D P that the publ i shed poll 
results were biased or even man ipu l a t ed? 
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A p p a r e n t l y t h e C D U and the SPD al ike were interested in c rea t ing the 
image of a neck- to-neck r a c e — a l t h o u g h act ing on different theor ies of 
vo t ing b e h a v i o r . In b o t h par t ies , only very few pe r sons—al toge the r pro-
bably not m o r e t han 6—knew the m o r e correct results. In those ins t i tu tes 
r epo r t i ng a neck-to-neck race, unusua l securi ty p recau t ions were strictly 
enforced, and he re again p r e s u m a b l y no m o r e than a half-dozen pe r sons 
saw the actual resul ts before publ ic release. T h e success of the w h o l e ope-
ra t ion , however , was not the result of these security a r r a n g e m e n t s : s ince 
a l t e rna t ive c h a n n e l s of in fo rmat ion were avai lable , m e r e i n fo rma t ion con-
trol would no t have sufficed. Securi ty a r r a n g e m e n t s had mere ly t h e func-
t ion of p r e v e n t i n g the ma in actors (par ty headqua r t e r s , and the pol ls ters in 
league wi th t h e m ) to speak wi th different voices. T h e success of th is o p e -
ra t ion n e c k t o - n e c k « depended largely on the impress ion given to the pub-
lic. 
Ear ly in t h e campa ign , i n fo rma t ion was leaked to respected j o u r n a l i s t s 
about a neck- to-neck race. In a small and very gossipy capi tal such as Bonn 
th is sort of news t ravels fast, and persona l and privi leged i n f o r m a t i o n 
begins to b o u n c e back u p o n the n e w s m a k e r s l ike voices in an echo cham-
ber . T h u s pol i t ic ians and Bonn c o r r e s p o n d e n t s kept re inforc ing the i r own 
beliefs, and a l though th is news or ig ina ted from only about 5 sources , i t 
acqui red m a n y voices and kept ga in ing in plausibi l i ty . T h e fact tha t poli-
t ic ians acted on this diagnosis s t rongly re inforced it. T h e very fact tha t 
pe rsona l c o m m u n i c a t i o n wi th in elite segments in Bonn is qu i te effective 
leads to quick consensus : all tha t is needed is a j ud ic ious choice of inpu t . 
A c o m b i n a t i o n of in fo rma t ion con t ro l and p l a n n e d publ ic i ty for one 
diagnosis was successful in c rea t ing a h igh consensus in the va r ious »smal l 
worlds .« T h e avai labi l i ty of persona l contac ts then lent an air of au-
thent ic i ty to these shared beliefs. If th is can be used to m a n a g e for a pe r iod 
of several m o n t h s t he op in ions about a topic of such general interest as t he 
o u t c o m e of the na t iona l e lect ion, i t can be used with even grea ter effecti-
veness to m a n a g e op in ion and consent in areas such as defense policies . 
G e r m a n y ' s policy toward a tomic a r m s is a p r i m e example . Ever s ince 
t h e end of World War II a ma jo r i t y of t h e G e r m a n elite have s t rongly 
opposed a tomic a r m a m e n t for G e r m a n y . S t rong suppor t exists for inter-
na t iona l a g r e e m e n t s on non-pro l i fe ra t ion of nuc lea r weapons a n d for ent-
er ing in to such ag reemen t w h e t h e r or no t G e r m a n y has a par t in negotia-
t ing t h e m . T h e r e is even widespread suppor t bo th in the popu la t i on (a bit 
less t h a n 50 pe r cent) and a m o n g the elite (about 50 per cent) for a neut ra-
lized G e r m a n y . Yet G e r m a n y ' s official policy does no t at all confo rm to 
these op in ions . 
Th i s case has m o r e than one cu r ious aspect. Obviously , po l i cymake r s in 
o ther coun t r i e s a re no t really aware of this state of o p i n i o n . T h e elite 
wi th in G e r m a n y are insufficiently consc ious of t he actual policies of the 
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g o v e r n m e n t ; and insofar as a defini te gove rnmen t policy for the acquisi-
t ion of nuc lea r weapons is perceived, the re is merely p r iva te d i sapprova l 
r a t h e r than act ive protest . Th i s s i tuat ion has been in exis tence for m a n y 
years . Obvious ly the very small minor i ty involved in discussions of defen-
se policies is successful in not c o m m u n i c a t i n g its real a ims , provided the re 
are any. With respect to G e r m a n advocacy of the M L F (mul t i la tera l nu-
clear force), the elite appear to be consoled by the belief that n o t h i n g will 
c o m e of i t and tha t the subject is too technical to u n d e r s t a n d anyway. 
W h a t will happen if some form of G e r m a n par t ic ipa t ion in a nuc lea r 
defense system is b rough t about? Probably the same tha t happened when 
the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t rejected the widely accepted Rapack i Plan for a 
neu t ra l zone t h r o u g h Europe : no th ing . T h e r e will be an acquiescence to a 
slightly d isapproved new fact. 
By the size of aud ience and the intensi ty of i nvo lvemen t , discussions 
about defense policies are the very opposi te of discussions abou t the 
s t reng th of political par t ies . T h e smal ler the audience , the less t h e invol-
v e m e n t , and the greater the sense of inevitabil i ty, the easier it is for a 
d e t e r m i n e d minor i ty , and especially for the g o v e r n m e n t , to inf luence opi-
n ion and also to create a fait accompli. 
G i v e n t h e r a the r high exposure to very different med ia and the avai-
labil i ty of personal contacts , th is vulnerabi l i ty of t he system to manage-
m e n t and this insensit ivi ty to major i ty op in ion are largely a result of t he 
pecu l ia r t reel ike s t ruc ture of t h e elite class. As m e n t i o n e d , most c o m m u -
nica t ion occurs by region wi th in specific elite sectors; in these small 
wor lds , the c o m m u n i c a t i o n is qui te in tense . Different segments of the elite 
a re l inked together by a finite set of persons w h o keep mee t ing each o the r 
in different contexts . Since these l inkage persons are readi ly avai lable for 
direct contac t , the spur ious sense of being highly in fo rmed is fur ther en-
h a n c e d . C o m b i n e d conf idence in one 's ability to be in fo rmed and re l iance 
of the system on a finite n u m b e r of l inkages (plus the pauci ty of c o m m u -
nica t ion across segments wi th in localities), reduces t he suspicion of a ma-
n a g e m e n t of op in ion that an elite in a more secretive society may have 
(127). At the same t ime, however , the system is r a the r insensi t ive to at-
t e m p t s a t mass convers ions . 
T h e Value System of the Elite 
In its compos i t ion and s t ructure , the elite in G e r m a n y is now qui te 
s imi la r to that of o ther indust r ia l ized countr ies , no tab ly to the elite in the 
U .S . Significant differences in degree remain , and for the sake of clarity 
they h a v e been accentua ted in the descr ipt ion. M a n y of these differences 
a re a consequence of a pecul ia r m i x t u r e of e lements specific to an indu-
strial society and those carr ied over from feudal ism. Th i s coexis tence of 
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e l e m e n t s from different social systems affects social s t ruc ture , and it also 
d e t e r m i n e s the pecul iar va lue system of the G e r m a n elite (not »el i te va-
l u e s ^ since top d e c i s i o n m a k e r s s imply share those of the u p p e r - m i d d l e 
class). 
A dis t inct ion can be d rawn be tween : 1) values or n o r m s regula t ing mo-
des of conduc t (ana logous to traffic rules) i r respect ive of the pa r t i cu la r 
con ten t of an act ion, i.e., »system n o r m s « and 2) t he subs tan t ive values 
which under ly a way of life, i.e., »subs tan t ive no rms .« To the degree that 
t he re is any elite sub-cul ture , th is should manifest itself first in a set of 
pa r t i cu la r system n o r m s . Consensus about subs tant ive n o r m s is less fre-
quen t in indust r ia l societies anyway, and to the degree that we observe i t at 
all for t h e G e r m a n elite, i t is often no th ing specific to the elite bu t cha-
racter is t ic for its »set t ing,« t he uppe r -midd le class. In a diversif ied elite, 
such as the G e r m a n one , the re is also a diversif icat ion of subs tan t ive va-
lues. There fore , a general descr ipt ion of values of the elite impl ies a h igh 
degree of abs t rac t ion from the actual diversi ty. 
In c o m p a r i s o n wi th o ther E u r o p e a n elites, t he re is for the G e r m a n elite 
l i t t le of the peer -group cont ro l wh ich regulates behav io r , especially wi th in 
t he Bri t ish elite. Th i s is a necessary consequence of regional diversifica-
t ion , of segmenta t ion by spheres of compe tence , and of a lack of homo-
genei ty in b a c k g r o u n d and social izat ion. With li t t le in formal face-to-face 
in te rac t ion a m o n g elite m e m b e r s across sectors, t he re is b u t a small c h a n c e 
for t h e deve lopmen t of a set of system n o r m s for the G e r m a n elite in 
genera l . Of greater re levance are system n o r m s specific for elite segments-
i.e., a series of specific professional codes of conduct . Of course s o m e t h i n g 
l ike an in formal code of ch iva l ry in deal ing wi th status equals may be 
detected, bu t i t r ema ins opt ional because t he re are few effective sanc t ions 
tha t affect an elite m e m b e r as a p r iva te pe r son . O n e of the most effective 
m e a n s of social cont ro l wi thin t ight ly b o u n d groups , os t rac ism, is imprac-
t icable in such a diversified and segmenta l ized elite. 
Since the rules of conduct vary by sector, a general ag reemen t on sub-
s tant ive values migh t serve as an in tegra t ing force. But no such ag reemen t 
is l ikely in a society as different iated as G e r m a n y . In the absence of m a n y 
in tegra t ing factors of o ther E u r o p e a n societies, a shared belief in the sig-
ni f icance of elite status and a consensus on some ra the r general va lues of 
l i t t le i m m e d i a t e re levance for b e h a v i o r have to serve as a correc t ive . 
Elite s tatus is indeed widely perce ived as a jus t i f icat ion for l eade r sh ip 
based on super ior compe tence , and this shared self-perception does estab-
lish m e m b e r s h i p in a c o m m o n reference g roup (128). Since high s ta tus is 
in te rp re ted as be ing deserved, and since s tatus differences in G e r m a n so-
ciety a r e no t i l legi t imate, the G e r m a n d e c i s i o n m a k e r s do not feel as de-
fensive abou t the i r super ior i ty in s tatus and power as do the i r A m e r i c a n 
c o u n t e r p a r t s (129). T h e m u t u a l respect for elite s tatus and the metaphys ics 
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of mer i t p r o v e n by status are a m o r e effective in tegra t ing e lement than is 
t r ue for t h e U.S. Yet beyond some agreement on general i t ies there are 
m a n y causes for dissent, and this condi t ion is bo th recognized and feared. 
T h e fear of in ternal dissent is p robab ly responsible for one of the most 
pe rp l ex ing p h e n o m e n a wi thin the G e r m a n elite: the tendency to bypass 
polit ical an t agon i sms . F o r m e r Nazis and ant i-Nazis , fo rmer vict ims of pro-
secut ions and the i r p rosecu tors may be observed in amiable conversa t ion 
wi th each o ther , b o t h agreeing tha t an extension of the s tatute of l imita-
t ions would be sowing dissent. G i v e n the weakness of in tegrat ing factors , 
open dissent is a process that the system charac ter ized here canno t deal 
wi th effectively. Dissent will easily e rupt in to open conflict (130). 
T h e elite itself c anno t be expected to exercise effective self-policing over 
diss ident m e m b e r s . T h e con t inued poli t ical power of a m a n so widely be-
l ieved discredi ted by his p r iva te life as Franz-Josef Strauss is an example 
for t h e weakness of general system n o r m s in the face of suppor t from a 
r a t h e r small sub-group wi th in the elite. N u m e r o u s indeed are the stories of 
phys ic ians cover ing up for a physician of whose act ions they d i sapprove . 
F o r m e r (hopefully so) Nazis may be qui te n u m e r o u s in the jud ic ia ry , but 
t he re are obviously m a n y ant i -Nazis , too , and in m a n y cases the behav io r 
of s o m e fellow j u d g e du r ing the Nazi per iod was widely d isapproved by his 
col leagues. A n d yet in the Federal Republ ic no single j udge has ever been 
sen tenced for his deeds as a Nazi magis t ra te . In fact, the Bundestag even 
passed a law al lowing c o m p r o m i s e d judges to voluntar i ly ret i re with full 
pens ion and (in effect) i m m u n i t y for past act ions (131). T h e i n g r o u p spirit 
is usual ly s t ronger t han the respect for m o r e general values. 
In a n u m b e r of Western indust r ia l ized societies effective control of elite 
ac t ions is exercised by publ ic op in ion . Except in t imes of ex t r eme publ ic 
agi ta t ion , however , publ ic op in ion is usual ly effective only in censor ing 
specific ind iv idua ls . T h e G e r m a n elite share with elites of o ther European 
societies an avers ion against b e c o m i n g the subject of publ ic cont roversy . 
T h e r e is genera l r e sen tmen t when a m e m b e r t u rns to the publ ic at large 
for suppor t in a d isagreement with o ther elite m e m b e r s . Accept ing t he 
verdic ts of pub l i c op in ion would be to yield the pr inc ip le of professional 
a u t o n o m y . 
In the i r re lat ion to publ ic op in ion in a wider sense of the term (opinion 
de rows), t he elite in G e r m a n y differ marked ly from the elites of Anglo-
Saxon coun t r i es . Fo r G e r m a n d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , publ ic op in ion is a capri-
c ious sovereign merely in a very l imited sense; it is an i r ra t ional threat to 
t h e exper t bu t ne i the r a final arbi ter n o r a court of last resort . For t he 
G e r m a n elite publ ic opin ion as the voice of masses is a problem ra the r 
t h a n a guide , is a force one has to c o m e to t e rms with or, be t te r still, to 
con t ro l (132). This descr ipt ion may be ove r s impl i f i ed , but for m a n y 
g roups no t very m u c h so. By now, pol i t ic ians are the large except ion, alt-
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h o u g h G e r m a n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s (and qui te often on t h e side of the 
angels) cons ider t hemse lves as i n d e p e n d e n t agents r a the r than as passive 
s p o k e s m e n for t h e will of t he peop le (133). 
Th i s a t t i tude toward pub l ic op in ion i s consis tent with t he p reva i l ing 
se l f -concept ions and va lue o r i en t a t i ons in t he G e r m a n eli te. G i v e n t h e 
i m p o r t a n c e of exper t ise in dec id ing issues, pub l ic op in ion is seen mere ly as 
a force cha l lenging the r ea sonab le way of sett l ing issues. Accordingly , the 
eli te feel the i r ac t ions should no t be pol iced by pub l ic op in ion . T h e objects 
of such pol ic ing can coun t on t h e sympa thy t h o u g h not act ive aid of the i r 
peers . In th is eva lua t ion we e n c o u n t e r a pecul ia r but charac ter i s t ic m i x t u r e 
of t echnoc ra t i c and feudal is t ic o r i en t a t ion . 
T h e a t t i tude toward publ ic o p i n i o n is connec ted wi th t he general belief 
in a » n a t u r a l l aw« to which t h e exper t has a privi leged access. It will be 
recal led tha t a ma jo r i ty of t h e elite bel ieve tha t t h e r e a re always » t rue« 
so lu t ions , p rovided one i s qualif ied enough to f ind t h e m . W h a t e v e r t he 
issue on which the pub l i c expresses a preference , t he re should be s o m e o n e 
wi th in t h e elite w h o is be t t e r qualified to j u d g e . Even m a n y Social De-
mocra t s a r g u e — w h e t h e r wi th explicit reference to t he theor ies of M a r x or 
n o t — t h a t after all » the peop le« do not k n o w the i r t rue interests and had 
be t te r t ake the in t e rp re t a t ion of the i r t rue interests from the i r leaders . 
T h e p reva i l ing ideology wi th in t he elite is one of a col legiate body which 
i s t ry ing to serve t he c o m m o n weal and whose m e m b e r s possess super ior 
qual i f ica t ions in specific a reas . Howeve r , i t is no longer c o n s o n a n t wi th the 
p reva i l ing ideology in elite circles to coerce t he publ ic . W h i l e publ ic opi-
n ion is no t unde r s tood to legi t imately prescr ibe conduc t , the publ ic does 
set l imi ts for r ight or w r o n g — u s u a l l y t he lat ter . Th i s is accepted as a pr ice 
one pays for democracy . 
Today the G e r m a n elite cons ide r democracy the only possible form of 
g o v e r n m e n t . Howeve r , in s tudy ing elite concep t ions of democracy , we find 
tha t th is te rm » d e m o c r a c y « seems to cover qui te different fo rms of govern-
m e n t , some of which a re a bit far r emoved from the usual m e a n i n g of 
democracy . In spite of th is , a t t e m p t s to again conv ince t he elite tha t »po -
p u l a r « democracy is a b r a i n c h i l d of u n t r u s t w o r t h y l iberals or tha t Ger -
m a n y needs a » G e r m a n d e m o c r a c y « have not been very successful (134). 
T h e need to es tabl ish an ideological ident i ty against the c la ims of East 
G e r m a n y has been helpful for t he acceptance of democracy . Never the less , 
t h e general e n d o r s e m e n t of democ racy is a bit unspecif ic as to con ten t . 
W h e n m e m b e r s of the G e r m a n elite n o w endorse democracy , they pri-
mar i ly refer to a form of g o v e r n m e n t , not an a t t i tude or a va lue or ienta-
t ion . Being democra t i c a p p e a r s to m e a n : be ing a consc ien t ious ci t izen un-
der a n e w form of g o v e r n m e n t , loyally c o n f o r m i n g to new laws, giving 
democ racy wha t i s due to Caesar . In the i r a t t i tudes , howeve r , the ma jo r i ty 
of t he elite display an a m b i v a l e n c e to a democra t i c o r i en t a t ion . 
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As is t rue for elites in o ther Western indust r ia l ized count r i es , on que-
st ions of civil r ights the G e r m a n elite is by and large m o r e liberal t han the 
popu la t ion , a l though criticism from intel lectuals is widely begrudged as 
»negat ive« (135). Plura l ism of sor t s—namely , as the r ight of different 
g roups to live the i r own life, provided there is g roup consensus about this 
style of l i fe—has been accepted; indiv idual i sm m u c h less (136). No longer 
can s u b g r o u p s of the elite (such as business) be mobi l ized to b reak o ther 
g roups (such as t rade un ions ) . T h e r e is qui te a bit of r e s en t men t against 
some of the changes in social s t ructure—especia l ly against t he s t rong po-
sition of worke r s in the labor m a r k e t and against the democra t i za t ion of 
le i sure—but no feeling that a different political system would be des i rable 
in order to u n d o these changes . A m a j o r cause for uneas iness is the bar-
ga in ing process of interest groups , and whi le the var ious pa r t s of the elite 
gratefully accept wha tever thei r own pressure g roup achieves , a m o r e »ob -
j ec t ive« system would be welcomed. T h e no t ion of a jormierxe Gesellschaji 
which is advocated by Erha rd is qui te explicit only on this poin t : t he con-
d e m n a t i o n of g o v e r n m e n t by pressure groups . However , whi le the present 
G e r m a n society may not c o m m a n d a great deal of affection from its elite, 
the re is no longer a consensus tha t p rev ious forms of G e r m a n society were 
m o r e des i rable t han the present one . 
T h e G e r m a n elite is by and large now much less conserva t ive t han i t is 
bel ieved to be , and this is even t rue for business leaders . Accord ing to a 
survey in 1965, m o r e than one- th i rd of the elite is left of cen te r in its 
political ph i losophy , and only be tween one-fifth to one-four th can be ter-
med conserva t ive . T h e r e is no longer a debate about the jus t i f icat ion of the 
welfare state, only a widely shared feeling that welfare measu res are by 
now going a bi t far. Some occasional industr ial is t may still be recrui ted by 
g roups of the far r ight , but no longer industr ia l is ts as a class. 
This diagnosis of political a t t i tudes of the elite may sound s t range, in 
view of the c o n t i n u o u s uncover ing of yet ano the r suppor t e r of Nazism 
now in a posi t ion of high au thor i ty . However , the lack of resis tance to 
Nazism and the extent of coopera t ion that it received from the elite does 
not imply tha t its ph i losophy was widely shared . Accord ing to the 1956 
study of Edinger , 24 per cent of the elite had identif ied wi th Naz i sm, and 
no m o r e t han 19 per cent could be coun ted as hav ing opposed the reg ime 
(137). T h e ma jo r i ty of the el i te—just l ike the major i ty of the popula t ion-
were e i ther neu t ra l or ambiva len t toward the Nazi reg ime . Probably the 
percentage of fo rmer Nazis in the elite was greater than in the popu la t ion 
in genera l . But in a vast n u m b e r of cases compl i an t ac t ion did not mean 
acceptance of the ideology. A major i ty of the elite did not have to recant 
Naz i sm; they jus t had to change thei r act ions . A n d in addi t ion , t he re has 
been lately a significant t u rnove r in pe r sonne l . 
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T h e most i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e con t r ibu t ing to the stabil i ty of a democra t i c 
form of g o v e r n m e n t is, however , t he decl ine of the t r ad i t iona l form of 
n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e r e is l i t t le left of the rabid and self-centered na t iona l i sm 
of ear l ier t imes ; in its p lace s tands a general e n d o r s e m e n t of ever-s t ronger 
re la t ions wi th o the r count r ies of the »West.« Even in t he p r iva t e l ives of its 
m e m b e r s , the G e r m a n elite has finally defined itself as par t of the West. 
T h e U.S . and F r a n c e are the two societies that a cons ide rab le m i n o r i t y find 
a t t rac t ive e n o u g h to imagine l iving there p e r m a n e n t l y . Ins tead of the ear-
lier def in i t ions of G e r m a n y as a coun t ry be tween the East and the West, 
G e r m a n y is n o w widely seen as jus t one m o r e va r i a t ion of a Western 
society. 
T h e advocacy of s t ronger ties to o the r Western coun t r i e s m a y often 
sound l ike a m e r e exercise in r i tual . This observa t ion migh t lead to t h e 
conc lus ion tha t t he G e r m a n elite adheres to the Western a l l iance jus t as 
long as th is a l l iance does not conflict with G e r m a n y ' s policies . Such a 
conc lus ion would be wrong . 
Increas ingly since John F . K e n n e d y assumed the Pres idency in the U.S. , 
pa r t s of t he G e r m a n elite have been perce iv ing differences be tween Ger-
m a n y ' s poli t ical a i m s and the policies of her all ies. Younger m e m b e r s of 
t h e elite advoca te tha t the example of De Gau l l e should be followed and 
tha t G e r m a n y should pu t its self-interests ahead of the interes ts of o thers . 
Yet even a longer per iod of conflicts in policies is un l ike ly to affect t he 
basic e n d o r s e m e n t of t he al l iance. T h e al l iance as such is seen to be in 
G e r m a n y ' s na t iona l interest and i s widely u n d e r s t o o d to be t he very 
founda t i on of West G e r m a n y ' s con t inued exis tence. T h e fear of c o m m u -
n ism is genera l , deep , and t r anscends ra t ional cons ide ra t ions . A G e r m a n 
na t ion-s ta te is fe l t—and th i s is really on the level of e m o t i o n — t o be in-
capab le of resist ing c o m m u n i s m by itself in the long run . A 1965 survey of 
t he elite shows a redef ini t ion of the » C o m m u n i s t danger ,« away from the 
p reoccupa t ion wi th a mi l i t a ry danger . Yet the c o m m o n fear of c o m m u -
nism r e m a i n s as the closest th ing to an unofficial G e r m a n rel igion. 
Fea r is one c o m p o n e n t of this or ien ta t ion to t h e West, of th is new de-
f ini t ion of G e r m a n y as a »Western count ry .« An equal ly i m p o r t a n t com-
p o n e n t is the absence of a t rue nat ion-s ta te . G e r m a n y as a na t ion-s ta te in 
any of t h e usual m e a n i n g s of the concept is e i ther a r emin i scence or a hope 
but cer ta in ly no reality. Occasional a t t empts to a t tach the symbols of a 
t r ad i t iona l na t ion-s ta te to the Federal Republ ic h a v e no t met wi th no tab le 
success. As a consequence , a major i ty in the G e r m a n elite cons ider the 
na t ion-s ta te obsolete for European coun t r i e s in genera l , and in addi t ion 
we l come this d e v e l o p m e n t . 
Th i s is indeed an unusua l cond i t ion : a na t iona l eli te wi thou t a full na-
t ion-s ta te . Will th is lead to an a t t empt at reuni f ica t ion at all costs? Most 
l ikely, n o . S t rong fears and acceptance of the fact tha t G e r m a n y is a se-
91 
c o n d r a t e power b ind the G e r m a n elite to the West and l imit the scope of 
na t i ona l poli t ics. Whi le the re are indicat ions that na t iona l pr ide is on the 
increase, the re are few signs tha t this means a desire for nat ion-s ta te po-
litics in t he t rad i t ional sense. Fo r the G e r m a n elite, E u r o p e is t u rn ing into 
s o m e t h i n g of a second na t i on . Nowhere is the endo r semen t of Eu ropean 
in tegra t ion as s t rong and as consis tent as in this elite wi thout a nat ion-
state. 
T h e redefini t ion of G e r m a n y as a par t of the West has p roven to be a 
p leasure exper ience . Both out of necessity and now out of preference , the 
G e r m a n elite has b e c o m e cosmopol i tan . And yet at a basic level, the atti-
t ude system of the G e r m a n elite is pervaded by an »anthropologica l pes-
s i m i s m ^ by a belief tha t most h u m a n s are m u c h too imperfect to be really 
t rus ted ; the re is a lack of op t imism in fur ther h u m a n perfect ibi l i ty. Th i s is 
c o m b i n e d with a s t rong feeling that only very except ional m e n wi th a 
Faus t i an a rdor are mas te rs of the i r fate, whi le the rest of u s - - n e a r l y ever-
yone—is mere ly bowing to ever changing necessities. Th i s general orienta-
t ion to t he wor ld is not specific to the elite; it is a character is t ic of the 
G e r m a n upper -midd le class. 
In t h e past , var ious an t i -democra t ic ideologies could be easily fused with 
such an out look. Th i s is un l i ke now, i f only because a m o n g the G e r m a n 
eli te, too , the interest in systems of thought of cosmic scope has very m u c h 
receded. True, in thei r va lue or ien ta t ion and in their political belief sy-
s tems the G e r m a n elite still are not t he world 's foremost p r o p o n e n t s of 
democracy . But ne i the r are they active enemies of democracy n o r do they 
even passively reject it. 
Al ready wi th respect to the stratification system we observed a m i x t u r e 
of democra t i c and non-democra t i c value or ien ta t ions , which r e m a i n e d ne-
ver the less ra ther i r re levant for the political system. T h e same is t rue for 
t he inc idence of non-democra t i c (or even a n t i d e m o c r a t i c ) values a m o n g 
the elite. To a degree, th is follows from the charac te r of the essentially 
u p p e r - m i d d l e c l a s s ideology in which public life does not seem terr ibly 
re levant for » m a n « (i.e., the individual in an empha t i c sense of the t e r m ) . 
Tradi t ional ly , for m e m b e r s of t he G e r m a n elite, jus t as for most G e r m a n s , 
t he va lue system always pe rmi t t ed wi thdrawal in to pr iva te life if publ ic life 
b e c a m e repel lent . And as long as one r ema ined a v i r tuous m a n in pr iva te , 
compl i ance with non-v i r tuous g o v e r n m e n t s did not really destroy self-
respect . In the past , a n u m b e r of ant i -democrat ic political m o v e m e n t s and 
systems were compa t ib l e with the mélange of values ; at present the de-
mocra t i c system benefi ts from this high compat ib i l i ty of different system 
levels and segments on G e r m a n society. 
Then migh t an t i -democra t ic systems still be compat ib le with the va lue 
system of the G e r m a n elite? In pr inciple , yes; but not in pract ice . Whi l e it 
i s t rue tha t in G e r m a n y even democracy has an au thor i t a r i an flavor, the re 
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are a n u m b e r of cor rec t ive e l emen t s against a t ru ly n o n - d e m o c r a t i c mo-
v e m e n t . Most of t he elite endorse democracy in n a m e , a n d a good m a n y 
accept it who lehea r t ed ly . 
T h e strongest correc t ive e lement against any a n t i d e m o c r a t i c a d v e n t u r e s 
or excesses of na t iona l i sm, however , is ne i the r the va lue system of the elite 
n o r pub l i c op in ion but is the high degree of respons iveness to Western 
o p i n i o n s abou t G e r m a n y and its elite. No m a t t e r wha t m a n i p u l a t i o n s of 
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n system wi th in G e r m a n y might be feasible, the Ger-
m a n elite has and uses access to foreign media . G i v e n the reappra isa l of 
G e r m a n y as a secondary power and the redef in i t ion of G e r m a n y as a 
Western coun t ry , a widespread cri t icism of G e r m a n y will be perce ived and 
heeded—poss ib ly with r e sen tmen t , bu t heeded anyway. 
T h e G e r m a n elite m a y have changed less than was hoped for in 1945. 
But by v i r tue of its new responsiveness to the elites of o the r Western coun-
tr ies , t h e elite in G e r m a n y has indirect ly become m u c h m o r e of an asset 
t han a l iabili ty for democracy . 
NOTES 
1) A g r e e m e n t a m o n g social researchers was h ighes t immed ia t e ly after 
1945, w h e n social psychologists of F r e u d i a n o r i en ta t ion ar r ived at a 
near ly u n a n i m o u s verdict . Most of the i r d iagnoses were strongly in-
f luenced by t h e theor ies first developed in t h e F r a n k f u r t Inst i tut für 
Sozia l forschung; cf. Max H o r k h e i m e r (ed.), Studien über Autorität 
und Familie (Paris , 1936). Represen ta t ive for the early diagnosis : Na-
zism is a consequence of the au tho r i t a r i an persona l i ty p reva len t in 
G e r m a n y , and the G e r m a n au tho r i t a r i an persona l i ty is a consequen-
ce of the G e r m a n family system (Ber t ram Schaffner, Fatherland: A 
Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family [New York, 1948]). 
T h i s ag reemen t quickly de te r iora ted . As an example , c o m p a r e David 
Rodn ick , Postwar Germans: An Anthropologist Account (New H a v e n , 
1948), wi th Schaffner 's book . Viewed from today, it is s t r ik ing to what 
degree these F r e u d i a n s accepted as facts t he c o m m o n s tereotypes ab-
ou t G e r m a n y and proceeded to th ink up exp lana t ions for the presu-
m e d charac ter i s t ics . These analyses are even today still par t of the 
conven t i ona l wisdom a m o n g Western inte l lectuals , even t hough in 
actual social research ag reemen t about d i s t inguish ing features of 
G e r m a n society is by now ra the r low. 
2) Rober t H. Lowie, The German People: Social Portrait to 1914 (New 
York , 1937). 
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3) Reader's Guide lists near ly 6,000 articles on G e r m a n y in the U.S. 
d u r i n g the per iod of 1945 th rough 1964 - - abou t a th i rd m o r e t h a n 
abou t F rance , one of the mos t frequently discussed countr ies . In 1964, 
fea ture stories on G e r m a n y appeared in most Amer i can mass-circu-
la t ion per iodicals , such as Look, Life, Time, Holiday. Examples of 
m o r e recent topical issues of semi-intel lectual and intel lectual jour -
na l s of G e r m a n y are the March 9, 1953, issue of the Saturday Review 
and the Apr i l , 1965, issue of Encounter. The research d e p a r t m e n t of 
Der Spiegel has c o m p u t e d tha t an average of 3 books a day is now 
be ing publ i shed on G e r m a n y ! 
4) T h e locus classicus for Engl ish- language discussions of the G e r m a n 
class system and its re la t ion to the political system is Talcott Parsons , 
» T h e Problem of Cont ro l l ed Inst i tu t ional Change ,« in T. Pa rsons 
(ed.) , Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied (G lencoe , 111., 
1949), p p . 310-45; see also Parsons , » D e m o c r a c y and Social S t ruc ture 
in P r e N a z i G e r m a n y , « Journal of Legal and Political Sociology (No-
v e m b e r , 1942). 
T h e preva i l ing views in Engl ish- language l i te ra ture on the G e r m a n 
fami ly are found in the publ ica t ions by H o r k h e i m e r (ed.), Studien 
über Autorität und Familie, and Schaffner, Fatherland; see also Erik 
H. Er ikson , »Hi t l e r ' s Imagery and G e r m a n Youth,« Psychiatry, V 
(1942), 475-93; Er ich F r o m m , »Psychoanalyt ic Charac tereology and 
Its Appl ica t ion to t he U n d e r s t a n d i n g of Cul ture ,« in S. S. Sargent and 
M a r i a n W. Smi th (eds.), Culture and Personality (New York, 1949), 
p p . 1 1 0 . 
T h e no t ion of a pecul ia r G e r m a n personal i ty f inds its expression in 
such publ ica t ions as Kurt Lewin, »Some Psychological Differences 
be tween the Uni t ed States and G e r m a n y , « in G e r t r u d Lewin (ed.) , 
Resolving Social Conflicts (New York, 1948), pp . 3-33; Dona ld V. 
M c G r a n a h a n , »A C o m p a r i s o n of Social At t idues a m o n g Amer i can 
and G e r m a n Youth ,« Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
XL1 (1946), 245-57, and M c G r a n a h a n , » G e r m a n and A m e r i c a n 
Traits Reflected in Popu l a r D r a m a , « Human Relations, I (1948), 
429-55; I . T h o r n e r , » G e r m a n Words, G e r m a n Personal i ty , and Pro-
t e s t a n t i s m ^ Psychiatry, VIII (1945), 403-17; David C. McCle l l and , 
» T h e Uni t ed States a n d G e r m a n y : A C o m p a r a t i v e Study of Nat iona l 
Cha rac t e r , « in Dav id C. McCle l land (ed.), The Roots of Conscious-
ness (Pr ince ton , 1964), p p . 62-92. See also R. Br ickner , Is German 
Incurable? (Ph i lade lph ia , 1943); Kur t Wolff and W. Mischel l , »De-
fenses against Defeat: G e r m a n Discussions in 1950-51,« in Herbe r t 
C. K e l m a n (ed.), Images in International Behavior (New York, 1963); 
M a r t h a Wolfenstein and N a t h a n Leites, Movies: A Psychological Stu-
dy (G lencoe , 111., 1950); Ru th Benedict , »The Study of Cul tu ra l Pat-
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t e r n s in E u r o p e a n Nat ions ,« Transactions of the New York Academy 
of Science, V I I I 2 (1946), 274-79; G o r d o n W. Al lpor t et al., »Persona-
lity u n d e r Social Ca ta s t rophe : Nine ty Life His tor ies of the Nazi Re-
vo lu t ion ,« Character and Personality, X (1941), 1 22. 
F o r a crit ical and ba lanced discussion of the concept of moda l nat io-
na l persona l i ty , see Alex Inkeles and Danie l J . Lev inson , »Na t iona l 
C ha rac t e r : T h e Study of Modal Personal i ty and Sociocul tura l Sy-
stems,« in G a r d n e r Lindzey (ed.) , Handbook of Social Psychology 
(Read ing , Mass. , 1954), p p . 977-1020; Maur i ce L. F a r b e r , »The Pro-
b lem of Na t iona l Charac te r : A Methodologica l Analysis ,« in Neil J. 
and Wil l iam T. Smelser (eds.), Personality and Social Systems (New 
York, 1963), p p . 80-87. 
A s imi lar discussion is charac ter i s t ic for pos twar social science publi-
ca t ions on J a p a n . Represen ta t ive are R u t h F. Benedic t , The Chrysan-
themum and the Sword (Boston, 1946); Geoffry G o r e r , » T h e m e s in 
J apanese Cu l tu r e ,« Transactions of the New York Academy of Scien-
ce, V 2 (1943), 106-24. 
T h e l i t e ra tu re on these topics i s even m o r e n u m e r o u s t h a n the socio-
logical and social psychological l i t e ra ture cited in n. 4. An example of 
analyses a t t r ibu t ing pecul iar i t ies of recent G e r m a n poli t ical h is tory to 
ins t i tu t iona l a r r a n g e m e n t s is F e r d i n a n d A. H e r m e n s , The 
Representative Republic (No t re D a m e , Ind. , 1958). On the role of 
strategic g r o u p s and political va lues in G e r m a n society, see: Karl 
Die t r i ch Bracher , Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Villingen, 
1960); Louis Baud in , »Eli te ,« in Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissen-
schaften, III (1961), 198-202; Ot to S t ammer , » D a s El i teproblem in 
der D e m o k r a t i e , « in Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. L X X I (1951); H a n s 
G e r t h , » T h e Nazi Party: Its Leade r sh ip and C o m p o s i t i o n , « American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLV (1940); Karl W. Deu t sch and Louis 
Edinger , Germany Rejoins the Powers (Stanford, 1959); F. S. Busin, 
»Bureauc racy and Nat iona l Social ism,« in Rober t K. M e r t o n et al. 
(eds.) , Reader in Bureaucracy (G lencoe , III., 1960); Louis J. Edinger , 
» C o n t i n u i t y and C h a n g e in t he Background of G e r m a n Decision 
Make r s , « Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XIV (1961); Maxwel l E. 
Kn igh t , The German Executive, 1890-1933 (S tanford , 1952); H a r o l d 
D. Lasswell et al., The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford, 1952); 
Dan ie l L e r n e r et al., The Nazi Elite (Stanford, 1951); F r a n z B. Neu-
m a n n , The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944 
( N e w York, 1944); N iko laus von Pre radov ich , Die Führungsschichten 
in Österreich und Preussen, 1804-1918 (Wiesbaden, 1955); Joseph 
S c h u m p e t e r , » D a s soziale Ant l i t z des D e u t s c h e n Reiches ,« in J . 
S c h u m p e t e r (ed.), Aufsätze zur Soziologie (Tüb ingen , 1953); Ralf 
D a h r e n d o r f , » D e m o k r a t i e u n d Soz ia l s t ruk tur ,« in R . D a h r e n d o r f 
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(ed.) , Gesellschaft und Freiheir (Mun ich , 1963). pp . 260-99; Er ich 
Ma t th i a s and Rudolf Morsey, Das Ende der Parteien, 1933 (Düssel-
dorf, 1960). T h e inevi tabi l i ty of Nat iona l Socialism as a consequence 
of the character is t ics of G e r m a n y is the ma in t h e m e of William Shi-
rer ' s be s t s e l l e r about the rise and fall of Nazi G e r m a n y , bu t in a less 
s imple -minded form it is one d o m i n a n t t h e m e of scholarly discus-
s ions. 
Examples : the au thor i t a r i an personal i ty s t ruc ture of most G e r m a n s 
m a k e s to ta l i tar ian l eadersh ip inevi table ; the anarch i sm implici t in 
G e r m a n society calls for th an overemphas i s on order ; the democra t i c 
poli t ical ins t i tu t ions in G e r m a n y were (and are) insufficiently foun-
ded in p o p u l a r sen t iment and must c r u m b l e in any period of crisis; 
t he G e r m a n uppe r class wi th its an t i -democra t ic a t t i tude and enmi ty 
against t rade un ions and in to le rance of compe t i t ion wi thin G e r m a n y 
and outs ide its b o u n d a r i e s was and is always ready to suppor t polit ical 
adven tu re r s . Etc . Fo r m a n y of these con ten t ions , a cons iderable body 
of suppor t has been assembled; my main uneas iness is based on a 
suspicion of all uni-causal exp lana t ions for complex , m o d e r n socie-
ties. 
T h e exp lana t ions of Japanese political deve lopmen t by sociologists 
and social psychologists are even m o r e suspect. See Jean Stoetzel , 
Jeunesse sans chrysantheme ni sabre (Paris , 1954), for f indings con-
t r a ry to t he work of Benedict and Gore r . 
T h i s was the problem to which such Amer i can scholars as Schaffner 
and Rodnick addressed themselves in pos twar s tudies of G e r m a n fa-
mi l ies . 
See, for example , Ben Hech t , A Guide for the Bedevilled (New York, 
1944); T. H. Tetens, Know Your Enemy (New York, 1944), or some of 
D r e w Midd le ton ' s wri t ings when he covered the advance of Al l ied 
t roops in to G e r m a n y . T h e an t i -Ge rman racism implicit in p o p u l a r 
fiction may be seen in books of such diverse cha rac te r bu t wide au-
d ience a m o n g intel lectuals as Ka the r ine A n n e Por ter ' s Ship of Fools 
or Ian F leming ' s Bond-saga Moonraker. Th i s a n t i - G e r m a n i s m has a 
t r ad i t i on as old as the industr ia l izat ion of G e r m a n y , as is evident in 
t h e wr i t ing of Maur i ce Barres and Rudyard Kipl ing. Max Weber 
reflected wi thou t too m u c h success about this p h e n o m e n o n of a Ger-
m a n o p h o b i a as intense as ant i -Semit ism. In G r e a t Bri ta in, anti-Se-
mi t i sm and G e r m a n o p h o b i a were often associa ted--e .g . , with Lord 
Northcl iffe . A very good example of such p re jud ice in its p r imi t ive 
form is H a n s Koningsberger , »A M a p of The i r Own ,« Holiday, Vol. 
X X X V I , No . 4 (October , 1964). 
T h e r e is a long-s tanding t radi t ion of self-criticism in G e r m a n y , t o o - -
a l t h o u g h it is p robably even less tolerant ly received than is t rue for 
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o t h e r Western count r ies . Nietzsche 's crit icism of G e r m a n y and » the 
G e r m a n s « is especially po in ted and has been of some inf luence. T h e 
cr i t ic i sms du r ing the Weimar per iod by He in r i ch M a n n or Kur t Tu-
cholsky f ind the i r present-day con t inua t ion in the pub l ica t ions of 
M a x Picard , Mar t in Walser, G i in te r Grass , a n d Rolf H o c h h u t h . Re-
cent example s are »Bi lanz der Bundes repub l ik« the tit le of a special 
issue of Magnum in 1961; H a n s Werner R ich te r (ed.), Beswndsauj-
nahme: Eine deutsche Bilanz ( M u n i c h , 1962). 
10) T h i s s t a t emen t is based on a compar i son of t he resul ts for G e r m a n y 
wi th those for o ther coun t r i es in the surveys by B u c h a n a n and Had-
ley Cant r i l in 1949; the 4-country survey by the U N E S C O Ins t i tu te 
for Social Research in 1959; the 7-country survey » P r o d u c t s and 
Peop le« 1963; and the 3-country survey by Melvin Turn in. T h e th ree 
la t te r s tudies are as yet unpub l i shed . Stereotypes about G e r m a n y and 
t h e G e r m a n s have changed wi th different speed in different coun-
tr ies: t h e c h a n g e has been very rapid in F rance , r a the r slow in Eng-
l a n d . Cf. »L 'op in ion pub l ique et l 'Europe des six,« Sondage, Vol. 
XXV, N o . 1 (1963). 
11) T h e research on na t iona l s tereotypes has usually p roceeded from the 
a s s u m p t i o n tha t s tereotypes are m e r e he inous pre jud ices . L a m e n t a b l e 
as s tereotypes are in the i r consequences for the re la t ions be tween 
na t ion-s ta tes and ind iv idua ls from var ious coun t r i e s , i t is doubtful 
tha t na t iona l s tereotypes are p u r e fabr ica t ions . C o m m o n sense should 
suggest (and in my op in ion research suppor t s th is n o t i o n ) that nat io-
nal s tereotypes are u n d u e abs t rac t ions and genera l i za t ions from some 
aspects of reali ty, compl ica ted by the readiness to pro jec t feelings of 
host i l i ty to ou tgroups . 
O n e of the most in fo rmat ive accounts of such impress ions by a dis-
ce rn ing observer is Walter Rudolf L e o n h a r d t , Xmal Deutschland 
( M u n i c h , 1962). 
12) It is p resent ly one of t he fash ionable topics for social scientists and 
j o u r n a l i s t s in West G e r m a n y to speculate w h e t h e r differences in lin-
guist ic usages and ci t izen-state re la t ions signify tha t West and East 
G e r m a n y n o w have b e c o m e two na t ions . Ra lph D a h r e n d o r f i s one of 
those inc l ined to accept the two-nat ions theory . Of course , such spe-
cu la t ions a re very m u c h at odds with the official claim of the Federa l 
Repub l i c tha t the re is no such th ing as even a different poli ty called 
D e u t s c h e D e m o k r a t i s c h e Republ ik , the e u p h e m i s m for East G e r 
m a n y . 
13) P e r h a p s t h e best e x a m p l e of the t endency to t reat a given nat ion-s ta te 
as co inc identa l wi th a polit ical system is the work of the C o m m i t t e e 
o n C o m p a r a t i v e G o v e r n m e n t . Th i s c o m m i t t e e represen ts the a t t empt 
to m a r r y t h e sys tem-or ienta t ion of t rad i t iona l polit ical science with 
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sociology (specifically with the concept ion of social systems by Talcott 
Parsons) and with empir ical social research (specifically survey re 
search) . T h e as sumpt ion tha t g o v e r n m e n t policies must accurately 
reflect t he social character is t ics of the ci t izenry is here in t roduced as 
a self-evident r equ i r emen t for a func t ioning sociopol i t ica l system. 
Cf. Gabr i e l A l m o n d and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Pr ince ton , 
1963). 
14) Seymour Mar t i n Lipset, The First New Nation (London , 1964). 
15) Ind ica tors for this negat ive a t t i tude toward publ ic life are preferences 
for such ques t ionna i re choices as »Mos t people cannot be t rus ted,« or 
»Nobody up the re pays any a t ten t ion to the real p rob l ems of the 
people ,« or » O n e should not to lera te any criticism by outs iders of 
one 's fa ther land .« Surveys show a r e m a r k a b l e stability for such re-
sponses over a 10-year per iod. 
16) Example s are not ha rd to f ind. D u r i n g the whole of the Federal Re-
publ ic 's exis tence, about 80 per cent of the electorate favors capi tal 
p u n i s h m e n t , and yet a t t empts by individual pol i t ic ians and political 
par t ies to r e i n t r o d u c e capital p u n i s h m e n t (presently abol ished) have 
not b rough t any not iceable advantages to its p r o p o n e n t s . Again , a 
major i ty of the popula t ion is against a p r imary school system orga-
nized a long denomina t i ona l l ines (Bekenntnisschule), yet advocates 
of change have never been rewarded by voters . Nor is this lack of a 
t ight re la t ionsh ip between voter decision and subs tant ive wishes of 
the very s ame voters a p h e n o m e n o n specific to G e r m a n y . In his in-
vest igat ions of work ing class au tho r i t a r i an i sm, Mar t in Lipset has 
found a s imi lar lack of co r re spondence for English voters . Cf. Poli-
tical Man ( G a r d e n City, N.Y. , 1959), esp. Chaps . IV-V. 
17) T h e concep t ion of systems (personal i ty system, social system, and 
cul tura l system) and system e lements has a t ta ined some d o m i n a n c e 
in c o n t e m p o r a r y sociology main ly from the work of Talcott Parsons . 
Pa rsons conceived his no t ion of a system largely in analogy to the 
system concept in biology. In o rgan isms the re is usually a high inter-
re la t ion be tween organs . I assume, with m a n y critics of th is system 
no t ion , that for most societies the in ter re la t ion be tween system ele-
m e n t s is m o r e compl ica ted than i t is in h igher-order m a m m a l s (such 
as au thors ) . T h e best in t roduc t ion to Pa r sons ' concept of system can 
be found in T. Parsons et aL (eds.), Theories oj Society (G lencoe , 111., 
1961), I, 30-79. 
18) T h e best k n o w n of these »lags« is W. Ogburn ' s cul tural lag. Ogburn 
as sumes 1) tha t technology changes m o r e rapidly t han »cu l tu ra l« 
p h e n o m e n a in a society and 2) that in our present society there exists 
a large gap be tween technical sophist icat ion and archaic family sy-
s tems and n o r m s . I t should be obvious that this is ma in ly a vulgar ized 
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M a r x i s m , w h e r e a technological de t e rmin i sm takes t he place of the 
s o m e w h a t n e b u l o u s »p roduc t ive forces« of M a r x . 
19) R e l a t i onsh ip s be tween system levels may also be revealed t h r o u g h 
analys is of degrees of »indifference.« 
20) T h e presen t ly fash ionable type of au tho r i t a r i an i sm m a k e s use of ne-
wer in fo rma t ion about op in ion fo rmat ion in func t iona l ly highly dif-
fe ren t ia ted societies. T h u s bo th in present -day Yugoslavia and in 
F r a n c e the o rd ina ry cit izen is largely free of h a r a s s m e n t even if he is 
s o m e w h a t of an o p p o n e n t of the regime. F r o m this po in t on, the 
f o r m s of au tho r i t a r i an i sm differ. A full-fledged a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m will 
in te r fe re w h e n e v e r the o p p o n e n t s of the reg ime try to achieve some 
form of o rgan iza t ion . A mi ld and highly sophis t icated form will to-
le ra te some formal oppos i t ion and will only bo th wi th the med ia of 
m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n and with op in ion leaders such as univers i ty pro-
fessors or effective wr i te rs . T h u s in F r a n c e t he reg ime of G e n e r a l De 
G a u l l e keeps a t ight control over the only large F r e n c h wire service, 
t h e rad io and television ne tworks , and to some degree t he m o v i e 
indus t ry ; i t will view with approva l the concen t ra t ion of newspr in t 
d i s t r ibu t ion in t he h a n d s of Hache t t e and persecu te wr i t e r s t h r o u g h 
t h e regular cour t system. T h u s whi le dur ing the Th i rd and F o u r t h 
Repub l i c s the laws against insul t ing the Pres ident were invoked less 
t h a n half a dozen t imes , du r ing the Fifth Repub l i c p rosecu t ions of 
wr i t e r s u n d e r th is law have exceeded 300 cases. Actual ly , no s table 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n regime is compa t ib le wi th a highly different ia ted in-
dus t r ia l society that relies on full-t ime oppress ion of c i t izens. Even 
t h e Naz i reg ime in G e r m a n y dur ing the years 1933-39 restr icted itself 
to t he violent prosecut ion of organized political oppos i t ion , dismissal 
of poli t ical o p p o n e n t s in civil-service pos i t ions , and to t h e suppres-
sion of f reedom of expression in the mass med ia . Othe rwise , t he Nazi 
r e g i m e largely was satisfied with the overt compl i ance of t h e indivi-
dua l c i t izen, c o u n t i n g as it did on a cer ta in a m o u n t of »unoff ic ia l« 
t e r r o r by its a d h e r e n t s against indiv idual c i t izens. Wholesa le t e r ro r 
and ex t e rmina t i on charac te r ized t he war years; to m a k e th is form of 
p rosecu t ion t he cr i ter ion for label ing a reg ime a d ic ta torsh ip is to 
over look progress in t he technology of au tho r i t a r i an i sm . 
21) T h e d is t inc t ion be tween macro-sociology and micro-sociology has 
been developed by Georges G u r v i t c h to dis t inguish be tween the ana-
lysis of societies with the in tent of exp la in ing the i r laws of develop-
m e n t and the analysis of specific p h e n o m e n a wi th in a society with 
t h e in ten t to u n d e r s t a n d only those p h e n o m e n a . I use t he t e r m s in the 
s a m e sense. 
22) Cross-cul tura l c o m p a r i s o n s inc lud ing several indus t r ia l coun t r i e s and 
us ing the tools of empir ica l social research are no t too f requent . Alt-
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h o u g h in the isolated ins tances of social research dur ing the 19th 
cen tu ry in te rna t iona l compar i sons appeared as a na tura l strategy, and 
a l though »classical« methodolog is t s such as D u r k h e i m and J. S. Mill 
declared the c o m p a r a t i v e approach to be the strategy central to the 
social sciences, empir ica l social research as an ins t i tu t ional ized acti-
vity was ove rwhe lming ly conceived with the nat ion-s ta te as a na tu ra l 
contex t . Present cross-cultural compar i sons largely take the form of 
c o m p a r i s o n s be tween one developed count ry and one or m o r e un-
derdeve loped societies. Therefore our body of compara t ive studies for 
Western indust r ia l ized societies is qui te smal l , the frequent a l lus ions 
in sociological wri t ings to differences be tween the U.S., Eng land , 
F rance , G e r m a n y , o r Italy no twi ths t and ing . 
In n. 10 several s tudies were cited. Below I also d raw upon the results 
of op in ion and marke t - research surveys where s imilar data h a p p e n e d 
to be collected in paral lel but uncoord ina ted invest igat ions, and I 
m a k e use of a c o m p a r a t i v e study on goals and me thods in child trai-
n i n g by Ur i e B r o n f e n b r e n n e r and Edward Devereux . Most of this 
mate r ia l is as yet unpub l i shed . Cer ta in addi t ional in format ion has 
been taken from the »World Polls« section of Public Opinion 
Quarterly, t he in te rna t iona l periodical Polls, and the work of the 
In te rna t iona l Sociological Associat ion research commi t t ees on the fa-
mily , on social stratif ication and mobil i ty , and on mass cu l tu re and 
le isure. 
23) Not all scholars restrict themse lves to »Western« industr ia l ized socie-
ties in pos tu la t ing of a c o m m o n type of social organiza t ion . Alex 
Inkeles has m a i n t a i n e d tha t regardless of the pr inc ip le of g o v e r n m e n t 
or historical t radi t ion the re is an industr ia l society as one specific 
form of social system wi th a co r respond ing type of personal i ty . These 
though t s , first advanced in Inkeles , »Indus t r ia l M a n : T h e Relat ion of 
Status to Exper ience , Percept ion , and Value,« American Journal of 
Sociology, LXVI (1960), 1-31, have gained wide acceptance. 
24) T h e popu la r no t ion of the G e r m a n family as domina ted by an au-
tho r i t a r i an father insist ing on b l ind obedience , with formal re la t ions 
be tween family m e m b e r s , is jus t plain nonsense if th is is pos tu la ted 
to be the ma in type. Such a family constel la t ion existed of course in 
G e r m a n y and e lsewhere in Europe mainly a round the tu rn of the 
cen tury and in the upper -midd le and midd le class; i t is now under-
stood by family sociologists as a t rans i tory p h e n o m e n o n after the 
unasser t ive d o m i n a n c e of the male had lost its factual basis and lead 
to an assertive d o m i n a n c e (sekundärer Patriarchalismus). Ci. René 
König , »Fami ly and Author i ty ,« Sociological Review, V (1957), 
107-27. Even du r ing th is per iod a n u m b e r of family types coexisted, 
and a m o n g unski l led worke r s a form of mat r ia rcha l i sm was re-
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por ted ly qui te f requen t . Even as p rov ided for in official legislat ion, 
t h e G e r m a n fami ly was neve r as pa t r i a rcha l as the F r e n c h family 
insofar as the la t te r was reflected in the Code N a p o l e o n . 
25) T h e recent work of Melv in Turn in con f i rms that t he re are c o m p a r a b -
le levels of p r e jud i ce in mos t indus t r ia l ized societies. T h e level of 
an t i -Semit i sm in E n g l a n d , F rance , and G e r m a n y is of r a the r s imi lar 
m a g n i t u d e , a l t hough the actual d e m o n s t r a t i o n of this p re jud ice is not 
c o m p a r a b l e at all . Of course , the objects of p re jud ice vary from coun-
try to coun t ry : an t i -Pol i sh p re jud ice in G e r m a n y largely co r re sponds 
to ant i -Alger ian bias in F r a n c e and anti-West Ind ian feelings in Bri-
ta in . Tumin es t imates tha t at present in all of these societies near ly 
two- th i rds of the p o p u l a t i o n can be classified p re jud iced against one 
e t h n i c g roup or a n o t h e r ; p e r h a p s th is a m o u n t of p re jud ice is a pro-
per ty of indus t r ia l society in its p resent mani fes ta t ion . 
26) Th i s j u d g m e n t i s based u p o n the cross-cul tural study by Tumin and 
surveys conduc t ed in G e r m a n y , par t ly by t he g o v e r n m e n t itself. 
27) U n i t e d States Strategic B o m b i n g Survey, The Effects of Strategic 
Bombing on German Morale (Washington , D.C. , 1947), I, 33. 
28) Right -wing e x t r e m i s m in t he Federal Republ ic has always been m o r e 
vis ible t h a n pol i t ical ly effective. D u r i n g the 1965 elect ions t he N P D 
(a new Na t iona l Par ty of G e r m a n y ) openly appealed to Nazi senti-
m e n t s bu t received mere ly 2 per cent of t he vote ; in its most success-
ful cons t i tuenc ies th i s pa r ty received be tween 6 and 7 per cent of the 
p o p u l a r vote . Never the less , on the basis of a n u m b e r of surveys I 
e s t ima te t he pe rcen tage of ideological Nazi ' s at present closer to 4 per 
cent of the p o p u l a t i o n . 
29) The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale, I, 16. 
30) Regional differences still persist as s tereotypes about Bavar ians or 
R h i n e l a n d e r s , a n d d u r i n g the 1965 e lect ions they also h a d — i n the 
absence of s t rong par ty ident i f ica t ions—a not iceable inf luence on vo-
t ing behav io r . Cf. Deu t sches Indus t r i e ins t i tu t , Analyse der Wahl zum 
5. Deutschen Bundestag am 19. September 1965 (Köln , 1965); see also 
Werne r Kalteflei ter , » W ä h l e r und Par te ien in den Land tagswah len 
1961 1965,« Zeitschrift für Politik (1965), p p . 224-50. 
31) To cons ider the p o s t w a r per iod as a t i m e apar t may be mis leading , for 
several social changes p robab ly began d u r i n g the war . Th i s has been 
suggested for changes in the au thor i ty s t ruc ture of middle-class fa-
mi l ies and is p robab ly t rue for changes in the strat if icat ion system 
and ci t izen-state re la t ions . For the changes in t he family in response 
to w a r t i m e cond i t i ons , see t he case s tudies collected by G e r h a r d 
Wurzbache r , Leitbilder gegenwärtigen deutschen Familienlebens (2d 
ed.; Stut tgar t , 1954). F o r a cross-cultural compar i son of degrees of 
a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m in Western indus t r ia l ized societies, see Glen H. El-
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der, Jr., »Ro le Rela t ions , Sociocultural E n v i r o n m e n t s , and Autocra t ic 
Fami ly Ideology,« Sociometry, XXVII I (1965), 173-96. 
32) T h e te rm »p lu ra l i sm« gained cur rency d u r i n g the debate in the Ca-
thol ic organiza t ions about a few posit ion of the i r chu rch in its rela-
t ions to political ins t i tu t ions . T h e Catho l ic C h u r c h wished to emp-
hasize that it was wil l ing to cons ider d issent ing g roups as a perma-
nen t par t of its e n v i r o n m e n t . Pol i t ic ians quickly added this term to 
the i r vocabulary , a l though Chance l lo r E r h a r d himself is chas ing after 
the t rad i t iona l G e r m a n goal of Gemeinschajt when advocat ing his 
»comple t e society« (formierte Gesellschajt). 
33) Talcott Parsons , too , in his »Program for Ins t i tu t ional ized Change ,« 
Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied, cons iders the status 
system as pecul iar and as par t ly responsible for Naz i sm. Consequent -
ly, he states (1944) tha t a change of the status system is a prerequis i te 
for t h e deve lopmen t of a stable democracy in G e r m a n y . 
34) Especially dur ing the 19th century , E u r o p e a n observers were awed by 
the lack of r i tual in the re la t ions be tween s tatus unequa l s . Cf. Max 
Berger, The British Traveller in America, 1836 1860 (New York, 
1943), p p . 54-55; Har r i e t Mar t i neau , Society in America (New York, 
1837), Vol. I l l ; F rances Trol lope, Domestic Manners of the Americans 
( L o n d o n , 1832). A great m a n y c i ta t ions of Eu ropean observers that 
refer to th is lack of deference in Amer ica are repor ted in Lipset, The 
First New Nation, p p . 106-22. 
Lipset uses t he con t inu i ty of these references as a main evidence in 
his con ten t ion that t he re is an u n c h a n g i n g A m e r i c a n charac ter . Of 
course , 19th-century Europeans , c o m i n g from a society much m o r e 
d o m i n a t e d by pa t t e rn s of deference charac ter i s t ic of feudal ism, were 
m o r e e loquent than present-day E u r o p e a n s in the i r descr ipt ion of 
awe at th is A m e r i c a n t rai t . I bel ieve, however , tha t th is lack of de-
ference is not an expression of an A m e r i c a n cha rac te r but is a con-
sequence of a »pu re« system of inequal i ty based on class. To the 
degree that th is feature becomes d o m i n a n t , th is » A m e r i c a n « trai t will 
also manifest itself m o r e strongly in Eu rope , inc lud ing an increased 
i m p o r t a n c e a t tached to symbols of prest ige. 
In A m e r i c a n sociology, the term »class« is most ly used as in te rchan-
geable wi th s tatus and s t r a tum. I m p o r t a n t examples are Richard Cen-
ter, The Psychology of Social Classes (P r ince ton , 1949); W. Lloyd 
Warne r et al., Social Class in America (Chicago , 1949). »Officially,« 
however , even in Amer i ca , s tatus and s t r a tum are cons idered the ge-
neral t e r m s for inequal i t ies , of which social class is then a specific 
case. H e r e I follow the p reva i l i ng—though p e r h a p s deplorable—cu-
stom of using the t e rms as in t e rchangeab le . 
35) T h e r e is also ag reement tha t the U.S. as t he society wi th a low degree 
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of legi t imacy for class differences is also t he society w h e r e t he re is 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y conce rn wi th prest ige. T h i s is manifes t bo th in con-
s u m p t i o n p a t t e r n s (see t h e descr ip t ions of Vance Packard in The Wa-
ste Makers (New York, 1960); The Pyramid Climbers (New York, 
1962), a n d The Status Seekers (New York, 1959) a n d in the compl i -
cated m a n e u v e r s in in te rpe r sona l re la t ions in order to be l iked and 
respected (this is one m a j o r t h e m e of Erv ing G o f f m a n ' s wr i t ings and 
a factor in t he a t t en t ion he receives). H o w e v e r , sociologists shou ld 
expect an increas ing e m p h a s i s on prest ige wi th dec l in ing legi t imacy 
of class differences; » t h e less defini te t he s ta tus , t he m o r e asser t ive 
the b e h a v i o r « is a well-establ ished regular i ty . T h u s wives w h o have 
der ived s ta tus are m o r e assert ive of s ta tus differences t han the i r hus-
b a n d s . In a con tex t w h e r e status differences a re mutua l ly accepted, 
t h e r e can be easy i n t e rming l ing—prov ided the r i tual p e rmi t s th is—of 
s tatus u n e q u a l s ; ch i ld ren of physic ians a n d of the i r c h a r w o m e n may , 
for example , be less in ter fered with in p lay ing toge ther if s ta tus dif-
ferences be tween p a r e n t s are not cha l l enged . An unde r ly ing confl ict 
in t he U.S . s t ems from official equal i ty and factual inequal i ty ; a pre-
vai l ing s trategy is to » u n m i x « and to restr ict one ' s p r iva te life to 
in t e rcour se with status equals or to those of h igher s tatus. All these 
m e c h a n i s m s were a l ready recognized by 19th-century vis i tors (cf. 
Lipset , The First New Nation). In con t r a s t i ng t he U.S . and G e r m a n y , 
an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t he systems of social s t ra t i f icat ion will be m a d e 
easier if one cons iders these differences as a l t e rna t ive def in i t ions of 
inequal i ty . 
O n e of t he foreign observers w h o shows sensi t ivi ty to this aspect of a 
r i tual of defe rence is Talcott Parsons , Essays in Sociological Theory 
Pure and Applied, p. 320 et passim. P a r s o n s emphas i ze s the forma-
lism of G e r m a n ins t i tu t ions in general a n d po in t s to t he dissociat ion 
of emo t iona l m e a n i n g a t tached to express ions of deference . »Ger -
m a n s a re m u c h m o r e preoccupied wi th s ta tus t h a n A m e r i c a n s , bu t 
t he r e has been li t t le roman t i c i za t ion of success in G e r m a n y . A m e r i -
cans a re p r o n e to roman t i c i ze a t t a i n m e n t wi th in t h e ins t i tu t iona l ized 
s ta tus system; whi le G e r m a n s have a grea te r r o m a n t i c interest in 
goals ou ts ide it« (p . 321). 
T h u s St. Hi ldegard argued tha t jus t as G o d assigns his angels in hea-
ven to different places in t he s tatus h ie ra rchy , so He separa tes his 
ch i ld ren on ear th accord ing to different es ta tes—»but G o d loves 
t h e m all .« T h e s t rength of feudalist ic a r r a n g e m e n t s in G e r m a n socie-
ty was vividly descr ibed by Karl Marx and Fr iedr ich Engels: tha t they 
f o u n d i t in the i r t ime p e r h a p s reflects t he fact tha t indus t r ia l iza t ion 
in G e r m a n y was unusua l ly late and rap id . 
A c o u n t r y wh ich at p resen t displays the con t rad ic t ion be tween feu-
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dalistic r e m n a n t s and a class system is Italy, and he re t he tens ions 
tha t spill over in to polit ics are especially p r o n o u n c e d . See Erik Al-
lard t a n d Yrjö L i t t unen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Sy-
stems (He l s ink i , 1964); T h e o d o r Geiger , Die Klassengesellschaft im 
Schmelztiegel (Köln , 1949). 
39) Erwin K. Scheuch , »Sozialprest ige u n d soziale Schich tung ,« Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, XI I I (1961), p p . 
65-103; E. K. Scheuch and Die t r ich Rüschemeyer , »Scal ing Social 
Status in Western G e r m a n y , « British Journal of Sociology, II (1960), 
p p . 15T68 . See also Karl Mar t in Bolte, Sozialer Aufstieg und Abstieg 
(Stut tgar t , 1959). 
40) Accord ing to a n u m b e r of indica tors in E. K. Scheuch , »Bundestag-
wah l s tud ie 1961,« an u n p u b l i s h e d research co mp i l a t i o n . Th i s par t of 
t h e mater ia l is as yet unpub l i shed . See also Hans-Jürgen D a h e i m , 
» D i e Vorstel lungen vom Mit te l s tand ,« Kölner Zeitschrift für Sozio-
logie und Sozialpsychologie, XII I (1960), p p . 237-77; Alfred Willener, 
Images de la société et classes sociales (Bern, 1957); R e n a t e Mayntz , 
Soziale Schichtung und sozialer Wandel in einer Industriegemeinde 
(Stut tgar t , 1958); H a n s P o p i t z e r al., Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbei-
ters (Tüb ingen , 1957). 
41) A n u m b e r of empir ica l s tudies on the r a n k i n g of occupa t ions in m a n y 
indus t r ia l ized coun t r i e s were repor ted in vol . II (1960) of the British 
Journal of Sociology. F u r t h e r references can be found in the repor t 
of the C o m m i t t e e on Social Stratification and Social Mobi l i ty of t h e 
In t e rna t iona l Sociological Associat ion; cf. David V. Glass and R e n é 
König (eds.), Soziale Schichtung und Soziale Mobilität (Köln , 1961). 
Some older bu t re levant s tudies are repor ted in Nat iona l Op in ion 
Research Cente r , »Jobs and Occupa t ions : A Popu l a r Eva lua t ion ,« in 
R e i n h a r d Bendix and Seymour Mar t in Lipset (eds.) , Class, Status, 
and Power (G lencoe , 111., 1953), pp . 411-26; Nata l ie Rogoff, »Social 
Strat if icat ion in F r a n c e and in the Uni ted States,« American Journal 
of Sociology, LIX (1953), 347 57. 
42) T h e G e r m a n of the Federal Republ ic as comfor t -minded , gadget-
hun t i ng , superficial , oppor tun is t i c , and so on is the subject of a con-
cer ted at tack from r ight-wing social critics (such as Klaus Harp-
p rech t ) and left-wing crit ics (such as Erich Kuby) in t he newest Ger-
m a n exercise in inte l lectual ized s tereotyping: » D i e Bundesdeut -
schen,« Der Monat, No . 200 (May, 1965). A m e r i c a n readers may feel 
tha t in connec t ion with the i r own pos twar society they have read all 
too m a n y such diagnoses before. 
43) Tha t such goods are indeed symbols and not d e t e r m i n a n t s of s tatus 
can be seen by an analysis of cases where these symbols and o the r 
status cr i ter ia do no t coincide . A certain m a k e of car is at first accep-
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ted at face va lue as an index of s tatus b u t then is r e in te rp re ted as an 
a t t e m p t at snobbery and even decept ion if, e.g., occupat ion and in-
c o m e do no t corre la te with o w n e r s h i p of this good. A b o o k k e e p e r 
m a y save m o n e y in order to buy his wife a m i n k coat, but this will be 
j u d g e d by his peers in occupat ion as l iving beyond one 's means . In 
feudal societies, co inc idence be tween s tatus and such symbols as at-
t i re , hous ing , and c o n s u m p t i o n of luxury good was regulated by law, 
so tha t dressing beyond one 's s tatus led to legal ac t ion . T h e lack of 
such regu la t ions has m a d e symbols of s tatus in to a m b i g u o u s targets 
for in tens ive s t r iving. C o m p a r e the recent empir ica l s tudies repor ted 
by H. K r e i k e b a u m and H. Rinsche , Das Prestigemotiv in Konsum und 
Investition (Berl in, 1961), esp. p p . 116-24. 
44) Rogoff, »Social Strat if icat ion in F r a n c e and in t he Un i t ed States.« 
45) Th i s is accorded m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e by Ralf D a h r e n d o r f in va r ious 
recent pub l ica t ions . See especially Dahrendor f , » D e m o k r a t i e u n d So-
z i a l s t ruk tu r in Deu t sch l and ,« in R. D a h r e n d o r f (ed.) , Gesellschaft 
und Freiheit ( M u n i c h , 1963), p p . 260-99. D a h r e n d o r f in a sort of in-
ver ted M a r x i s m argues that no m o d e r n democracy i s possible wi thou t 
b u s i n e s s m e n hav ing bo th high status and great polit ical power . He 
bel ieves tha t the lack of e i ther in pre-World War 1 G e r m a n y led to the 
fai lure of democracy . 
46) T h a t a h ighe r posi t ion also m e a n s h ighe r c o m p e t e n c e of t he incum-
b e n t is no t jus t popu l a r belief or ed i tor ia l iz ing by the Prairie City 
Times bu t is t he so-called funct ional is t ic exp lana t ion of social strati-
f icat ion. P re sumab ly , t he h igher rank of s o m e occupat iona l categories 
expresses the i r greater significance for the society, and the cr i ter ia for 
ach iev ing these h igher categories are ha rde r to meet than those for 
pos i t ions wi th lower prest ige; there fore the h igher a m a n , the be t te r a 
m a n . Of course , ne i t he r con ten t ion has been cri t ically ana lyzed . To 
mee t th is view in all its intel lectual and exper ient ia l na ive te consul t 
Kingsley Dav i s and Wilbert E. M o o r e , » S o m e Pr inc ip les of Stratifi-
ca t ion ,« American Sociological Review, X (1945), 242-49. 
47) T h e different rank order of factors bel ieved to lead to u p w a r d social 
mobi l i ty can be seen in Rogoff, »Social Strat i f icat ion in F r a n c e and 
in t he U n i t e d States«; Deu tsches Ins t i tu t für Volksumfragen ( D I V O ) , 
Umfragen 1958 (F rankfu r t , 1959), p. 124 et passim. 
48) C o m p a r e Talcott Pa r sons ' r emark in Essays in Sociological Theory 
Pure and Applied, p. 321, that the re is l i t t le roman t i c i za t ion of success 
in ascr ip t ive societies. 
49) See Dav id V. Glass (ed.), Social Mobility in Britain (London , 1954); 
G las s and König (eds.), Soziale Schichtung und Soziale Mobilität, p p . 
171-229. 
50) T h i s difference be tween the privi lege accorded to r ank and the re-
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spect accorded to a specific person is also k n o w n in the U.S. in cer ta in 
s i tua t ions—notab ly in A r m y life and in the Ca tho l ic clergy. 
51) T h e dis t inct ion be tween p r imary and secondary e n v i r o n m e n t has 
been explained in Erwin K. Scheuch, »Di e Sichtbarkei t pol i t ischer 
Eins te l lungen im all täglichen Verhal ten,« Kölner Zeitschrift für So-
ziologie und Sozialpsychologie, XVII (1965), p. 173 et passim. 
52) Fr i ed r i ch Weltz, Wie steht es um die Bundeswehr? ( H a m b u r g , 1964), 
pp . 13, 104. 
53) D I V O , Umfragen 1958, pp . 117-23. Cf. Alex Inke les and Peter Rossi, 
»Na t iona l Compar i sons of Occupat ional Prestige,« American Journal 
of Sociology, LXI (1956), 329-39; Rober t E. C la rk , »Psychoses, In-
c o m e , and Occupat ional Prestige,« in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), Class, 
Status, and Power; p. 336 et passim; C. A. Moser and R. Hal l , »The 
Social G r a d i n g of Occupat ions ,« in Glass (ed.), Social Mobility in 
Britain, pp . 26, 34, 39. 
54) T h e distances between the var ious social strata are , of course , no t 
evenly spaced. In all industr ia l ized societies s trat i f icat ion p y r a m i d s 
are a combina t ion between a cont inual increase of some factors (»pre-
stige«) plus some definite discont inui t ies in be tween , the la t ter phe-
n o m e n o n being in agreement with older no t ions of social inequal i ty . 
Significant for the reduct ion of tens ions resul t ing from a stratifica-
t ion system is t he fact, tha t the re is no great gulf be tween upper - lower 
and lower-middle class. The re is now in G e r m a n y as in the U.S. a 
def ini te dis tance between lower-lower and upper - lower class. Most of 
these s ta tements are based on unpub l i shed mate r ia l from Scheuch , 
»Sozialprest ige und soziale Schichtung,« p p . 78-84. 
55) In cont ras t to present-day G e r m a n y , b o t h in F r a n c e and in Eng land 
the re is a ma jo r gap between manua l and n o n - m a n u a l occupat ions ; 
specifically in England there is an addi t ional m a j o r d iscont inui ty in 
t he strat if ication c o n t i n u u m between self-employed and wage-ear-
ners , in F rance a break be tween agricul tural and non-agr icul tura l 
occupa t ions . These s ta tements are based on a re-analysis of several 
po l l s and research articles on the stratification system of these coun-
tr ies . Cf. Moser and Hal l , »The Social G r a d i n g of Occupat ions ,« p p . 
35 ff.; D I V O , Umfragen 1958, pp . 119 22. 
56) O n e of the few sociological diagnoses of c o n t e m p o r a r y society that 
has been widely accepted in G e r m a n y is H e l m u t h Schelsky, Wand-
lungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart (Stut tgar t , 1954). In 
th is book Schelsky coined the term nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft 
for a society whe re a pet i t -bourgeois exis tence is cons idered the »nor-
m a l « form of existence and where most people would identify 
themse lves with the midd le class. This identif icat ion was p re sumab ly 
t h e result of upward mobil i ty , where the upward ly mobi le would 
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quickly adap t to the i r new s i tua t ion , and d o w n w a r d mobi l i ty , w h e r e 
t h e d o w n w a r d l y m o b i l e would still retain the i r middle-class cons-
c iousness . » D i e Gesel lschaf t ist in ih rem Sozialbewusstsein auf ir-
g e n d e i n e Mi t te l lage hin nivel l ier t , der Begriff ihres Selbstbewusst-
seins lebt von der Ü b e r w i n d u n g einer S p a n n u n g zwischen Ober- u n d 
U n t e r s c h i c h t « (p . 224). Schelsky by n o w repudia tes th is analysis , 
wh ich a m o n g o the r a s s u m p t i o n s was based on the expecta t ion »dass 
in der E n t w i c k l u n g der indus t r ie l l -bürokra t i schen Gesel lschaft die 
sozialen Abst iegsprozesse übe r die Vorgänge des sozialen Aufstiegs zu 
d o m i n i e r e n b e g i n n e n , m i n d e s t e n s in der deu tschen Gesel lschaf t« 
(pp . 211-22). See also Schelsky, Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Sozio-
logie (Düsseldorf , 1959). T h e cross-cutt ing of d i m e n s i o n s of stratifi-
ca t ion tha t is a s sumed he re was observed in two studies by the For-
schungs ins t i tu t für Soziologie in Cologne . Most r e sponden t s perceive 
a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l system of strat if icat ion, not a s imple a r range-
m e n t of a p o p u l a t i o n accord ing to one cr i ter ion, e.g., owne r sh ip or 
n o n - o w n e r s h i p of m e a n s of p roduc t i on . Cf. Scheuch , »Sozialprest ige 
u n d Soziale Sch ich tung ,« p . 76. 
57) Schelsky, Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart, p p . 
103-4. 
58) F o r t he degree to wh ich worke r s accept pet i t -bourgeois preferences , 
see R i c h a r d F . H a m i l t o n , »Aff luence and the Worker : T h e West Ger-
m a n Case,« American Journal of Sociology, L X X I (1965), 144-52. T h e 
s a m e t e n d e n c y is no ted also for A m e r i c a n w o r k e r s in Richard F. 
H a m i l t o n , » T h e Behav io r a n d Values of Skilled Workers ,« in A r t h u r 
Shostack a n d Will iam G o m b e r g (pes.), Blue-Collar World (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J. , 1964). T h e data used in H a m i l t o n ' s ar t icle for West Ger-
m a n w o r k e r s were collected in 1959, and they no longer descr ibe 
p resen t pa r ty a l i g n m e n t s . I found recently tha t class vot ing a m o n g 
whi te-col lar w o r k e r s has decl ined and is decl in ing still fur ther . 
59) Interes t g r o u p s r ep resen t ing the »old midd le d a s s « and certain un-
qualif ied whi te-col la r worke r s protested v e h e m e n t l y against »prole-
t a r i an i z ing« t h e m i d d l e class. Actual ly , the i r »fears were p r imar i ly 
caused by a d i s appea rance of status gaps be tween whi te and b lue 
col lar r a the r t h a n by a decl ine in the s tatus of lower-middle-class 
g roups . Acco rd ing to T h e o d o r Geiger , » D e r Zwe i f ron t enkampf (der 
Mi t te l sch ich t ) wi rd n u n i m m e r deut l icher zu e inem Kampf gegen 
den Klas senkampf ... D a s Klassenpr inz ip , die Klassengesellschaft als 
S t r u k t u r m o d e l l , ist der Mit te lschicht ein D o r n im Auge« (Die Klas-
sengesellschaft im Schmelztiegel (Köln , 1949)). F o r t h e i m p o r t a n c e of 
d i s tance r a the r t h a n m e r e pos i t ion , see E d m u n d Gob lo t , La barrière 
et le niveau (Par is , 1930). 
60) A c c o r d i n g to t h e f ind ings of my »Bundes tagswahls tud ie ,« a ma jo r i ty 
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of G e r m a n s th ink tha t one should be satisfied wi th one 's s tat ion »in 
life, declare themse lves to be m o r e or less satisfied wi th themse lves , 
and abou t 40 per cent m a i n t a i n they would not choose to do any th ing 
else than they are do ing now even if they could start all over . Of 
course , these responses only express »official« ideology, bu t then th is 
is largely wha t lack of tens ion be tween social strata m e a n s . 
61) Th i s no t ion was explored m o r e fully by Alexander Weinstock, in col-
l abora t ion wi th Erwin K. Scheuch, »Strat if ication and the Locus of 
Blame,« a pape r to be publ i shed by the British Journal of Sociology. 
62) See Glass (ed.), Social Mobility in Britain, p. 74 et passim. 
63) C o n f i r m e d by the data from the »Bundes tagswahls tud ie .« 
64) Cf. McCle l l and (ed.), The Roots of Consciousness, p. 78. 
65) O n e of t he inhe ren t weaknesses of t he Weimar Republ ic was the h o p e 
of employers and u n i o n s al ike to achieve a definite and final victory 
over each o ther . Employe r s ' associat ions were wil l ing to back practi-
cally any par ty that p romised to c rush the un ions . Today, indust r ia l 
legislation has b lu r r ed the l ine be tween labor and m a n a g e m e n t , and 
u n i o n s work t h r o u g h bo th m a j o r par t ies . The S P D takes cons iderab le 
pa ins to d e m o n s t r a t e its i ndependence from un ions , jus t as t he La-
b o u r Par ty in Bri ta in does now. In polls conduc ted du r ing 1961 and 
1962, a large major i ty of r e sponden t s n a m e d bo th u n i o n s and em-
ployers as h a v i n g too m u c h power; the only o ther ins t i tu t ion or g roup 
s imilar ly accused of be ing m o r e powerful t han i t should be was t he 
Ca tho l ic C h u r c h . Th i s is, by the way, not a bad j u d g m e n t of actual 
p o w e r in G e r m a n y . 
66) A two-thi rds major i ty though t in 1961 that the present was no t t he 
best t i m e to live and m e n t i o n e d the Wi lhe lmine per iod as the t ime 
w h e n peop le were happies t (»Bundes tagswahls tud ie«) . In p r inc ip le , 
t he t endency to glorify the » h o r s e a n d b u g g y days« has also been 
observed in A m e r i c a n polls , bu t th is t endency is s t ronger in G e r m a -
ny . A m o n g the reasons given for prefer r ing the pre-World War 1 days, 
one of t he most i m p o r t a n t was the imagined absence of conflicts . 
67) In Grea t Bri ta in , t he un ions—par t ly in response to past abuses of t he 
»But ty« system of sub-contract ing-have followed a policy of r educ ing 
wage differentials be tween different categories of worke r s . Before 
World War I, an unski l led Brit ish laborer received 50 per cent of t he 
salary of a skilled worker , whi le today he receives 85 per cent (this 
policy p robab ly did not exactly tend to increase efficiency in British 
indus t ry ) . Cf. T. Brennan , »The Work ing Class in Brit ish Social Struc-
t u r e ^ in Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology (Lon-
don , 1957), III , 106-12. A c o m p a r a t i v e invest igat ion of the in te rna l 
compos i t ion of white-col lar groups in Western indus t r ia l ized societies 
will be found in H a n s Bayer (ed.), Der Angestellte zwischen Arbeiter 
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schaft und Management (Berl in, 1961), p p . 145-69. See also R. K. 
Burns , » T h e C o m p a r a t i v e E c o n o m i c Posi t ion of M a n u a l and Whi te-
Col la r Employees ,« Journal oj Business, XXVII (1954), 257-67; » D i e 
E n t w i c k l u n g der Anges te l l t engehä l t e r seit dem Kriege im Vergleich 
zu den A r b e i t e r l ö h n e n , « Der Angestellte ( January 10, 1954); A r t h u r 
Nik isch , Zur Neuabgrenzung der Begriffe Angestellter und Arbeiter 
(Berl in , 1959); Michel Crozier , » L ' a m b i g u i t e de la consc ience de clas-
se chez les employes et les pet i ts fonc t ionna i res ,« Cahiers lnternatio-
naux de Sociologie ( January-June , 1955), p p . 78-97; K. Rieker , »Ar-
be i t s lohn , Angeste l l ten- u n d Beamtengehä l t e r ,« Arbeit und Sozialpo-
litik ( M a r c h , 1954). T h e most c o m p r e h e n s i v e inves t iga t ions of the 
in te rna l d i f ferent ia t ion a m o n g whi te-col lar worke r s in G e r m a n y are 
O t to S t a m m e r (ed.), Angestellte und Arbeiter in der Betriebspyramide 
(Berl in , 1959); Karl Mar t in Bolte, »Angeste l l tenfrage im Lich te der 
Z a h l e n , « in Bayer (ed.), Der Angestellte zwischen Arbeiterschaft und 
Management, p p . 63-121. My genera l conclusion from a qu i t e large 
n u m b e r of s tudies is that wi th regard to in terna l d i f ferent ia t ion with-
in occupa t iona l g roups G e r m a n y is get t ing to be less » E u r o p e a n « and 
m o r e » A m e r i c a n . « 
68) T h e »Bundes tagswah l s tud ie« indica tes tha t m a n y G e r m a n s p r i ze 
h a p p i n e s s in the family even before f inancial well-being. In a ra t ing 
of i m p o r t a n c e of occur rences in several spheres , events in poli t ics 
were rated jus t above events in spor t s and re la t ions with ne ighbor s , 
b o t h be ing of exceedingly low i m p o r t a n c e . Th i s conflicts wi th ans-
wers by t h e very same r e sponden t s as to why they cons idered the past 
p re fe rab le to the present a n d what was a cause for concern in the 
fu ture : he re polit ical events were m e n t i o n e d frequent ly . 
69) See Ralf Dahrendor f , Homo Sociologicus (Köln , 1958). Dahrendor f -
in a g r e e m e n t wi th Schelsky and A d o r n o — p e r c e i v e s a choice be tween 
ro le obl iga t ions and ind iv idua l i sm. T h e preva i l ing view in A m e r i c a n 
ro le theory is tha t ind iv idual i ty expresses itself via in te rac t ion of per-
sonal i ty and ro le r e q u i r e m e n t s ; t h e no t ion of a t rue ind iv idua l as 
be ing free from role r e q u i r e m e n t s would appear qui te fantas t ic . 
70) G e r m a n schoo lbooks p resen t »pol i t ics« in a very formal is t ic sense 
only. T h u s cri t icism of polit ical par t ies or of the ac t ions of t he 
Bundes tag is usual ly d e n o u n c e d as cha l l eng ing the democra t i c order . 
P o p u l a r pro tes t s dur ing the Spiegel case were s imilar ly cri t icized in 
t h e n a m e of democra t i c o rder , and s o m e t h i n g l ike a civil r ights mo-
v e m e n t would be in te rpre ted by G e r m a n au thor i t i e s as ou t r igh t anar-
chy. T h e ci t izen has a »du ty« to vote , may inform himself by read ing 
t h e releases tha t the respect ive par t ies and groups deem p r o p e r for 
pub l i c c o n s u m p t i o n , and is encouraged to jo in a political pa r ty . In 
o rde r to discuss poli t ics; but from then on »order l iness« (Ruhe) is 
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en jo ined u p o n h i m . Accordingly, A l m o n d and Sidney Verba, The Ci-
vic Culture, find G e r m a n s especially well in formed by compar i son 
wi th the Bri t ish and the A m e r i c a n electorate but lacking in demo-
crat ic sen t iments and general invo lvement in the poli ty. 
71) Unt i l the midd le 1950's, t he refugees were cons idered a potent ia l new 
pro le ta r ia t . For the preva i l ing views at tha t t ime , cf. H e l m u t h Schels-
ky (ed.), Arbeitslosigkeit und Berujsnot der Jugend (2 vols. ; Köln , 
1952). By now, most analysts agree that refugees have most ly regained 
the i r f o rmer status, with the except ion of o lder white-collar workers . 
Cf. H i d d o M. Joller , Zur Soziologie der Heimatvertriebenen und 
Flüchtlinge (Köln , 1965). Consequent ly a t t empts to treat refugees as 
one vo t ing bloc have been increasingly unsuccessful ; t he specific »re-
fugee vote« is now probably less than 4 per cent . 
72) T h e preva i l ing view of West G e r m a n h is tor ians is n o w that by a r o u n d 
1930 powerful economic interest groups , the a rmy, and a substant ia l 
pa r t of the u p p e r echelons of the civil service had decided that par-
l i amen ta ry democracy had failed and that some sort of au tho r i t a r i an 
reg ime was needed . Naz ism was definitely not wha t these g roups had 
in mind , and Hi t le r was only accepted re luctant ly , late, and after 
p r o m i s e s by h im w h i c h — h a d he kept t h e m — w e r e to reduce h im to 
t h e role of a m e r e vote-getter. See the d o c u m e n t a t i o n in Er ich Matt-
h ias and Rudolf Morsey, Das Ende der Parteien, 1933 (Düsseldorf , 
1960); J. P. Mayer , Max Weber and German Politics (London , 1956), 
p. 48 et passim. 
73) H a n s G e r t h , »The Nazi Party: Its Leadersh ip and C o m p o s i t i o n s 
A m e r i c a n Journa l of Sociology, XLV (1940), 517-41; Danie l Lerner , 
The Nazi Elite (Stanford, 1951). 
74) T h e r e is a very extensive l i te ra ture about t he b a c k g r o u m d of those 
involved in the 20th of July resis tance m o v e m e n t , and especially of 
t he role of the t rad i t ional mi l i ta ry elite in th is bela ted a t t empt . See, 
e.g., Josef F o l t m a n n and H a n s Möller-Wit ten, Opfergang der Ge-
nerale (3d ed.; Berl in, 1957). In m a n y ways this m o v e m e n t can, of 
course , be unders tood as a re tu rn to 1932, an a t t emp t to b r i n g about 
t h e »p rope r« k ind of au thor i t a r i an reg ime in G e r m a n y after Hi t le r 
be t rayed the trust of m a n y of his suppor te r s . It was precisely the 
conserva t ive and qui te often a n t i d e m o c r a t i c charac te r of th is resi-
s tance m o v e m e n t tha t m a d e its fai lure a n d the subsequent purges so 
i m p o r t a n t for chang ing the compos i t ion of t he G e r m a n elite. 
75) Th i s is my conclus ion from four surveys of G e r m a n elite op in ion , 
n o n e of which has been publ ished so far. O n e of these, conduc ted in 
1964 by the Forschungs ins t i tu t für pol i t ische Wissenschaften of the 
Univers i ty of Cologne , was specifically devoted to t he topic of defen-
se policy and included bo th representa t ives from the Bundes tag in-
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volved in mi l i t a ry poli t ics and leaders of t he mi l i ta ry . Inves t iga t ions 
of p r o c u r e m e n t p rocedures pub l i shed in a var iety of p o p u l a r j o u r n a l s 
a n d in t he daily press also show tha t the G e r m a n mi l i ta ry a p p a r a t u s 
is so far t rea ted by pol i t ic ians as a polit ical asset and as an i n s t ru men t 
to reward f r iends and buy al legiances. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of mi l i ta ry 
cons ide ra t ions in G e r m a n foreign-policy discussions is no t t he result 
of lobbying by genera ls but reflects the i nvo lvemen t of some deput ies 
in s trategic p l a n n i n g . H e l l m u t h Heye resigned late from his post as 
Wehrbeauftragter in 1964, he wa rned against the present sense of 
a l iena t ion of t he mi l i tary as a possible new source of danger . 
76) Extens ive , if somewha t less t han wel l -organized, d o c u m e n t a t i o n of 
t h i s fact will be found in Kur t Pr i tzkolei t ' s books Die neuen Herren 
( M u n i c h , 1955) and Das kommandierte Wunder ( M u n i c h , 1959). 
77) Cf. Ralf Dahrendor f , »Recen t Changes in the Class S t ruc ture of Eu-
ropean Societies,« Daedalus (Winter , 1964). 
78) T h e pos i t ion of high-level civil se rvants still r ema ins to be p roper ly 
d o c u m e n t e d , for t he official statistical sources are r a the r mis lead ing 
he re . C o n t r a r y to Anglo-Saxon t rad i t ion , G e r m a n civil se rvants are 
m e m b e r s of the b o a r d s of t rus tees of the m a n y co rpo ra t i ons in which 
federal , s tate , or mun ic ipa l au thor i t i e s hold an interest , and they are 
far m o r e n u m e r o u s a m o n g elected officials ( G e r m a n civil se rvants 
can n o w be m e m b e r s of t he legislative b r a n c h of g o v e r n m e n t ) than 
can readi ly be seen from h a n d b o o k s . T h u s Rudolf W i l d e n m a n n , » D e r 
H a n g zur B ü r o k r a t e n - D e m o k r a t i e , « Deutsche Zeitung und Wirt-
schaftszeitung, August 10, 1953, was able to show tha t the official 
des ignat ion »civil se rvan t« vastly u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d the actual n u m -
be r of civil se rvants in p a r l i a m e n t . See also Rudolf W i l d e n m a n n , 
Macht und Konsens (F rankfu r t , 1963), p p . 140-50; Edinger , »Cont i -
nu i ty and C h a n g e in t h e Background of G e r m a n Decision M a k e r s « ; 
Maxwel l Knigh t , The German Executive, 1890 1933 (Stanford, 1951). 
79) Cf. Ralf Dah rendo r f , »E ine n e u e deu tsche Obersch ich t?« Die Neue 
Gesellschaft, IX (1962), 18-31; Dahrendor f , » A u s b i l d u n g e iner Elite,« 
Der Monat, No . 166 (1962), p p . 15-26; Louis Baud in , »Eli te ,« Hand 
Wörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, III (1961), 198-202; Baud in , 
» F ü h r u n g s s c h i c h t u n d E l i t ep rob lem,« in Jahrbuch der Rankegesell-
schaft (F rankfu r t , 1957); H e l m u t h Plessner , » Ü b e r die El i tebi ldung,« 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, VI (1955), 602-6; H a n s P. Drei tze l , 
Elitebegriff und Sozialstruktur (Stut tgar t , 1962). 
A subs tant ia l pa r t of th is discussion is ra ther h i la r ious . Fo r example : 
» D a s Werden der Elite bleibt gehe imnisvo l l . Es muss ein plötz l iches 
A u f b e g e h r e n der Persön l ichke i t , ein angstvol les Bewusstsein der Ein-
zigart igkei t der Person , ein Losreissen du rch Selbstbekräf t igung ge-
b e n , die das bewi rk t . D e m El i t emenschen wird sein Lohn in der Be 
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t r a c h t u n g seines Werkes, aber auch nur , wenn es ihn und andere zu 
e r h ö h e n ve rmag , w e n n es g le ichermassen Grösse u n d Liebe ist« 
(Baud in , »El i te ,« p p . 201-2). T h e d o m i n a n t ideal seems to be that of a 
l ikeable » Ü b e r m e n s c h , « a sort of intel lectual » G r e e n G i a n t « of 
A m e r i c a n adver t is ing fame. 
T h e G e r m a n no t i ons of elite are quite s imilar to those prevai l ing in 
F r ance . Cf. M. Clifford-Vaughn, »Some F r e n c h Concepts of Elites,« 
British Journal of Sociology, XI (1961), 319 31 . 
80) Th i s no t ion is fur ther e labora ted in Rona ld Nut ta l l , Erwin K. 
Scheuch , and Chad G o r d o n , »Sanct ions , Resources, and a Typology 
of Inf luent ia ls ,« a pape r read at the mee t ing of the Eastern Sociolo-
gical Society in Boston, Apr i l , 1965. 
81) A lack of conco rdance be tween formal posi t ion and actual inf luence 
gets G e r m a n a u t h o r s ra the r excited. As examples , see T h o m a s Ell-
wein , » D i e M a c h t s t r u k t u r in Westdeutschland,« Die Neue Gesell-
schaft , XII (1965), 852-59; E. Richer t , Macht ohne Mandat (Kö ln , 
1958). 
82) Journa l i s t s appear to be m o r e sensitive to this than sociologists, who-
se theore t ica l p reconcep t ions tend to i m p a i r thei r vis ion. Cf. the fol-
lowing accounts by analytical ly incl ined and respected journa l i s t s : 
A n t h o n y Sampson , Anatomy of Britain (London , 1962); R a y m o n d 
Isay et al., »Les Elites Francaises ,« La Revue des Deux Mondes, Nos . 
12-17, 24 (1960); Rudolf Walter Leonha rd t , Xmal Deutschland, esp. 
C h a p . X X I . 
83) T h e funct ional is t ic theory of stratif ication in sociology has now m a d e 
profess ional ly respectable an old m y t h — n a m e l y , that those in top 
pos i t ions must be of super ior qualif ication because they are in top 
pos i t ions . M o d e r n societies are funct ional ly differentiated, and the 
p r i m e express ion of funct ional differentiat ion is occupat ional diver-
sif ication; occupa t ions are then h ie ra rch ized according to p r e sumed 
con t r i bu t ion to some th ing tha t in professional j a rgon is often called 
system m a i n t e n a n c e . Since top posi t ions are pos i t ions of the greatest 
i m p o r t a n c e for this mythica l system m a i n t e n a n c e , i t follows tha t only 
t he best qualified are acceptable there . Since j an i t o r s and professors 
a re both funct ional ly impor t an t to the m a i n t e n a n c e of societies (and 
univers i t ies) , an addi t ional cr i te r ion is in t roduced: compe t i t ion for a 
pa r t i cu la r j o b because of its a t t ract iveness , which in turn der ives 
from the s tatus of t he posi t ion. I m p o r t a n c e is deduced from the status 
of the j o b (and not empir ical ly from the degree of ta lent necessary to 
pe r fo rm it), and thus the reasoning becomes near ly circular . Since 
func t iona l different iat ion is the organiz ing pr inc ip le of m o d e r n so-
cieties, and because th is differentiat ion expresses itself in diversifi-
ca t ion of fo rmal posi t ions , one w h o follows this l ine of reasoning 
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conc ludes tha t formal pos i t ions mus t define inf luence and that in-
f luence no t co inc id ing wi th a pos i t ion is dev ian t . Consequen t ly , t he 
mos t i m p o r t a n t pa r t of an elite mus t be what G e r m a n sociologists 
in f luenced by D a h r e n d o r f call Funktionselite, t he aggregate of the 
best in t he mos t i m p o r t a n t pos i t ions . (This is mere ly a repor t about 
t h e p reva i l ing sociological analysis of t he elite in G e r m a n y ; empir ica l 
a s s u m p t i o n s a n d logic of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a re the p r o p e r t y of the re-
spect ive au thor s . ) 
84) On the bas is of a critical survey of G e r m a n l i t e ra ture on the elite, t he 
p reva i l ing type of classification is given by Sch luch te r as follows: 1) 
F u n c t i o n a l elite (Funktionselite); 2) no rm-se t t i ng elite (Wertelite); 3) 
» h i g h society« (Repräsentationselite). See Wolfgang Schluch te r , » D e r 
Elitebegriff als soziologische Kategor ie ,« Kölner Zeitschrift für Sozio-
logie und Sozialpsychologie, XV (1963), 233-56. 
U n d e r l y i n g our own subsequent discussion is the fo l lowing n o t i o n . A 
func t iona l ly different ia ted social system tha t c a n n o t rely main ly on 
t r ad i t ion requi res : pos i t ions tha t are leg i t imated to represent social 
n o r m s ; a reward system for differential effectiveness in the perfor-
m a n c e of socially va lued activit ies; a n d a defini te decision s t ruc ture 
(in the sense tha t the decis ions are accepted as e i ther legi t imate or 
r equ i r ing acquiescence as a m a t t e r of p rudence ) . These different 
func t ions m a y be represen ted by different sets of pe r sons . H e r e I am 
p r i m a r i l y in teres ted in those sets of p e r s o n s w h o con t ro l decis ions 
a n d in o the r sets of pe r sons (p r imar i ly those rep resen t ing social 
n o r m s ) insofar as they sanct ion decis ions . T h u s t h e t h e m e here i s 
differential power . 
85) Wolfgang Zapf, Wandlungen der Deutschen Elite ( M u n i c h , 1965). 
86) See t he methodolog ica l append ix , ibid., for fu r ther detai ls . 
87) A n u m b e r of resul ts are repor ted in a cover story by Der Spiegel, Vol. 
XIX , No . 25 ( June 16, 1965), p p . 44-57, and in a pub l i c re la t ions 
repor t , » F ü h r u n g s k r ä f t e , « Spiegel Dokumentation ( June , 1965). 
88) T h e Co logne sociologists ' 1965 s tudy was t he final pa r t of t he surveys 
of t he elite in Eng land , F rance , and G e r m a n y tha t Dan ie l Le rne r has 
superv ised s ince 1953. 
In choos ing the i r m e t h o d s , t he research t e a m s from Cologne t u r n e d 
to t h e l i t e ra tu re on c o m m u n i t y power s t ruc ture because empir ica l 
s tudy of l eade r sh ip g roups has developed far thest in tha t field. Abou t 
500 »Communi ty« repor t s have been pub l i shed wi th in one decade, 
a n d th is g rowth has been accompan ied by a c o n t i n u o u s and ra the r 
v io lent deba te about m e t h o d . T h e th ree chief app roaches are: 1) t he 
r epu ta t i ona l t echn ique , based on wha t its de t rac to rs call a publ ic opi-
n i o n poll on power ; 2) t he pos i t ional a p p r o a c h , pos tu la t ing an identi-
ty be tween formal office and actual in f luence ; 3) the issue app roach , 
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a t echn ique in which first a n u m b e r of issues are selected and then 
those involved in decisions on these issues are identif ied. Each of 
these t echn iques is especially suited to a par t icu la r organizat ion of the 
elite, the reputa t iona l t echn ique being most effective with ol igarchies 
and the issue approach being most suited when a high degree of dif-
ferent ia t ion of inf luence exists. Each m e t h o d by itself is insensi t ive to 
e r roneous postula tes about reality. 
Lately, c o m b i n a t i o n s of var ious techniques have been designed, and 
the approach chosen in the Cologne survey of the G e r m a n elite is 
based on one such t echn ique that we developed for the study of lea-
dersh ip g roups in Amer i can u rban areas. F u r t h e r in format ion on the 
m e t h o d s developed in this field, especially exper iences with the in-
sufficiency of the posi t ional approach , can be found in American So-
ciological Review, XXVII (December , 1962), 838-54. 
See also E. Baltzell, »Eli te and U p p e r Class Indexes in Met ropo l i t an 
Amer ica ,« in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), Class, Status, and Power; Ro-
ber t Dah l , Who Governs? (New H a v e n , 1961); D. A n t o n i o and H. 
Ehr l i ch (eds.), Power and Democracy (Not re D a m e , Ind. , 1961); H. 
Ehr l ich , » T h e Reput iona l Approach to the Study of C o m m u n i t y Po-
wer ,« American Sociological Review, XXVI (1961), 926 27; Floyd 
H u n t e r , Top Leadership--U.S. A. (Chapel Hil l , 1959); N. Polsby, 
»Three P rob l ems in the Analysis of C o m m u n i t y Power ,« American 
Sociological Review, XXIV (1959), 796-803; R. Schulze and L. Blum-
berg , »The De t e rmina t i on of Power Elites,« American Journal of So-
ciology, LXIII (1957), 290-96. 
89) Personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n by G e r m a n y ' s leading agency for the re-
c ru i tmen t of top m a n a g e m e n t . 
90) Sampson , Anatomy of Britain, p p . 195-217. See also Mark A b r a m s , 
»Bri t ish Elite At t i tudes and the Eu ropean C o m m o n Marke t ,« Public 
Opinion Quarterly, X X I X (1965), 236-46; A b r a m s finds that 45 per 
cent of the British elite (Who's Who) have gone to e i ther Oxford or 
Cambr idge . T h e F r e n c h equivalent of the Brit ish p a t t e r n — a t t e n d a n c e 
of a handful of publ ic schools plus en ro l lmen t in cer tain colleges at 
Oxford and Cambr idge—cons i s t s of s tudy at one of t he »grandes éco-
les«; see David G r a n i c k , The European Executive (New York, 1962), 
C h a p . V. For an evalua t ion of a univers i ty educa t ion by G e r m a n 
bus ines smen , see He inz H a r t m a n n , Education for Business Leader-
ship (Par is , 1955). An increasing emphas i s on educa t ion as a prere-
quisi te for top m a n a g e m e n t has been found by Lloyd Warner and N. 
H. Mar t in , Industrial Man: Businessmen and Business Organizations 
(New York, 1959). 
91) Th i s migh t be in terpre ted as actually showing a h igher level of formal 
educa t ion for G e r m a n bus inessmen than is t rue for those of o ther 
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coun t r i e s . However , the stages in t he educa t iona l systems of Anglo-
Saxon coun t r i e s and of G e r m a n y a re no t c o m p a r a b l e ; f u r t h e r m o r e , 
t h e doc to ra te in G e r m a n y has h igh prest ige value in bus iness , resul-
t ing in m a n y (successful) requests for h o n o r a r y doctora tes , whi le the 
reverse t ends to be t rue in the U.K. and in England . O n e canno t infer 
f rom the n u m b e r of doc tora tes a mu l t ip l e of that n u m b e r hav ing the 
equ iva len t of the B.A. degree. If t op bus iness leaders in G e r m a n y 
have a univers i ty educa t ion , they tend to go fur ther in academic work 
t h a n the i r c o u n t e r p a r t s in the U.K. ; bu t the percentage of those going 
to college at all is lower t han in the U.S . 
92) All of the elite s tudies in which this could be checked agree on a 
» w e s t e r n « t r end . Cf. Zapf, Wandlungen der Deutschen Elite, p. 172. 
93) Mate r ia l on t h e social base of t he F r e n c h elite may be found in A. 
G i r a r d , La réussite sociale en France (Par is , 1961); J. L ' H o m m e , Le 
grande bourgeoisie au pouvoir (Par is , 1960); Matte i D o g a n , »Que lques 
ape rçus sur l ' évolut ion de la s t rat i f icat ion des élites en France ,« in 
Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology ( L o n d o n , 
1964), III , 275-82. 
94) Th i s is the defini t ion used in t he Co logne index of social s tatus. See 
Scheuch and Ri ischemeyer , »Scal ing Social Status in Western G e r 
m any.« 
95) Near ly two- thi rds of all elite m e m b e r s do not hold and have never 
held publ ic office. This is in m a r k e d con t ras t to the elite in t he U.S . If 
pub l i c offices are held, t he re is often a progress ion from local office 
to na t iona l office, a l though near ly half of those in publ ic office ap-
pear to have gone directly for an office of n a t i o n w i d e re levance . 
96) In the U.S. , lengthy mi l i tary service t ends to be associated wi th con-
servat ism a m o n g elite pe r sonne l and wi th a greater recept ivi ty toward 
mi l i t a ry cons idera t ions . Repu ted ly in fo rmer t imes th is was also t rue 
for G e r m a n reserve officers, so tha t t he present s i tuat ion appea r s to 
be a b reak bo th with G e r m a n y ' s own past and wi th cond i t ions in 
o the r Western count r ies . 
97) I base th is in te rp re ta t ion on a var ie ty of sources, a m o n g them 
S am pson , Anatomy of Britain; Pr i tzkole i t , Das kommandierte Wun-
der; Der Spiegel's survey; and i n f o r m a t i o n received from the mana-
g e m e n t consu l tan t M. Schubar t . 
98) These figures are based on an analysis by the research staff of t he 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1963. See also Der Spiegel, Vol. 
XIX , N o . 25 ( June 16, 1965), p p . 44-57. 
99) In 1960, 73 of the Conse rva t ive deput ies had been educa ted at jus t 
o n e pub l ic school , Eton. F o r m e r P r i m e Minis te r Macmi l l an i s repor-
ted to h a v e r e m a r k e d i ronical ly: » M r . At t lee had th ree old E ton ians 
in his cabinet , and I have 6; th ings are going twice as good u n d e r t he 
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Conservat ives .« Lord Keynes, George Orwel l , Ha ro ld Macmi l l an , 
A ldous Huxley, and Lord H a u s h a m were all »old Etonians .« T h e 
s t rength of sen t imen t tha t a t tending a par t i cu la r publ ic school con-
veys may be inferred from the fol lowing s ta tement , which was by no 
m e a n s m e a n t to be i ronic . On being called upon to form a cabinet , 
Baldwin wrote : » O n e of my first t hough t s was that it should be a 
g o v e r n m e n t of which H a r r o w should not be ashamed .« Five mem-
be r s of Baldwin 's subsequent cabinet had g radua ted from H a r r o w . Cf. 
Sampson , Anatomy of Britain, pp . 175 ff. 
100) Th i s is also emphas ized by H e i n z H a r t m a n n as a result of an empi-
rical study of G e r m a n m a n a g e m e n t . See his Funktionale Autorität 
(Stut tgar t , 1964), and Authority and Organization in German Mana-
gement (Pr ince ton , 1959). 
101) Chance l lo r E rha rd , for one , misses no oppor tun i ty to express his dis-
m a y at t he existence of pressure g roups . An essential par t of his for-
mierte Gesellschaft is the reject ion of divisive g roups ba rga in ing di-
rect ly wi th each o ther at the expense of t he general publ ic . T h u s 
dis l ike of pressure g roups is now an official policy, a l though so far 
th i s has no t not iceably inf luenced g o v e r n m e n t act ions . 
102) T h e most f amous elite boa rd ing schools in G e r m a n y are the academy 
in Salem and in general the Waldorf Schulen. In addi t ion , t he re are 
fu r the r elite schools of regional fame, no tab ly those run by Jesuits . 
103) T h e r e is of course a prest ige h ie ra rchy a m o n g G e r m a n univers i t ies . 
See, e.g., the rank ings listed by L e o n h a r d t , Xmal Deutschland, pp . 
152-56. However , t he re is no over-all » leading« G e r m a n univers i ty , 
for a lmost any univers i ty may lead in a specific field of study. T h e 
pos twar surge of big-city univers i t ies has fur ther leveled the relat ive 
s t and ing be tween univers i t ies . 
104) In the absence of a general and uncha l l enged status superior i ty , and 
in view of t he ambiva lence toward the term and the t radi t ional no-
t ion of elite, the re are a t t emp t s to d e m o n s t r a t e elite status via some 
formal recogni t ion . In decl in ing order of effectiveness, the invi ta t ion 
lists of the Bundespräsident, service medals , and d ip lomat ic hono r s 
a re the chief indicators . At present 290 G e r m a n s have acqui red the 
t i t le of hono ra ry consuls and represent a host of smal ler na t ions in 
exchange for bear ing the cost of opera t ion of such a consula te 
themse lves . Cf. » H o n o r a r Konsuln ,« Capital, Vol. IV, No . 8 (August , 
1965), p p . 35-42. Character is t ical ly , persons of somewha t indetermi-
n a t e degrees of inf luence vie for such symbols . 
105) Recent ly , even the top of the G e r m a n status h ie rarchy , the Ordina-
rius (full professor at a univers i ty) has come in for cr i t icism, and the 
g r o u n d s are in par t an alleged lack of d i scr imina t ion and taste in 
everyday life. 
116 
106) T h e r e appea r s to be a s t rong avers ion a m o n g those with p o w e r and 
especially of t hose d is t inguished by a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s against be ing 
c o u n t e d as m e m b e r s of »h igh society.« Repea ted a t t emp t s in Ger -
m a n y to es tabl ish occasions and places w h e r e high society migh t ga-
the r have failed precisely a t tha t m o m e n t when the p o p u l a r press 
d u b b e d t h e m as society affairs. E x a m p l e s of such fai lures a re t h e 
d e b u t a n t e ba l l s in some G e r m a n ci t ies (notably M u n i c h ) and the 
Presseball in Bad Godesbe rg . A recent pub l ica t ion by the j o u r n a l i s t 
G r e g o r von Rezzor i successfully stuck the label of Schickeria on the-
se a t t empt s , and th is t e rm in effect m e a n s » d e m i m o n d e . « (See »Idio-
t e n f ü h r e r d u r c h die deu tsche Gesel lschaf t ,« the series n a m e for a 
n u m b e r of separa te ly t i t led vo lumes wr i t ten by von Rezzor i and 
pub l i shed in H a m b u r g over the past few years.) A paral le l t r e n d — 
t h o u g h different in de ta i l s—has been observed by Cleve land A m o r y , 
Who Killed Society? (New York, 1960). 
107) Segmen ta t i on m a y be conceptua l ized as a form of » indi f fe rence bet-
ween system e l e m e n t s « — t h i s t ime h o w e v e r not be tween levels of a 
social system b u t be tween sectors. A high indif ference be tween sy-
s tem e l emen t s at different levels m e a n s a h igh compat ib i l i ty of t he 
s a m e social o rgan iza t ion wi th different polit ical o rgan iza t ions . H igh 
indi f fe rence be tween system e l emen t s at the s ame leve l—or h igh seg-
m e n t a t i o n — d o e s not p r imar i ly ind ica te h igh compat ib i l i ty wi th dif-
ferent poli t ical sys tems so m u c h as i t does compat ib i l i ty wi th diffe-
rent polit ical a i m s and policies. If this is t rue , t he usual segmenta t ion 
shou ld have s o m e m a j o r consequences for assessment of fu ture po-
litical d e v e l o p m e n t s in G e r m a n y . Aga in i t should p rove difficult to 
t ransfer some well-establ ished p ropos i t i ons from Eng land or the U.S. 
to G e r m a n y , in spi te of s t rong s imi lar i t ies of social s t ruc ture in o the r 
respects . 
108) Th i s is my conc lus ion after two elite surveys in the Un i t ed States. See 
also H u n t e r , Top Leader ship--U.S. A. A s imi la r conclus ion can be 
infer red from t h e survey of data p rov ided by Rober t P res thus , Men at 
the Top (New York, 1964), and from A n t o n i o and Ehr l ich (eds.), 
Power and Democracy. In spite of its conspi ra tor ia l bias, even C. 
Wright Mills , The Power Elite (New York, 1956), is not really incom-
pat ib le with th i s a s s u m p t i o n . My later descr ip t ion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
pa t t e rn s a n d of a r r a n g e m e n t s across elite sectors tallies qui te well 
wi th m u c h of Mil ls 's a r g u m e n t — o f course m i n u s the a s sumpt ion of a 
m o n o l i t h i c and ra t ional ly purposeful c o m b i n a t i o n of a few m a j o r 
f inancial in teres ts . 
109) T h e radio and television n e t w o r k s are by and large organized by Län-
der, and th is m e a n s the i r h e a d q u a r t e r s a re located in t he regional 
capi ta ls . Rad io and television n e t w o r k s wi th a cons ide rab le su rp lus 
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i n c o m e are the m o d e r n G e r m a n equivalent of t he feudal maecenas in 
m o r e t h a n one way. Consequent ly , a cons iderable cul tura l life t ends 
to cluster a r o u n d t h e m . Even the newspapers a re regional and midd-
le-sized wi th a few except ions . T h e average G e r m a n newspape r serves 
several coun t i e s s u r r o u n d i n g one central city and sells about 
100,000-200,000 copies a day—wi th a m a x i m u m of about 450,000 for 
o n e p a p e r in the R u h r district . Somet imes these pape r s achieve a 
m o d i c u m of na t iona l impor t ance ; examples are t he Süddeutsche Zei-
tung, Stuttgarter Zeitung, and Frankfurter Rundschau. 
110) T h e na t iona l average of s tudents w h o are organized in any kind of 
c lub , f ra terni ty , or association is a bit less than 30 per cent . Somewhat 
less t h a n half of those w h o be long are m e m b e r s of o n e of the m o r e 
conse rva t ive f ra terni t ies . T h u s the re has not been a comeback of the 
type of s tudent f raterni t ies which cul t ivated e x t r e m e na t iona l i sm and 
res is tance to democracy . 
111) L e o n h a r d t , X-mal Deutschland, p p . 157-63. 
112) T h e b a n k r u p t c y of the self-made au tomobi le p roduce r Car l F . W. 
Borgward was widely c o m m e n t e d on as »un jus t .« Edi tor ia ls argued 
tha t t he b a n k s should have helped Borgward since as his own chief 
des igner he was a creat ive engineer , even t hough he was undoub ted ly 
no t a very conv inc ing bus ine s sman . By way of cont ras t , the downfal l 
of a n o t h e r self-made m a n , Willy H. Schlieker, was no t l amen ted , for 
Schl ieker was cons idered »mere ly« a r isk- taking b u s i n e s s m a n . Con-
t ra ry to m a n y op in ions abroad , i t is not bad as such to be a self-made 
m a n in G e r m a n y , p rov ided one has »dese rved« success. Th i s em-
phas i s on exper t ise may possibly be overdone for the sake of clari ty. 
H o w e v e r , i t is still not c o m m o n in G e r m a n y to be fired as a m a n a g e r 
for lack of success, p rov ided one tr ied ha rd and with the best know-
ledge avai lable . And elite m e m b e r s do treat each o the r differently 
d e p e n d i n g on whe the r the p a r t n e r in quest ion is credi ted with pro-
fessional compe tence or jus t wi th power . 
113) Cf. Erwin K. Scheuch and Rudolf W i l d e n m a n n (eds.) , Zur Soziologie 
der Wahl (Op laden , 1965). 
114) M a x Weber ' s theory of bu reauc ra t i c organizat ion may be under s tood 
as an ideal-typical reflection of these n o r m s . See Weber, Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft (new ed.; Tüb ingen , 1956), Vol. I. 
115) T h e n o r m of a paternal is t ic re la t ionsh ip to subord ina te s was one of 
t he chief obstacles against the co-de te rmina t ion laws regula t ing la-
b o r - m a n a g e m e n t affairs. Qui te r ightly i t was felt tha t t he part icula-
ristic r e la t ionsh ip of the leader-fol lower type would be impai red by 
outs iders (i.e., delegates of the na t iona l un ions) a t t emp t ing to repre-
sent pe r sonne l from n u m e r o u s enterpr ises . See H a r t m a n n , Authority 
and Organization in German Management', M a r k van de Vail, »The 
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Worker ' s Counc i l s in Western Europe : A i m s and Results ,« Procee-
dings oj the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations 
Research Association (1965), p p . 1-12; Deu t sches Indus t r i e ins t i tu t , 
Bibliographie zur Mitbestimmung und Betriebsverfassung (Köln , 
1963); H a n s Jürgen Teuteberg, Geschichte der industriellen Mitbestim-
mung in Deutschland (Tübingen , 1961). 
116) See D a h r e n d o r f (ed.), Gesellschaft und Freiheit. C h a p . XI I , on t he 
G e r m a n evalua t ion of business . These s en t imen t s are shared in t he 
popu l a t i on at large, where the single most resented g roup are busi-
n e s s m e n , and the most resented activity is a ccumula t i ng m o n e y by 
sell ing (Scheuch , »Sozialprest ige und soziale Schich tung ,« p. 78 et 
passim). 
117) In op in ion surveys, a major i ty of r e sponden t s are found to be l ieve 
tha t mos t polit ical issues could be settled by referr ing t h e m to exper t s . 
M a n y r e s p o n d e n t s a s sume tha t i f all po l i t ic ians had the necessary 
m e a s u r e of good will and would free themse lves of special in teres ts , 
» jus t« so lu t ions could be found for most issues conf ron t ing t he po-
lity. T h u s political d i sagreement s a re largely viewed as unnecessa ry 
and t h e result of mora l deficiency in t he pol i t ic ians. 
118) T h e dis t inct ion be tween facts and va lue j u d g m e n t that i s used here 
fol lows the preva i l ing conceptua l d is t inct ion in the ph i lo sophy of 
sc ience. Value s t a t ements can be t rea ted as facts when they b e c o m e 
objec ts of analysis . If they are s imple dec la ra t ions of preferences , 
va lue s t a t emen t s are , of course , merely in fo rma t ive about t he speaker 
and no t abou t the objects they p r e s u m a b l y refer to: in th is way, va lue 
s t a t e m e n t s may be argued in a m e t a l a n g u a g e . T h e t e rm »technical 
ques t ion« refers to so-called technological va lue j u d g m e n t s . These 
a r e p r o n o u n c e m e n t s by exper ts tha t a cer tain course of act ion or a 
cer ta in state of affairs is preferable to a n o t h e r one . Insofar as such 
s t a t e m e n t s imply a goal and r e c o m m e n d a way of ach iev ing it, t h e 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n can be r ephrased as an assert ion about a means -end , 
or func t iona l , r e l a t ionsh ip and wi th in these l imi ta t ions is a leg i t imate 
pa r t of an exper t ' s scope of j u d g m e n t . 
119) T h i s hes i tancy to synthesize one ' s own op in ion is t rue only for a reas 
w h e r e leg i t imate au thor i t i e s are bel ieved to exist. F o r t he subject 
m a t t e r of t he social sciences such hes i tancy is not no t iceable . 
120) In genera l , t he level of i n fo rma t ion about cu r ren t affairs in G e r m a n 
society is r a the r h igh . In the in t e rna t iona l c i t izenship survey, A l m o n d 
a n d Verba, The Civic Culture, found a G e r m a n cross-section some-
w h a t be t t e r i n fo rmed than a Brit ish o n e and cons iderably m o r e so 
t h a n an A m e r i c a n sample . 
121) In t e r lock ing d i rec tora tes are a pa t t e rn b o t h inside and outs ide busi-
ness . T h u s the pres ident of the b o a r d of d i rec tors of t he Dresdner 
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Bank is a m e m b e r of the board of t rustees of the Metallgesellschaft 
AG, and in t u rn the president of the b o a r d of directors of the Metall-
gesellschaft AG is a m e m b e r of the board of trustees of the Dresdner 
Bank. Conflict-of-interest posi t ions are qui te frequent in the G e r m a n 
elite, bu t they are not admi t ted to cause a conflict of interest . After 
all, a G e r m a n exper t is p resumably serving not interest bu t t r u th . T h e 
very no t ion of conflict of interest is insul t ing to the G e r m a n elite. 
122) T h e list of invi tees to the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis p rovides a 
rough n o t i o n of the scope of the G e r m a n elite (applying a l iberal 
def in i t ion) , except for politics and business . Cf. the i r Proceedings, 
pub l i shed by R. von Becker Verlag, H a m b u r g . 
123) T h e work of th is Wissenschaft und Politik g roup is publ i shed in Ul-
rich L o h m a r (ed.), Deutschland 1975 ( M u n i c h , 1965). 
124) T h e Abendländische Akademie has had a n u m b e r of p r o m i n e n t po-
l i t ic ians w h o some t imes seem to find themse lves in c o m m o n polit ical 
ac t ion. S o m e i m p o r t a n t m e m b e r s were He in r i ch von Bren tano , then 
Fore ign Min i s te r of the Federal Republ ic , and Richard Jaeger, Mi-
nis ter of Jus t ice in the second cabinet fo rmed by E r h a r d (who, by the 
way, appea r s to prefer Salazar to F ranco) . 
125) A s u m m a r y of this debate is given in Erwin K. Scheuch, »Dre i Fra-
gen an die D e m o s k o p e n , « Die Welt, October 1, 1965, p. 7. 
126) Al ready in t he spr ing of 1965, the differences be tween the results of 
several pol ls b e c a m e so puzzl ing tha t the C o m m i t t e e on Methodo logy 
of t he G e r m a n Sociological Society appoin ted a commiss ion to s tudy 
t h e pre-elect ion pol ls . However , the C o m m i t t e e was advised by some 
pol ls ters to pos tpone the work unt i l after the elect ion. 
127) Lack of contac t at the c o m m u n i t y level dis t inguishes the G e r m a n 
elite f rom the A m e r i c a n . In Amer ica , in addi t ion to clubs and socia-
l izing, va r ious civic activities b r ing m e m b e r s from different elite sec-
tors toge ther ; in G e r m a n y civic activities involving elite m e m b e r s are 
n o t organized locally. T h e varied organiza t ions and informal grou-
p ings for elite m e m b e r s that were m e n t i o n e d earl ier are most ly na-
t ional in scope. 
128) T h e concept of reference g roup is used here in accordance with Ro-
ber t K. M e r t o n , Social Theory and Social Structure (2d ed.; G l e n c o e , 
111., 1957), p p . 225-386. 
129) With re ference to the Amer i can emphas i s on equality, see Lipset, The 
First New Nation, p p . 110-22 et passim. Of course, to a lesser degree 
equal i ty is also the »official« G e r m a n ideal, a l though conserva t ive 
leaders upho ld bes ide it the no t ion of Leistungsgemeinschaft (i.e., a 
c o m m u n i t y of those w h o are differentiated in status by abili ty). 
130) An ind ica tor for the degree to which open conflict exists is the n u m -
b e r of civil suits tha t elite m e m b e r s file against each o ther . Ra re is the 
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G e r m a n elite m e m b e r w h o at any one t ime is no t involved in some 
k i n d of suit for damages , l ibel, or s lander . Fo rma l cour t action has to 
subs t i tu te for m o r e in formal m e c h a n i s m s of social con t ro l . 
131) Fo r fu r the r in fo rmat ion , see the con t r ibu t ion by the head of the Of-
fice for t h e Prosecut ion of Nazi Cr imes , F r i t z Bauer , »Just iz als 
S y m p t o m , « in Rich te r (ed.), Bestandsaufnahme, p p . 221-32. 
132) T h e chang ing no t ions of publ ic op in ion in G e r m a n y and specifically 
of t he role of the »masses« in political process h a v e been d o c u m e n t e d 
by Jürgen H a b e r m a s , Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Neuwied , 
1962). 
133) Ever s ince the found ing of t he Federal Repub l i c the re has been a 
p o p u l a r major i ty for r e i n t r o d u c i n g capi tal p u n i s h m e n t ; for at least a 
decade a ma jo r i t y of the popu la t ion has advoca ted an end to all in-
ves t igat ions about Nazi c r imes ; a major i ty is against foreign aid and 
against social-welfare p a y m e n t s to foreign worke r s . These major i t i es 
were repor ted by opin ion polls , and occasionally a poli t ician did try to 
play on the sen t imen t s recorded here ( K o n r a d A d e n a u e r for one) , but 
by and large pol i t ic ians have resisted this t e m p t a t i o n . T h e au tho r s of 
t h e Basic Law del iberately excluded plebisc i tar ían e l emen t s and in 
do ing so referred to the exper iences wi th direct democracy in the 
W e i m a r Repub l i c . 
134) T h e first case (democracy as a b r a i n c h i l d of a des t ruc t ive l ibera l i sm) 
has been a rgued by some m e m b e r s of the Abendländische Akademie; 
t h e second posi t ion ( G e r m a n y needs a G e r m a n form of democracy) is 
often argued by those w h o bel ieve tha t the G e r m a n charac te r is ill-
sui ted for se l f -government . T h e s imilar i ty in a r g u m e n t a t i o n to some 
of the pos twar A m e r i c a n analyses of G e r m a n society is obvious . 
135) T h i s uneas iness e rup ted in to an issue du r ing the last election cam-
pa ign , when Chance l lo r E r h a r d vilified wr i te rs and art is ts w h o did 
vo lun tee r service for Willy Brand t . Fo r the G e r m a n n o t i o n s of intel-
lectuals , see M. Ra ine r Lepsius , »Kr i t ik als Beruf: Z u r Soziologie der 
In te l l ek tue l l en ,« Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsycho-
logie, XVI (1964), 75-91. 
136) F o r an analysis of earl ier cond i t ions , see T h e o d o r Geiger , Demokratie 
ohne Dogma: Die Gesellschaft zwischen Pathos und Nüchternheit 
( M u n i c h , 1963). 
137) Lou i s Edinger , » P o s t t o t a l i t a r i a n Leade r sh ip : Elites in the G e r m a n 
Federa l Republ ic ,« American Political Science Review (March , 1960). 
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